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ABSTRACT
Truth-Value Gaps in Natural Language
(May, 1980)
James H. Waldo, B.S.
,
University of Utah
M.A., M.A., University of Utah
Ph.D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Terence Parsons
The bulk of this work is an attempt to deal with
sentences such as "The theory of relativity is shiny,"
which are called category mistakes by philosophers and
sortally incorrect sentences by linguists.
In the first chapter, I argue that the deviance of
these sentences cannot be based on purely syntactic
characteristics (as proposed by Chomsky ( 1965 )) or merely
by appeal to Grician maxims of conversation, and that any
account of such sentences must be given in the semantic
component of a grammar for a language.
In the second chapter, a number of alternative
semantic accounts of such sentences are investigated, in-
cluding the bivalent system proposed by Bergmann (1977),
the four-valued system developed by Martin (1975), and
the truth-value gap semantics advocated by Thomason (19"2).
IX
After showing that all of these systems fail to adequately
treat quantification, I argue that, while the differences
in the approaches can be traced to disagreements so fun-
demental that no one oi them can be chosen on the grounds
of adequately accounting for the data, the type of approach
taken by Thomason is preferable to the others on the
theoretical grounds of simplicity and generality.
In the third chapter, I develop a truth-value gap
semantics for a fragment of English which includes both
sortally correct and sortally incorrect sentences using
the formal devices of partial functions, supervaluations,
and sorted quantification which evaluates simple sortally
incorrect sentences ab being neither true nor false, retains
the classical truths of logic, and avoids the problems had
by Thomason's system concerning quantification.
In the fourth chapter, I show how the semantics
developed in the third chapter can be applied to the
seemingly unrelated problem of discourse concerning fic-
tional objects. Using the theory of nonexistent objects
developed by Parsons (1978) as a point of departure, I show
how this theory can be both simplified and enriched by
the use of a truth-value gap semantics.
x
Xn the final chap ^er, I discuss the effect accepting
such a semantic framework has on our view of language; the
relationship between this type of semantics and claims
concerning the psychological reality of linguistic theories;
and the possibilities of applying such a semantic theory
to the investigation of metaphor.
xi
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CHAPTER I
FOUNDATIONS
Introduc tion .
The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation
for the investigation of the semantics of sortally incor-
rect sentences. In the lirst section of this chapter, we
will look at a number of examples of sentences which are
considered to be sortally incorrect, and at a variety of
attempts to explain what it is about these sentences which
makes them odd. In the second section, we will look at
some accounts of sortally incorrect sentences based on one
of these explanations, namely, at attempts which treat
sortally incorrect sentences as strings which aren't really
sentences at all, but rather syntactically deviant
strings. It will be argued that these accounts are flawed;
part of that argument will attempt to show that sortally
incorrect sentences are grammatical strings whose deviance,
therefore, cannot be traced to syntactic considerations.
In the third section of the chapter, we will look at
a sketch of a theory which treats the deviance of sortally
incorrect sentences as a pragmatic feature. On such an
account, sortally incorrect sentences are grammatical and
are interpreted in much the same way that other grammatical
1
2sentences are interpreted, but are odd because they are
never an appropriate part of any conversation. Such a
theory will not be objected to because it is inadequate,
but it will be argued that such a theory is incomplete in
that it never specifies how to interpret these sentences.
The conclusion of the chapter will be that some sem-
antic account of sortally incorrect sentences must be given
in an adequate theory of language. This sets the stage for
Chapters II and III, which discuss what such a semantic
account should look like.
Preliminaries .
Just what kinds of sentences are sortally incorrect?
If all we want are examples, we are in no trouble, as the
philosophical and linguistic leterature abound with sen-
tences authors claim to be sortally incorrect. A sampling
of the literature gives us, as a preliminary list, the
sentences
:
1.1) This stone is now thinking about Vienna
(Carnap (1937). P- 5)
1.2) My kangaroo is the fifth day of the week
(Passmore ( 1961 ), p. 141)
1.3)
Ceasar is a prime number (Reichenbach (1947),
3P-7)
1.4) Quadriplicity drinks procrastination (Russell
(1940)
,
p. 166)
1.5) Saturday is in bed (Ryle (1953), p. 75)
1 . 6 ) The number 5 weighs more than the number 6
(Drange (1966), p. 11 )
1.7) The theory of relativity is shiny (Waldo ( 1979 ),
P- 311)
1 . 8 ) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously (Chomsky
(1957), p. 15)
1.9) The spooky forest frightens the potato (Katz
( 1964a)
,
p . 413)
1.10) My toothbrush is pregnant (McCawley (1971),
p. 219)
The list could be extended, but it is certainly long
enough to give us the flavor of sortal incorrectness.
There does seem to be a definite pattern here, something
all these sentences have in common which makes them bi-
zarre . Just from the list we can feel reasonably confident
that the sentence:
1.11) The taste of lemon is breakable
is a sortally incorrect sentence , while the string
1.12) Was well today they may my
4while certainly deviant, is not a sortally incorrect sen-
tence (or, in fact, a sentence at all).
But when we come to attempts to characterize sortally
incorrect sentences or say what it is that makes such sen-
tences bizarre or deviant, the unanimity found when we
look for examples disappears. Few people who have written
about such sentences agree as to why these sentences are
bizarre; indeed, there is not even unanimous agreement
among these authors on whether or not sortally incorrect
sentences are even sentences.
So our first task is to look at some of the proposals
concerning the status of sortally incorrect sentences and
what goes wrong in such sentences. By getting such an
overview of the approaches to this problem, we will be able
to see some of the options open for dealing with them.
The first contemporary philosopher to discuss these
sentences at any length was Gilbert Ryle, who called such
sentences "category mistakes." This notion plays a central
role in Ryle's criticism of dualistic theories of mind and
body, as Ryle (1968) claims that such theories "are a mis-
take of a special kind ... namely , a category mistake" (p
.
17 )
.
This remark is somewhat confusing in the present context,
as it is a claim that theories, not sentences are category
5mistakes. However, a plausible reading of Ryle is to
take him to be claiming that the sentences which express
dualistic theories of mind and body are (at least some of
them) category mistakes. 1 By reading Ryle in this way we
can say that the sorts of things he would call a category
mistake is the sort of thing we are calling a sortally
incorrect sentence.
Prior to defending his view that dualistic theories
are all category mistakes, Ryle attempts to "indicate what
is meant by the phrase ’category mistake (p . 16) He does
this by giving a series of examples. But this will hardly
help us in the current stage of our investigation, as we
have more than enough examples of category mistakes in
sentences 1.1)-1.10).
However, in another work Ryle (1953) does attempt to
give a general characterization of the notion of a category
mistake. "When a sentence is (not true or false but) non-
sensical or absurd," says Ryle,
. . .although its vocabulary is conventional and
its grammatical construction is regular, we say
that it is absurd because at least one ingredient
expression in it is not of the right type to be
coupled or to be coupled in that way with the
other ingredient expression or expressions in
it. .
.
(Ryle(1953)
.
p. 75)
Ryle follows this explanation with the following three
6examples of what he takes to he sentences which commit
category mistakes:
1.13) I am now lying
1.14) "He tero logical" is he terological
1.5) Saturday is in bed
Whether 1.13) or 1.14) are sortally incorrect sentences or
are examples of some other sort of problem is an issue I do
not want to address in this work. However, 1 . 5 ) is
clearly the type of thing we want to count as a sortally
incorrect sentence.
While this account by Ryle provides us with more than
just some examples and does deal with sentences, it is
still not much help in determining in a general way what
sentences are to count as sortally incorrect. Ryle does
not provide us with any tests for determining the type of
ingredient expressions of a sentence, nor does he offer an
account of what type combinations are such that they
result in sentences which are sortally incorrect. Instead,
we are left with a criteria of sortal incorrectness or
category mistakes which relies on our intuitions concerning
the types of sentence ingredients, and these intuitions
seem far from clear.
But this passage does provide us with what Ryle takes
7to be two central characteristics of sortally incorrect
sentences or category mistakes. First of all, Ryle con-
siders such sentences to be grammatical sentences of
English. Secondly, Ryle claims that such sentences are
neither true nor false, but rather "nonsensical or absurd."
Whether Ryle takes "nonsensical or absurd" sentences to
have some truth-value other than true or false or to be
something else is not clear.
Theodore Drange (1966) agrees with Ryle concerning
the grammatical status of sortally incorrect sentences,
but disagrees with Ryle as to the truth-value of such
sentences. Sortally incorrect sentences, which Drange
calls "type crossings," are grammatical sentences which
are false; in fact, says Drange, such sentences are
"synthetic a priori falsehoods" ((1966), p. 212).
Drange draws a distinction between simple type
crossings and complex type crossings. The examples of
sortally incorrect sentences seen earlier, sentences 1.1)-
1.10), are all examples of simple type crossings according
to Drange. An example of a complex type crossing given
by Drange is
1 . 15 ) That thing is green and a prime number
A simple type crossing, says Drange, is a sentence "which
8ascribes to something, x, a property with which the type
associated is a class to which x does not belong, "(p. 212)
.vnile a complex type crossing is a sentence "whose trans-
xa tion into the language of symbolic logic applies to a
variable two properties at least one of which has assoc-
iated with it a type none of whose members has the other
property" (p. 212). Further, according to Drange
, type
crossings are "conceptually meaningless" as well as false,
in that sentences which are type crossings are such that
"we cannot understand what it would be like of it to be
true" (p . 204)
.
Drange ' s view will be examined in more detail in
Chapter II; for the purposes of this overview it will be
sufficient to note how he characterizes sortaily incorrect
sentences. Such sentences, according to Drange, are
syntactically sentences of a language, but are sentences
of the language which are always false . The deviance of
such sentences can be attributed to the fact that these
sentences are conceptually meaningless. Further, on
Drange
' s view sortal incorrectness is intimately tied to
reference, as the characterizations of both simple and
complex type crossings are given in terms of properties and
the things which are said to have those properties rather
9Than in terms of the ways in which words of the language
are combined.
A rather different approach to sortally incorrect
sentences is taken by Richmond Thomason (1972) in a recent
attempt to account for sortally incorrect sentences. Thom-
ason begins his investigation by noting that sentences like
1-16) The color of copper is forgetful
are deviant in a way which "is not conveniently explained
by grammatical considerations," and that in the case of
such sentences "it's natural and plausible to say that the
deviation arises from the application of the predicate
to something of the wrong sort" (( 1972 ) ,p . 209)
.
While
Thomason wishes to give a theory which will account for
such sentences, he states that "there will be no attempt
to extend the distinction between sortally correct and
sortally incorrect sentences to all sentences, however
complex, nor will the distinction ever appear as an
essential part of the theory" (p. 209). Instead, Thomason
regards the distinction between sortally correct and sort-
ally incorrect sentences as "informal, part of the data to
be explained rather than the explanation" (p. 209).
So far, except for his refusal to make the notion of
sortal incorrectness a central part of his theory, Thom-
10
ason looks much like Drange
. Both say that sortally
incorrect sentences are grammatical, and both say that the
deviance of such sentences is the result of a mismatch
between the predicate and the subject of a sentence. How-
ever, when it comes to the truth-value of such sentences,
Thomason returns to the line taken by Ryle, saying that
simple sortally incorrect sentences are neither true nor
false. In fact, Thomason goes beyond F.yle by stating that
simple sortally incorrect sentences have no truth-value
at all.
A very different approach from the ones we have seen
thus far is taken by Noam Chomsky ( 1965 ).^ According to
Chomsky, what we have been calling sortally incorrect
sentences are not, strictly speaking, really sentences at
all. Rather, strings like 1.1) -1.11) are ungrammatical
strings which will not be generated by a set of syntactic
rules in an optimal grammar of English. We are fooled into
thinking that these strings are sentences because the
syntactic rules which must be violated to produce such
strings are, in a sense to be made precise, lower level
rules than those which must be violated to produce such
strings as 1.12), which are clearly ungrammatical strings.
Chomsky is even willing to say that we can order the rules
11
of the syntax in terms of levels in such a way as to allow
us to say that sortally incorrect sentences are "more
grammatical" then word salad strings like 1.12), and hence
ohat we could consider sortally incorrect sentences to be
semi-grammatical." But the important aspect of Chomsky's
account is his claim that sortally incorrect sentences are
syntactically deviant. This claim clearly marks a differ-
ence between Chomsky's approach and that of Ryle, Drange
,
and Thomason. Because he considers sortal incorrectness
to be a syntactic phenomenon, Chomsky will account for
these strings without reference to the semantics of a
language. Hence Chomsky's account of sortal incorrectness
is based on properties of words and the way words are put
together rather than on properties and objects which are
the referents of those words.
An approach somewhat between that taken by Chomsky and
that taken by Ryle, Drange, and Thomason is put forward
by Jerrold Katz (1964a). Katz agrees with Chomsky that
the sentences we are calling sortally incorrect are in
fact ungrammatical strings which will not be produced by
an adequate syntax of English. However, Katz argues that
we must have some semantic treatment of these strings. His
reason for this is different from the reasons Drange and
12
Thomason give for requiring a semantic treatment of such
sentences. Since Drange and Thomason consider sortally
incorrect sentences to be grammatical, the semantic treat-
meant of such sentences which they give must show how and
why these sentences are deviant. Katz accounts for the
deviance of these strings on syntactic grounds, but re-
quires that some semantic analysis be given for these sen-
tences which will explain why these strings seem to make
some sort of sense. So, on Katz's view, some semantic
analysis of sortally incorrect sentences must be given to
distinguish these "semi-sentences" from the word salad
sentences like 1.12) which, while also ungrammatical, are
also uninte rp re table
.
While we have not looked at all the authors who have
discussed sortally incorrect sentences, our brief look at
some of these authors has shown considerable diversity in
the way these sentences are handled. It is not difficult
to establish a general typology of these approaches. A
major division can be made between those approaches which
claim that strings like 1.1) -1.11) are ungrammatical
strings and hence are syntactically deviant, and approaches
which claim that the strings are fully grammatical sen-
tences of English whose deviance is to be explained sem-
13
antically
. Among approaches of the first kind we can
further distinguish between those that say nothing about
hew these strings are to be interpreted, such as the theory
given by Chomsky, and those which attempt to say something
aoout the semantics of such strings, such as the theory
gi /en by Katz. Among the theories which claim that sort-
ally incorrect sentences are grammatical, we can distin-
guish between those like that given by Drange
,
which say
that all such sentences are false and hence attempt to
account for such sentences in a semantics which is
traditionally bivalent; and those like Thomason’s,
which claim that such sentences are neither true nor false,
thus requiring a non-bivalent semantic treatment.
An approach which differs from all of these has been
referred to by some authors (for example, Thomason (1972))
without ever having actually been espoused. On this
approach, sortally incorrect sentences are treated as
syntactically grammatical and semantically non-deviant.
The seemingly deviant nature of these strings is accounted
for on this approach on pragmatic grounds. On this
approach, sortally incorrect sentences are deviant because
there are no contexts in which such a sentence can be
used, that is, any use of such sentences violates some
14
conversational maxim governing the use of language.
Clearly, which of the above approaches we decide to
adopt will to a large extent dictate or be dictated by what
we take the root cause of sortal incorrectness to be. If
we say such strings are grammatical but semantically
deviant, we commit ourselves to the view that sortal
incorrectness is conditioned by the things which are talked
about by the language rather than a feature of the language
itself. If, instead, we take an approach which begins by
saying that strings like 1.1)
-1.11) are ungrammatical, we
are committed to the view that sortally incorrect sentences
are products of words and language. Finally, if we say
that sortally incorrect sentences are only pragmatically
deviant, the phenomena of sortal incorrectness will be
a feature not of language or of the things talked about
with the language but a feature of the way language is
used
.
It could be that there are arguments which would show,
independently of any theory, which of these approaches is
the correct approach. Unfortunately, if there are any
such arguments I don't know them. So the way that we will
proceed is to look at various theories which proport to
deal with sortally incorrect sentences in the hope that we
15
can determine, on the basis of the adequacy of the theories
based on each approach, which approach is to be preferred.
Syntactic Accounts of Sortal Incorrectness
.
In this section, we will look at two accounts of
sortal incorrectness which are based on the intuition that
sortally incorrect sentences are not sentences at all, but
rather are ungrammatical strings. The first account, which
we will look at in some detail, was offered by Noam
Chomsky (1965). The second account, which can be viewed
as either a revision or an extension of the Chomsky
account, was proposed by Jerrold Katz ( 1964a). Some of
the criticisms we will look at are directed specifically
against certain features of these systems. Other critic-
isms we will see in this section are more general in that
they proport to show that no syntactic account of sortally
incorrect sentences is possible.
Chomsky’s account of sortally incorrect sentences is
given within a particular framework of transformational
generative grammar which has become known as the "standard
theory" of transformational grammars. Such a grammar is
"a system of rules that can iterate to generate an in-
definitely large number of structures;" (Chomsky (1965),
16
p. 16) these structures will correspond to the sentences
°“ lanSuaSe accounted for by the grammar. The rules
of a transformational generative grammar can be separated
into three sets or components: a phonological component,
which "determines the phonetic form of a sentence generated
by the syntactic rules"; a syntactic component, which
specifies an infinite set of abstract formal objects,
each of which incorporates all information relevant to a
single interpretation of a particular sentence"; and a
semantic component, which "determines the semantic inter-
pretation of a sentence" (p. 16) . Most of the interesting
work in such a grammar is done by the syntactic component,
which specifies for each sentence of the language a deep
structure which is directly interpreted by the semantic
component and a surface structure which is interpreted
directly by the phonological component.
Two sorts of rules can be distinguished in the syn-
tactic component of a grammar. One group, the base rules,
"generate a highly restricted (perhaps finite) set of base
strings, each with an associated structural description"
(p. 17). The other rules of the syntactic component will
be the transformational rules, which are used in "genera-
ting a sentence, with its surface structure, from its
17
oasis" (p. 17). For our purposes we can simplify this
organization of the grammar by ignoring the transform-
ational component of the syntax (or restricting our grammar
to a
- ragrcent which has only an identity transformation)
.
While this is a massive oversimplification of the grammar
given in Chomsky's theory, it is one which will not
t either his account of sortally incorrect sentences
or our criticisms of that account.
The base of a syntactic component will generate
simple phrase markers; these can be represented by the
familiar "tree diagrams" of linguistics. Such phrase
markers are "based on a vocabulary of symbols that includes
both formatives (the, boy
,
etc.) and category symbols (S,
NP
,
V, etc.)"(p. 15)- The rules which are used to generate
phrase markers are rewriting rules, which Chomsky defines
as rules of the form
. . .A - Z/X Y
where X and Y are (possibly null) strings of
symbols, A is a single category symbol, and
Z is a nonnull string of symbols. This rule
is interpreted as asserting that the category
A is realized as the string Z when it is in the
environment consisting of X to the left and Y
the the right... (p. 66)
While Chomsky allows for the specification of an appropi-
ate environment in the definition of the form of rewrite
rules, all the rules we will look at will operate in any
18
environment, that is, they will be context free rewrite
rules where X and Y are both null.
At this point an example is in order. If we have the
category symbols S (sentence), NP (noun phrase), VP (verb
phrase), Aux (auxilary), N (noun), V (verb), M (modal),
and Det (determiner; and the formatives boy
, frighten ,
.
9
-
nce gi an<3 the
,
we could make a base component with
the following rewrite rules:
1.17) S - NP~Aux~VP
VP - V~NP
NP - De t"'N
NP - N
Aux - M
M - may
N -* sincerity
N -» boy
V - frighten
Det - the
Given this as a base component, we can generate the phrase
marker represented by the diagram
19
1.18)
sincerity
M V
may frighten
which would be a representation of the deep structure of
the sentence
1.19) Sincerity may frighten the boy
The problem of sortal incorrectness comes up even at
uhio simple stage
,
lor not only can we generate the phrase
structure represented by 1.18) using the rules in 1.17), we
can generate the phrase structure represented by
1 . 20 )
incorrect sentence
1.21) The boy may frighten sincerity
Thus early on in his account Chomsky must attempt to deal
with the problem of sortal incorrectness, as even so simple
. 4
a syntax as 1.17) generates sortally incorrect sentences.
20
Chomsky begins his account of sortally incorrect sen-
tences by noting that strings like 1.21) do not seem to be
deviant in the same way as a string like
1.22) sincerity frighten may boy the
which he takes to be a string which is the result of clear
cut violations of purely syntactic rules. Further, the
deviance of sortally incorrect sentences is not, on
Chomsky's view, of the same .type as the deviance of a
sentence like
1.23) Oculists are generally better trained than
eye -doc tors
a deviance Chomsky takes to be purely semantic
.
The device Chomsky introduces to account for the
deviance of sortally incorrect sentences is what he calls
"selectional features." These features are analogous to
the distinctive features used in phonological theory. In
phonological theory, each lexical item is represented by
a matrix of features which taken together determine the
phonological realization of that lexical item. In an
analogous way, says Chomsky, "each lexical formative is
represented [in the deep structure] by a distinctive
feature matrix" (( 1965 ). p. 81). This distinctive feature
matrix will serve as input to lexical insertion rules.
21
Chomsky then introduces a new sort of rule into the syn-
tactic component of the grammar, which he calls "selec-
tional restrictions." These rules, in effect, constitute
restrictions on the generative capacity of the rules in
a grammar like 1.1?)-- they will state restrictions on
such rules so that not every lexical item of a certain
syntactic category can be put together by the rules of
the grammar with every other lexical item in another
category. For two lexical items of appropriate categories
to be put together by a syntactic rule, certain conditions
concerning the feature matrices of those lexical items
will have to be met.
To see how this theory works, we can show how it would
account forthe deviant nature of sentence 1.21). We
first need to add to the rules of 1.17) a lexicon which
stipulates the feature matrix associated with each of the
formatives. We will use the lexicon supplied by Chomsky:
1.24) ( sincerity
,
_4-N, -f-Det
,
-Count, 4-Abstract,
• •
.])
( boy , [+N, 4-Det , +Count, 4-Animate , 4-Human,
. .
.])
( frighten , [+V,+ NP , 4-[ 4-Abstrac t] Aux
Det [-(-Animate]
,
4-Object Deletion,...])
22
( may
,
[+M,
. .
.]
)
(Chomsky ( 1965 ), p. 107)
j'le can read the selectional features given by this lexicon
in the following way. The features for sincerity tell us
that the word is in the syntactic category of Noun, can
occur after a determiner, is not a count noun and is
abstract. The features of frighten tell us that it is a
verb, occurs before a noun phrase, can take an abstract
subject and an animate object, and can undergo the trans-
formation "object deletion" (which is not a part of our
fragment of the grammar)
.
By supplimenting the grammar of 1.17) with these fea-
tures and the appropriate selectional restriction rules,
we can block the generation of sentence 1.21). In 1.21),
the verb frighten occurs with a subject which has the
feature "-(-Abstract." But the features of the lexical item
frighten are such that they do not allow the verb to occur
In the frame "[+Animate _! Aux [-(-Abstract]," in fact, the
feature specification might well specifically exclude such
a frame of occurence. If not, such a frame will certainly
be excluded by the selectional restrictions which are rules
of the grammar. So 1.21) can only be generated in a
Chomsky-style syntax with selectional features and restric-
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tions if we violate certain rules. The rules that are
violated or relaxed in generating these strings are not as
central to the syntax as those which appear in 1 . 17 )
,
hence uhe result of violating such rules is not a string
which is ungrammatical in the sense that the string 1.22)
^s ungrammatical. But the generation of strings like 1.21)
does require the violation of some syntactic rules, hence
Chomsky labels such strings as "semi-ungrammatical." All
so rtally incorrect sentences will require the violation
of some selectional rules to be generated, hence all such
strings are at best semi-grammatical. Thus this way of
dealing with sortally incorrect sentences requires that
Chomsky develop a notion of "degrees of grammaticality .
"
This notion is basically that strings which can be gen-
erated by a grammar by violating or relaxing rules con-
cerning selectional restrictions are more grammatical than
those which can be generated only by violating or relaxing
rules which do not concern selectional restrictions, but
only broader grammatical categories. Both sorts of strings
are less grammatical than strings which can be generated
by the grammar without violating or relaxing either sort
of rule
,
and it is only members of this last group which
can be claimed to be genuine sentences of a language.
Stepping back for a moment, we can pick out two
central characteristics of the Chomsky account. The first
of these, which will be shared by any attempt to account
for sortally incorrect sentences in the syntactic component
of a grammar, is that sortally incorrect sentences are at
least to some degree ungrammatical, that is, that they are
in some sense not well formed strings of the language.
Thus the rules which constitute the syntactic component
of the grammar of the language should not, when they are
strictly adhered to, generate such strings. The second
feature of the Chomsky account, which may or may not be
shared by other syntactic accounts of sortal incorrectness,
is the mechanism which blocks the generation of such sen-
tences--the lexical items are assigned selectional feature
matricies which dictate what lexical items can be combined
with what other lexical items by the syntactic rules of
the grammar to produce sentences of the language
.
It is not suprising that proponents of the view that
sortally incorrect sentences are semantically deviant
grammatical sentences of a language criticise the syntac-
tically based account of sortal incorrectness offered by
Chomsky. Theodore Drange (1966) considers Chomsky's
claim that sortally incorrect sentences, which he calls
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type crossings, are semi-grammatical, and rejects the
view because
. . .The sentence structure of type crossings
is the same as that of clearly meaningful sen-
tences. But clearly meaningful sentences do
not have the property of being "less grammatical
than" anything else. Hence, type crossings could
not have that property, either ...(( 1966 )
,
p
.
5^)
The argument Drange is presenting in the above passage can
be made explicit by charting it out in the following way.
His main argument is:
1.25) Sortally incorrect sentences are fully gram-
matical
1 . 26 ) No fully grammatical sentence is less gram-
matical than any other fully grammatical
sentence
1.27) Therefore, sortally incorrect sentences are not
less grammatical than any other fully grammat-
ical sentence .
This argument is obviously valid, and just as obviously
the soundness of the argument depends on the truth of
1.25)
•
if Drange can show that sortally incorrect sen-
tences are fully grammatical, he will have shown not only
that Chomsky's account of such sentences is in error, but
that any syntactic account of sortally incorrect sen-
tences which claims that such sentences are less than
26
fully grammatical is in error.
Drange offers two arguments which attempt to show that
^11 sortally incorrect sentences are grammatical. The
first of these, according to Drange, depends on the prin-
ciple that "since all clearly meaningful sentences are
grammatical, if a sequence can be transformed into a
clearly meaningful sentence without at all changing its
3 • ruc then the sequence must be grammatical" (p. 43 ).
Assuming this principle, Drange offers the argument:
1.28) All sortally incorrect sentences can be trans-
formed into meaningful sentences by substi-
tution of at least one noun or noun phrase for
another
1.29) Substitution of one noun or noun phrase for
another never results in a change of structure
1.30) Therefore, all sortally incorrect sentences
are grammatical
An immediate problem with this argument is the explicit
assumption that all meaningful sentences are grammatical.
This assumption, tying together the notions of semantic
anomalousness and syntactic deviance, is not one which
Chomsky must accept and indeed might will be rejected by
Chomsky. However, we can avoid this problem by recon-
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structing Drange ' s argument by replacing every occurence of
the phrase "clearly meaningful sentence" with the phrase
clearly grammatical sentence." Such a change would not
presuppose a connection between semantic deviance and
syntactic deviance, and would result in an argument which
I believe Drange would accept which would have 1 . 30 ) as
its conclusion.
Does the argument, so recast, show that sortally
incorrect sentences are grammatical? Clearly, the argument
is valid. So if we can show that the premises are true, we
will be able to reject any account of sortal incorrectness
which claims that such sentences are less than fully
grammatical
.
The principle as recast seems unobjectionable. It
now states that if a sentence can be transformed into a
clearly grammatical sentence without changing the struc-
ture of the sentence, then that sentence is grammatical.
This follows from the notion of grammaticality
,
which is
a property of the structure of a sentence. Nor can we
easily fault 1.28), for Drange has characterized sortally
incorrect sentences as sentences which can be transformed
into grammatical sentences in just this way. To go after
this premise would require that we find fault in Drange ' s
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characterization of sortally incorrect sentences. But we
don't have to go after 1.28) to reject this argument, for
x.29) is a statement which Chomsky would clearly reject.
Premise 1.29) states that the substitution of one
noun or noun phrase for another never results in a change
in the structure of a sentence. In effect, 1.29) claims
that the category of nouns or noun phrases are simple as
regards to sentential structure. But this is just what
Chomsky has denied in introducing selectional restrictions
into the grammar, for selectional restrictions are
features which subdivide grammatical classes such as noun
and noun phrase into groups which are different in syn-
tactically relevant ways. To be different in syntac-
tically relevant ways is to be such that substituting a
noun or noun phrase of one sub-category for a noun or
noun phrase of another sub-category does result in a change
of the structure of the sentence. So unless we have some
argument to establish the truth of 1.29)
»
the argument
which uses that as a premise against the treatment of
sortal incorrectness as a syntactic phenomenon simply begs
the question.
Drange does attempt to argue for 1.29), but unfort-
unately neither of the arguments he offers in support of
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uhat premise is sound. The first argument he offers is:
1.31) English expressions can be divided into
function expressions and content expressions
1*32) Only function expressions determine the
structure of a sentence
1.33) All nouns and noun phrases are content
expressions
1.3^0 Therefore, nouns and noun phrases do not
determine the structure of English expressions
Unfortunately, Drange justifies 1
.
31) -1 33 ) by an appeal
to the authority of current linguistic theory, specifically
citing Hockett as his authority. Since the time of the
Chomskian revolution in linguistics (and, more specific
ally, since the time at which Chomsky proposed the stand-
ard theory of transformational grammars) the weight of the
authority of linguistic theory is firmly against 1 . 31 )-
1.33). undercutting Drange ' s argument.
The second argument offered by Drange specifically
concerns the proposal to sub-divide the class of nouns
into classes which are syntactically dissimilar. "The
question arises," argues Drange,
. . .as to whether such a division of nouns is
purely arbitrary (or ad hoc ) or whether there
could be some basis for it. Certainly there is
a difference in type between a thought and, say,
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a hat. But is this a difference between gram-
matical structure or a difference between two
kinds of content words? ... There seems to be no
good reason to say that the difference is a
grammatical one ...(( 1966
)
,
p. 4?)
This argument fails for a number of reasons, not the least
of which is that it begs the question. If Chomsky's
account of sortally incorrect sentences is correct, then
there is a grammatical reason to differentiate between
classes of nouns. But even without the assumption that
Chomsky's account of sortal incorrectness is the right
account, there are distinctions such as number or, in
some languages, gender, which require a grammatical dis-
tinction between classes of nouns. Hence Drange '
s
second argument in support of 1.29) fails.
An alternative argument offered by Drange to show
that sortally incorrect sentences are grammatical is
1.35) The negations of sortally incorrect sentences
are true statements
1.36) True statements are grammatical
1 . 37 ) Any sequence is grammatical if its negation is
grammatical
1 . 33 ) Therefore, sortally incorrect sentences are
grammatical
The obvious weak point in this argument is 1.36)." Drange
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supports this claim by stating that "truth implies mean-
ingfulness implies grammaticality" (p. 50). It is the
second implication in this chain which Chomsky could reject
as he nowhere commits himself to the view that only gram-
matical strings are meaningful. In fact, the thrust of
the theory of semi-sentences given by Katz (1964a), which
/viil oe discussed below, is to show how certain ungram-
matical strings such as sortally incorrect sentences can
be given an interpretation in a Chomsky-style standard
theory. Without this connection between meaningfulness
and grammaticality and hence between truth and grammatic-
ality, Drange
' s argument falls apart.
In another discussion of sortally incorrect sentences,
Richmond Thomason (1972) offers some arguments directed
specifically against Chomsky's account of such sentences,
as well as some arguments against any syntactic account
of sortal incorrectness. Thomason's objection to Chomsky's
account is based on the added complexity that would be
required in the syntactic component of a language if that
component is to somehow exclude the generation of sortally
incorrect sentences. Specifically, this argument objects
to the complexity added to the syntactic component by the
introduction of selectional features and selectional
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restrictions. "There may be good syntactic reasons,"
Thomason admits,
...for classifying nouns according to whether
they are count, mass, or proper nouns, or
whether they take the pronouns "he," "she," or
it. But to exclude sortally incorrect sen-
tences... we will have to add a category of
"color. nouns" and a host of other equally
specific categories. Besides the previous
rules of syntax there will also have to be
rules projecting categories onto complex
expressions. Even if the task of formulating
these. rules were- a straightforward one, their
addition would constitute a considerable com-
plication to the grammar.
..( (1972)
,
p. 211-212)
Thomason concludes that given this level of added complex-
ity "it seems cruel or at least unsympathetic to burden
syntax with the task of disentangling sortally correct
from sortally incorrect sentences" (p. 211).
On the surface
,
this is not a very persuasive argu-
ment. However, I think that the most charitable inter-
pretation of this passage would read it as an attempt to
turn one of Chomsky’s own evaluation measures for grammars
against Chomsky's own theory. Chomsky's view is that one
of the features we need to strive for in constructing the
optimal grammar of a language is simplicity of the rule
system which constitutes that grammar. Thomason's point
seems to be that the account of sortally incorrect
sentences offered by Chomsky adds a whole new type of
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syntactic feature and a whole new set of syntactic rules to
the grammar in order to block the generation of sortally
incorrect sentences. By treating these sentences as
grammatical and accounting for their deviance in some
other component of the grammar, Thomason seems to be saying
that we can simplify the grammar, doing away with selec-
tional features and selectional restrictions.
Thomason s criticism is only devastating if simplic-
ity of the syntax is the major feature we are to use in
deciding which is the best grammar. Clearly this is not
a principle which Chomsky is committed to. Simplicity
certainly must take a back seat to the adequacy of the
grammar. So if sortally incorrect sentences are in fact
ungrammatical, any treatment of those sentences which
labels them as ungrammatical, no matter how complex, will
be more adequate in accounting for the data than any
(possibly simpler) account of those sentences which treats
them as non-grammatically deviant. Further, Chomsky
never meant simplicity to be a feature of only the syntax.
One is to choose the grammar which is overall the most
simple. If one can simplify the syntax only at the price
of adding tremendous complication to the semantic com-
ponent of a grammar, for example, the first grammar with
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the more complicated syntax will still be preferred on the
grounds that it is overall the simpler grammar. To make
the charge that treating sortally incorrect sentences as
grammatical will simplify the grammar as a whole, Thom-
ason must show that some other treatment results in a
total grammar which is more simple than the one proposed
by Chomsky, something which he has not done in his
argument.
Thomason seems to place more weight on his second
objection, which is directed at any attempt at treating
sortally incorrect sentences as syntactically deviant.
This argument is based on what Thomason labels the Prin-
ciple of Referentiality
,
which he formulates as:
1.39) The Principle of Referentiality : The only
feature of singular terms relevant to de-
termining sortal correctness in subject-
predicate sentences is their reference
Thomason argues for this principle by trying to show that
there could be no counterexample to it. Such a counter-
example would have to have the form of a sentence, "Pt"
,
which was sortally correct, with another sentence, "Ps"
which was sortally incorrect, where the object referred to
by "s" is the object referred to by "t". "Such an example
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cannot arise," argues Thomason, "because whatever reason
there is for the sortal incorrectness of 'Ps' will carry
°Ver 4:0 ,pt ' if ’s-t’ is true" ((1972), p. 212). Thomason
further claims that the Principle of Referentiality can be
extended to include definite descriptions as well as
singular terms.
Given the Principle of Referentiality
, Thomason
argues against any syntactic account of sortal incorrect-
ness in the following way. Consider the sentence
1.^0) What I am now thinking about is shiny
In contexts in which I am thinking about the theory of
relativity, the Principle of Referentiality dictates that
1.40) is sortally incorrect, as the sentence
1.41) The theory of relativity is shiny
is sortally incorrect and the referent of the phrase "what
I am now thinking about" in 1.40) is the same thing as
the referent of the phrase "the theory of relativity" in
1.41)
. But in contexts in which I am thinking about my
car, the Principle of Referentiality dictates that 1.40)
is sortally correct, as the sentence
1.42) My car is shiny
is sortally correct. The sortal incorrectness or correct-
ness of 1 .40)
,
therefore, is determined by the context of
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of use, specifically, the contextual determination of the
referent of the phrase "what I am now thinking about."
But context and reference are pragmatic and semantic
_eauures, not syntactic features; hence no purely syntactic
account of sortal incorrectness can possibly be correct.
Unfortunately, Thomason begs the question in this
argument. The circularity arises in his defense of the
Principle of Referentiality
. His defense of that principle
rested on his claim that no counterexample to the principle
was possible
,
for if a sentence "Ps" is sortally incorrect
and "s=t" is true then the sentence "Pt" will be sortally
incorrect for just the reasons the sentence "Ps" is
sortally incorrect. This only follows on the assumption
that the only factor which determines the sortal correct-
ness or incorrectness of a subject-predicate sentence
is the referent of the singular term in that sentence.
This presupposition simply is the Principle of Referent-
iality; if it is not assumed we have no justification for
the claim that "Ps" will be sortally incorrect for the
same reasons "Pt" is sortally incorrect if "s=t" is true.
In Thomason's defense, it should be noted that the
Principle of Referentiality is a reasonable principle if
we accept Thomason's characterization of sortal incorrect-
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ness, on which a sentence is sortally incorrect if it
predicates of an object a property of the wrong sort.
-his characterization is given in terms of the object and
the property referred to by the subject and predicate of
a sentence. Since sortal incorrectness, on this view,
depends on the referents of the words used in the sentence,
it should make no difference what words we use to refer
to that object or property, and hence the Principle of
Referentiality is justified. But Chomsky would certainly
deny the correctness of Thomason's characterization of
sortally incorrect sentences, as this characterization
precludes dealing with sortally incorrect sentences syn-
tactically. Thomason's characterization is based on the
idea that sortal correctness and incorrectness depends on
objects referred to by the words of a sentence, while
Chomsky takes sortal correctness or incorrectness to
to depend on the words themselves, regardless of the
referents of those words.
At this point, it should be noted that we have left
open *the question of whether or not sortally incorrect
sentences are to be considered as meaningful on Chomsky's
analysis. It will be recalled that the arguments against
treating these sentences as grammatical offered by Drange
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were rejected in part because those arguments presupposed
teat if we treat these sentences as ungrammatical we must
,reat i^hem as uninterpre table or meaningless. Chomsky
does not say much about this; in fact, the only remark he
makes is that "if interpre table at all, they [sortally
incorrect sentences] are surely not interpre table in the
manner of ^grammatical sentences^ ... rather
,
it seems that
interpretations are imposed on them by virtue of analogies
that they bear to non-deviant sentences" (( 1965 ), p. 76 ).
Thus
-/homsky leaves it open as to whether such sentences
are interpre table. But a variation of the Thomason argu-
ment we have just seen can be used to show that if
sortally incorrect sentences are to be treated as syntac-
tically deviant, they must also be treated as interpre table
.
Suppose that sortally incorrect strings are not only
ungrammatical but are also uninterpre table . Now again
consider the sentence
1.40) What I am now thinking about is shiny
In a situation in which I am thinking about my car, 1.40)
will have the same truth-value as the sentence
1.42) My car is shiny
that is, it will be true if my car is shiny and false if
my car is not shiny. Either way, 1.40) has a truth-value
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and hence an interpretation. Further, in this situation,
1 . 40 ) is a grammatical sentence. But now consider a sit-
uation in which I am thinking about the theory of relativ-
ity. In such a situation, 1.40) will have the same truth-
value as
1 . ^1 ) The theory of relativity is shiny
which is a paradigm sortally incorrect sentence. On our
beginning supposition, sortally incorrect sentences are
not interpretable; hence 1.41) will have no truth-value
and so 1.40) will have no truth-value and no interpret-
ation. Now we must ask whether 1.40) is grammatical in
cases in which it is uninterpre table . If it is not, then
we are in the situation of saying that sentence 1.40) is
grammatical in situations in which I am thinking about
my car and ungrammatical in situations in which I am
thinking about the theory of relativity. But this is
unacceptable, as this would mean that the supposedly purely
syntactic notion of grammaticality must be at least part-
ially determined by the pragmatic and semantic features
of a sentence, as 1.40) is grammatical or ungrammatical
depending on the reference of the phrase "what I am now
thinking about." So if we suppose that sortally incorrect
sentences are uninterpre table , we must also be committed
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to v ^ ew that some fully grammatical sentences are
uninterpre table
.
But if we hold that some fully grammatical sentences
are uninterpre table
,
we then must ask why we are treating
sortally incorrect sentences as ungrammatical. Since
we now allow fully grammatical sentences such as 1.40) to
be semantically or pragmatically deviant (and thus unin-
terpretable) we could just as easily allow that the sort-
ally incorrect sentence, 1.41), is also fully grammatical
but semantically or pragmatically deviant. In fact, we
could say that 1.41) is deviant in exactly the way 1.40)
is deviant when what I am thinking about is the theory
of relativity. Such an approach would have the advantage
of simplifying the grammar, in that no new devices would
have to be added to the semantic component of the grammar
to make the distinction between sentences which are
sortally incorrect and sentences which are sortally
correct. The distinction between the two sorts of sen-
tences could be made in the semantic component, which is
already required to be constructed in such a way that it
marks some fully grammatical sentences as uninterpre table
.
Further, this sort of approach would treat 1.40) and 1.41)
in exactly parallel ways in cases in which I am thinking
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acout the theory of relativity, marking both sentences as
grammatical but uninterpre table
; a result which has some
intuitive plausibility.
So it seems that Chomsky's account of sortal incor-
rectness is in trouble if Chomsky rejects the position
that sortally incorrect sentences are interpre table
. Now
vve must ask how these sortally incorrect and semi-gram-
matical strings are to be interpreted. Chomsky does give
a hint as to how he thinks such sentences are to be inter-
preted when he says that "interpretations are imposed on
them by virtue of the analogies that they bear to non-
deviant sentences" ( ( 1 9 6 5 ) » p- 76). While Chomsky does
not say how we are to do such interpretation by analogy,
Jerrold Katz (1964a) attempts to give a theory which
interprets sortally incorrect sentences in just this way.
Katz begins his account by offering the following-
preliminary definition of a semi-sentence:
1.43) "A string is a semi-sentence of the language
L iff it is not generated by an optimal
grammar of L and has sufficient structure to
be understood by the speakers of L" ((1964a),
p. 410)
Katz takes as his goal the construction of a theory which
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//ill capture the second feature of this definition, that
’
a theory which will tell us when an ungrammatical
string of a language has sufficient structure to he under-
stood by a native speaker of that language.
The theory presented is based on an explanation of
how speakers interpret semi-sentences. "A speaker knows,"
says Katz,
.
. .a system of rules that enables him to
associate a non-null set of grammatical sen-
tences with each semi-sentence. This assoc-
iation is performed on the basis of the struc-
ture that the semi-sentence has. And the
speaker's understanding of the semi-sentence
is nothing other than his understanding of the
sentences in the set with which the semi-
sentence is associated ...(( 1964a)
,
p. 411)
Katz labels the set of grammatical sentences with which a
semi-sentence is associated the comprehension set of that
semi-sentence; he calls the rules by which the association
is made transfer rules.
The system of transfer rules, as sketched by Katz,
will include at most one rule for each rule in the grammar.
The transfer rule which corresponds to an actual grammat-
ical rule will state a relaxation of the grammatical
rule such that, if we replace in the derivation or gener-
ation of a grammatical sentence the application of some
rule by the application of the corresponding transfer rule,
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the result is a semi-sentence. Associated with the set of
transfer rules will be a set of what Katz calls "traffic
rules. Traffic rules, in effect, restrict the combina-
tions of transfer rules which can be used to replace
actual rules of the grammar in generating a semi-sentence
in such a way that the application of transfer rules does
not produce a sentence which is both ungrammatical and
uninterpre table
.
To interpret a semi-sentence, according to Katz, we
must determine the comprehension set of that sentence.
Tne comprehension set of a semi-sentence will be determined
by some third component of the theory of semi-sentences.
This component will establish "a many-one mapping of
elements in SS [the set of semi-sentences! onto elements
in G(L) [the grammatical sentences of the language L] such
that the speakers understanding of ( l<i<n)[ €G( L) ! is a
possible way of understanding *S [the semi-sentence!"
((1964a), p. 412). The idea here is something like the
following. By backtracking the transfer rules used in a
derivation of a semi-sentence
,
we can replace those
transfer rules by the corresponding rules of the grammar,
generating a set of grammatical sentences, each of which
is a possible reading of the semi-sentence. To have a
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reading a semi-sentence must have a finite but non-null
number of semantically distinct grammatical sentences in
its comprehension set. If there is only one semantically
distinct sentence in a semi-sentence's comprehension set,
the semi-sentence is unambiguous; if there are n seman-
tically distinct sentences in the comprehension set of a
semi-sentence, the semi-sentence is n-ways ambiguous.
An example .given by Katz concerns the semi-sentence
1.44) The ball hit by the man
which, on the proposed transfer rule given by Katz, has in
its comprehension set the sentences
1.45) The man hit the ball
and
1.46) The ball was hit by the man
Since 1.45) and 1.46) are, according to Katz, paraphrases
of each other and thus not semantically distinct, the
semi-sentence 1.44) can be interpreted as having the same
meaning as sentences 1.45) and 1.46) if we assume that the
two grammatical sentences are the only members of the
semi-sentence’s comprehension set.
The above is only a brief sketch of Katz's proposal,
which in turn is claimed to be only a preliminary report
on how a theory of semi-sentences might be constructed.
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However, I think that the above sketch will suffice to
show that no theory of semi-sentences which attempts to
interpret those sentences by analogy to fully grammatical
sentences will ever be adequate as an account of how we
can interpret sortally incorrect sentences.
The first problem with such a theory is that it is not
a ^ clear that a sortally incorrect sentence like
1.4?) The taste of lemon is shiny
will have a finite comprehension set. The rule that must
be relaxed to get a transfer rule which would produce 1.4?)
would be along the lines of a rule on selectional restric-
tions. If we follow Chomsky the violated rule would state
that only noun phrases marked "^concrete" could appear in
the frame " is shiny" . But tracing back in our deriv-
ation and replacing the transfer rule with the proper rule
will either block the derivation of any sentence, on the
assumption that the lexical items inserted in the base
must remain the same; or will allow sentences such as
1.42) My car is shiny
1.48) Neptune is shiny
and many, many others, if we allow new lexical items at
the level of the base. On the first assumption, sortally
incorrect sentences like 1.47) will be uninterpre table , and
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all of the problems of the earlier arguments will arise
again. On the second assumption, we get a comprehension
set which tells us that one possible reading for 1.4?) is
1.48)
,
which is obviously absurd. Katz seems to have been
at leas t partially aware of this problem at the end of his
account, for he claims that further semantic work must be
done before a fully worked out theory of semi-sentences
can be given. In fact, when he returns to sortally in-
correct sentences in a later article (1964b), he treats
these sentences as "anomalous" sentences whose deviance is
totally semantic . We will see more of this theory in the
next chapter.
A second problem with the treatment of sortally in-
correct sentences as semi-sentences is that such an account
appears to get the status of such sentences backwards. On
the Katz theory, sortally incorrect sentences are strings
which are ungrammatical but fully interpre table . Yet if
anything is wrong with these strings, it does not seem to
be traceable to the way the words are put together but
rather to the assignment of meaning to the string. In
short, it seems that such sentences are more likely to be
candidates for the status of grammatical sentences which
are semantically deviant than they are for the status of
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ungrammatical "but semantically non— deviant.
This brings us to a criticism of Chomsky's theory
.vnich is hinted at in Thomason's first argument against
mhat account of sortal incorrectness, when Thomason states
that
...There may be good syntactic reasons for
classifying nouns according to whether they are
count, mass, or proper nouns... But to exclude
sortally incorrect sentences .. .we will have to
add a category of 'color nouns' and a host of
other equally specific categories ...(( 1972 )
,
p. 211)
Thomason o point does not seem to be very telling he^e
,
as
it is unclear in what sense a category like "concrete
noun" is more or less specific than a category such as
"count noun," which Thomason admits as a genuine syntactic
category. But Thomason does seem to be on to something
here, namely, that there seems to be a difference in kind
between the clearly syntactic features which separate
classes of words and the features which are used to separ-
ate words in accounting for sortal incorrectness.
One striking feature of the selectional restrictions
Chomsky cites is that they correspond exactly to charac-
teristics of the referent of the word. For example,
Chomsky tells us that the lexical item "sincerity" is
marked as "+abstract" while the lexical item "boy" is
marked "+ animate," "thuman," and presumably, "+concrete."
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These features, on Chomsky's theory, are merely syntactic
markers on the words themselves, and hence it is only
coincidence that the referent of the English word "sincer-
i ty is an abstract object while the referent of the
English word Doy is a set of things each of which is
animate
,
human, and concrete. But this seems to be an
implausible coincidence. Instead, it seems reasonable to
say that the selectional features of a lexical item are
determined by the referent of the lexical item, that is,
that the lexical item "boy" is marked with the selectional
features it has because it refers to objects which are
human, animate and concrete. If this is the case selec-
tional features which are used to block the generation of
sortally incorrect sentences are determined by reference,
which is a semantic feature. Hence such features ought
not to be taken as part of the syntactic component of the
language on a Chomsky-style theory which separates the
semantic and syntactic components of the grammar.
This criticism can be seen clearly if we consider a
hypothetical language, L*, which is syntactically exactly
like English, but which differs semantically from English
in the following way. The referent of the word "theory"
in L* is the same as the referent of the English word
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car," while the referent of the word "car" in L* is the
referent of the English word "theory." Other than that,
the two languages are semantically exactly alike. If we
^ollow Chomsky's account of sortal incorrectness and con-
sider sortally incorrect sentences to he deviant because
of syntactic considerations, the sortally incorrect sen-
tences of L* will be indistinguishable from those of
English
,
as the two languages have the same syntax.
Specifically, the sentence of L*
1.49) Some car is shiny
will be sortally correct, while the sentence of L*
1.50) Some theory is shiny
will be sortally incorrect. But 1.49) is the translation
of the sortally incorrect English sentence which looks
just like I.50). while I.50) is the translation of the
sortally correct English sentence which looks just like
1.49). Given the translation relation holding between the
sentences of L* and the sentences of English, it is
reasonable to say that it is 1.49), which says that an
• abstract object is shiny, which is sortally incorrect,
while I.50), which says of some concrete object that it is
shiny, is sortally correct. If this is the case, it
follows that sortal correctness or incorrectness is
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dependent on reference or meaning and is thus a semantic
feature, not a syntactic feature.
Much the same sort of criticism of syntactic accounts
of sortal incorrectness is made by James McCawley (1971).
McCawley oegins his discussion of sortal incorrectness by
noting that
...It is not clear that such [ selec tional]
restrictions, to the extent that they are
valid restrictions, have anything to do with
deep structures and lexical items rather than
with semantic representations and semantic items
that appear in them. If it in fact turns out that
"selectional restrictions" of all lexical items
are predictable from their meanings, then they
are not restrictions on how lexical items may
be combined but rather restrictions on how
semantic material may be combined ...(( 1971)
,
p. 218)
McCawley' s point here is something like the following.
Chomsky's theory of selectional restrictions, and in fact
any theory which treats sortally incorrect sentences as
syntactically deviant strings, holds that the features
which determine sortal correctness or incorrectness are
features of lexical items. However, if it can be shown
that these supposedly syntactic features are in fact pre-
dictable from the meanings of the lexical items, this would
be good evidence that the features which determine sortal
status are in fact tied to meanings rather than lexical
items and hence that sortal incorrectness is to be
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explained semantically rather than syntactically.
We have already seen some evidence that these selec-
oional
_Leatu.es can in fact be predicted by the meaning
cr a lexical item when we saw that there was a marvelous
correspondence between such selectional features of nouns
marked ^abstract or '-rhuman" and the fact that nouns
so marked refer to entities which are abstract or human.
McCawley notes that to falsify the thesis that selectional
restrictions can be predicted from the referent of a term
all that would be need are two words with the same meaning
which have different selectional features. Examples of
this sort have been proposed. But according to McCawley
careful investigation of the proposed cases shows that
the words claimed to be synonymous in fact differ in mean-
ing. For example, McCawley notes,
...one might propose defining the English verbs
kick
,
slap
,
and punch as "strike with the foot,"
"strike with the open hand," and "strike with
the fist," suggesting that they have the meaning
"strike" with different selectional restrictions.
However... in the bizarre situation in which a
person had been subjected to surgery in which
his hands and feet were cut off and grafted onto
his ankles and wrists, respectively, it would be
perfectly normal to speak of that person as kicking
someone with his fist or slapping someone with
his foot. This implies that the verbs refer to
the specific motion which the organ in question
performs and are thus not simply contextual variants
of strike... ((1971)* P- 218)
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McCawley considers another example from Japanese with the
same result. The proposed difference in selectional
restrictions can again be shown to actually be a differ-
ence in meaning. Thus there appears to be some reason for
saying that selectional restrictions are predictable from
meaning and hence based on semantic considerations, and
no clear cases of two lexical items which have the same
meaning but are such that the replacement of one of the
lexical items for another changes the sortal status of
some sentence. It should be noted that if this is indeed
the case, it provides us with new evidence in favor of
Thomason’s Principle of Referentiality
,
which in turn
gives new life to his argument against the possibility of
a syntactic account of sortal incorrectness.
McCawley presents a second argument designed to show
that at least some sortally incorrect sentences cannot be
treated as syntactically deviant. This argument is based
on the fact that "many so-called selectional restrictions
are actually not real restrictions, since ’violations' of
them are quite normal," (p. 219 ) specifically, such vio-
lations are normal in reports of dreams or beliefs.
McCawley gives a number of examples, among which are
1 . 51 ) I dreamed that I was a proton and fell in
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love with a shapely green-and-orange
-
striped electron
1 . 52 ) Harry thinks that his toothbruch is trying to
kill him
ouch sentences are, according to McCawley, clearly gram-
matical (although admittedly bizarre). Yet both 1 . 51 ) and
1.52)
violate the selectional restrictions postulated by
Chomsky, nence both 1.51) and I.52) should be ungrammatical
or at best semi-grammatical.
Actually, examples like I.51) and I.52) do not show
directly that there are grammatical sentences which vio-
late selectional restrictions. For neither I.51) nor
1 . 52
)
are themselves clearly sortally incorrect. Rather,
they are sentences which have as parts sentences which are
sortally incorrect. We cannot claim that the sentential
parts of a grammatical sentence are in all cases required
to be grammatical sentences themselves, for there are
sentences such as
1 . 53 ) One isn't speaking English when one says that
twas brillig and the slithey toves did gyre
and gimble in the wabe
which are grammatical sentences of English which contain
ungrammatical sentences as parts. But clearly McCawley
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not making the simple-minded claim that sortally in-
correct sentences are grammatical because such sentences
can appear as parts of grammatical sentences. Instead,
McCawley is pointing out that sortally incorrect sentences
can grammatically appear in positions which require a
grammatical sentence, such as in the reports of dreams or
beliefs
.
McCawley admits that someone who accepted a theory
like Chomsky's "might suggest that a person who says
thing's like
1.54) My toothbrush is alive and trying to kill me
observes different selectional restrictions than normal
people do" ((1971), p. 219). In effect, this would be to
say that such a sentence is grammatical for that person
because of a difference between that person's ideolect and
the standard dialect of English. But this sort of move
would be pointless, McCawley argues,
...since the difference in "selectional
restrictions" will correspond exactly to a
difference in beliefs about one's relationship
to inanimate objects. A person who utters
[1.54)7 should be referred to a psychiatric
clinic, not a remedial English course ...( (1971)
,
p.219)
So while one might claim that someone who did not consider
sortally incorrect sentences to be ungrammatical simply
had a non-standard syntax, such a claim would correspond
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exactly to that person having a standard syntax but a
non-standard view of the world which was related to that
syntax by that person's semantics.
McCawley s criticisms of syntactic approaches to
sortally incorrect sentences seem to cast grave doubt on
the adequacy of such an approach. It does appear that the
selectional features proposed by Chomsky are at least
predictable from the meaning of a lexical item if not
actually features of the referent of that lexical item.
If these features are predictable, it would seem to in-
dicate the possibility of a semantic treatment of sortally
incorrect sentences which would be simplier (since there
would be no need to duplicate the selectional restrictions
derived from the semantics in the syntactic component) and
hence, on Chomsky's own criterion of what makes a grammar
preferable, a semantic account would be preferable to the
syntactic account. If selectional features are actually
semantic, then an account which tries to make such
features syntactic is merely confused; again a semantic
account would be preferable. In either case, McCawley
has given evidence to support Thomason's Principle of
Referentiality
,
and hence the argument which Thomason
presented against syntactic accounts of sortal incorrect-
56
ness may again be put forward, now without circularity.
These criticisms, along with those seen earlier in
ms section, all point in the same direction: sortally
incorrect sentences are semantically deviant rather than
syntactically deviant. At best, these criticisms lead us
t0 re
.i
e ct attempts to account for sortally incorrect
sentences in the syntactic component of a grammar. At
worst we have a very strong motivation for attempting to
construct a theory of sortally incorrect sentences which
deals with such sentences semantically to enable us to
compare such a treatment with syntactic treatments we have
seen.
We will, therefore, leave syntactic accounts of
sortal incorrectness, and turn our attention in the next
chapter to attempts at dealing with sortal incorrectness
in the semantic component of a grammar. First, however,
we will briefly look at what could be called a pragmatic
approach to the problem.
A C onversational Account .
Having rejected the possibility of accounting for
sortally incorrect sentences in the syntactic component of
a grammar, we will now turn to an account which explains
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the deviant nature of these sentences by appealing to the
notion of maxims governing the general structure of con-
versation. It should be noted at the beginning of this
discussion that no such account of sortal incorrectness
has, to my knowledge, ever been fully articulated or
defended in the literature. However, it is not difficult
oO construct such an account from the principles governing-
conversation which have been argued for by a number of
authors, most noteably H.P. Grice ( 1972 ).
The guiding intuition underlying the study of con-
versational maxims is that "taling is a special case or
variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior" (Grice
( (1972)
,
p. 68) . The goal Grice sets is the discovery of
general principles which underlie this purposive behavior.
That such principles exist Grice takes to be shown by the
the fact that
. . .Our talk exchanges do not normally consist
of a succession of disconnected remarks, and
would not be rational if they did. They are,
characteristically, to some degree at least co-
operative efforts. Each participant recognizes
in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set
of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted
direction. This purpose or direction may be
fixed from the start. . . or it may evolve during
the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or
it may be so indefinite as to leave considerable
lattitude . . . But at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as
c onversa tionally unsuitable ...(( 1972 )
,
p. 66)
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1 1 is "the purpose of Grice's invest; iga.fi on to arrive at
the principles which determine which conversational moves
will be unacceptable in a given conversation.
Grice proposes one general principle governing con-
versation which he calls the Cooperative Principle, which
he formulates as
1.55) The Cooperative Principle ; Make your conver-
sational contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged.
Grice then proposes four maxims of conversation, which if
they are followed will lead to results which accord with
the Cooperative Principle. We can formulate these four
maxims as:
1.56) Make your contribution as informative as is
required (for the current purposes of the
exchange)
,
and do not make your contribution
more informative than is required.
1.57) Do not say what you believe to be false, or
that for which you lack adequate evidence.
1.58) Be relevant.
1.59) Be perspicuous.
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itfs could attempt to account four sontal incorrec tness
--l such a framework in the following way. Sortally in-
correct sentences are grammatical and are interpreted, but
they are sentences which are such that any utterence of
them will yeild a conversational act which does not follow
the Cooperative Principle. The deviant nature of sortally
incorrect sentences is not the result of the linguistic
features of the sentence, but is rather the result of the
lack of any possible use for such a sentence.
For example, consider the sentence
1.60) The taste of lemon is breakable
This sentence is clearly one we would want to call sort-
ally incorrect. On the conversational account of sortal
incorrectness hinted at above, the deviant nature of 1.60)
is explained by the lack of conversational contexts in
which that sentence would be appropriately uttered. Indeed
it is difficult to think of a conversation in which 1.60)
would count as a relevant remark. Thus sentence 1.60)
would seem to be such that any utterence of it would
violate one of the maxims of conversation, in this case
the maxim 1.58)- Further, sentence 1.60) and other sort-
ally incorrect sentences seem to be clear cases of
sentences which are not true, so even if they were rele-
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/ant to a conversation their utterence would seem to
violate maxim 1.57).
i.he above account is hardly a detailed theory of
mortal incorrectness as a conversationally based phenom-
enon, indeed, I have no idea how such a theory would be
de /eloped Deyond the above sketch. However, some import-
ant features of this kind of account can be stated without
working the theory out in any more detail. First, it
should be noted that on the conversational account sortally
incorrect sentences can be judged as both deviant and
grammatical, that is, their deviance is not a consequence
of their violating any syntactic rules of the language.
Secondly, a conversational account is neutral as to how we
are to interpret such sentences. Such an account would
seem to have to allow that such sentences are interpret-
able, as on this sort of account the deviance of such
sentences is pragmatic, not semantic. Beyond this restric-
tion, hov/ever, the theory favors no particular semantic
treatment of sortally incorrect sentences.
Thomason (1972) objects to a conversational approach
of dealing with sortally incorrect sentences on the
grounds that on any such account, "any assignment of
truth-values to category mistakes must be arbitrary, or
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else depend on an extraordinary and unexplained feature
of the English language" (p. 217). Such a criticism, I
chink, is fundementally misdirected. It is certainly
-rue that a Grician account says nothing about how we are
to ass ^-gn truth-values to sortally incorrect sentences, and
i L also true that on this kind of account sortally
incorrect sentences are pragmatically rather than semant-
ically deviant, and thus must be interpreted in some way.
But this interpretation will take place in the semantic
component of the grammar. It is thus not suprising that
the rules governing conversation do not have anything to
say about interpreting sortally incorrect sentences--
interpretation of such sentences is not one of the jobs of
this component. To criticise the conversatinal account
for this failure is like criticising the design of a
bicycle because following that design results in a bicycle
which can'
t
add.
However, even if we can account for the oddity of
sortally incorrect sentences by appeal to conversational
maxims which the utterence of such sentences violate, we
have not given a full account of these sentences. On the
conversational account sortally incorrect sentences must
be interpre table . The failure of the conversational
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account to give such an interpretation is not a drawback
_n that account, but the job of interpreting such sen-
tences must still be done. We must still give some account
in the semantic component of the language of sortally in-
correct sentences. The Grician account can tell us that
these sentences are never appropriate to a conversation,
perhaps because they add no information or because they
a -- always false. But we still need some semantic theory
which interprets sortally incorrect sentences in such a
way that they never add information or are always false.
At this point in our investigation the conclusions
we have reached have been largely negative. We first saw
that there are major problems inherent in any account of
sortally incorrect sentences which treats such sentences
as syntactically ill formed (ungrammatical) sentences. We
also saw that an attempt to account for sortally incorrect
sentences by claiming that such sentences violate conver-
sational maxims was incomplete, as such an account does
not provide any mechanism for interpreting such sentences
but holds that these sentences are interpre table . Thus
both accounts fail because they are not able to take into
account or explain semantic features of sortally incorrect
sentences. These facts are some evidence in favor of
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attempting to account for sortally incorrect sentences in
-ne semantic component of a grammar. We will now turn to
oome attempts to construct such a semantic account.
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Footnotes
--Chap ter I.
,
Actually, Ryle ( 1968 ) may not have taken sentences
,
? ^he sorts of . things which are category mistakes as13 exarnPles m this work leave the issue in doubt'. How-
° V
i
Qr
Y
0rk
-,
0
^
the notion of category mistakes
:
53/ he clearly claims that sentences are the thina's
which are category mistakes.
2Sentences 1.13) and 1.14) are both formulations ofGne
1
0G i^e c las sic paradoxes. Bergmann (1977) argues that
ouch sentences should be dis tinguished from category
mistakes or sortally incorrect sentences; she calls sen-tences like these "type mistakes." It is not clear to methat such a distinction can be made, but like her we will
a/oid the paradoxes in at least the quest for some sim-
plicity. If we wished to account for these paradoxical
sentences along the lines of the account of sortally
incorrect sentences we will present, we could try to do so
using as a base the work of van Fraassen ( 1970 ).
3mThe theory being ascribed to Chomsky here is not one
which he currently holds. However, this theory is the
only one I know of which specifically deals with sortally
incorrect sentences in the syntactic component of a
transformational grammar.
4
Actually, it may not be suprising that a simple
grammar produces sortally incorrect sentences, as one
might hold that the simplier and less constrained a grammar
the less likely it is that that grammar will make the
subtle syntactic distinctions needed to account for sort-
ally incorrect sentences.
'"Later, we will argue that premise 1.35) is also one
which should not be accepted. But we will postpone that
discussion, as even if we accept that premise Drange '
s
argument is flawed.
CHAPTER II
SEMANTIC ACCOUNTS OF SORTAL INCORRECTNESS
Introduction
.
In the las t chapter we saw that there are grave prob-
lems with attempts to account for sortally incorrect sen-
tences as syntactically deviant strings of a language, and
ohat attempts to account for the deviance of sortally in-
correct sentences by appeal to pragmatic rules surrounding
tne use of language rested on the assumption that such
sentences are to be interpreted without telling us how we
give such sentences their interpretation. This failure of
syntactic accounts and incompleteness of pragmatic accounts
along with various features of sortally incorrect sentences
noted in the arguments of that chapter lead to the con-
clusion that some sort of semantic account of sortally
incorrect sentences is necessary. We will begin our in-
vestigation of what kind of semantics is needed for such
an account in this chapter.
We will employ the following strategy. In the first
section, we will briefly discuss what constitutes a sem-
antic theory for a language
,
and point out the problems in
deciding what data need to be explained or accounted for
by a semantic theory for sortally incorrect sentences. In
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the following sections, we will look at a number of recent
proposals for a semantics of sortally incorrect sentences,
rhese theories will be laid out in as sympathetic a fashion
possible
,
we will pause only to note technical diffi-
culties in the theories as they arise. Some of these
technical problems will be major enough to cast grave
douots on the adequacy of the approach in question. How-
e/er, we will have a number of alternatives open after
looking at these proposals, none of which is clearly
preferable to the others on the grounds of accounting for
the data. The last section of this chapter will be devoted
to a discussion of which approach we should pursue.
Methodological Preliminaries
.
Before looking at proposals for how to give a seman-
tics for sortally incorrect sentences, we should say a few
things about what a semantics should look like and what we
want such a semantics to do. In this section we will
address two questions-- what is a semantic theory, and
what data concerning sortally incorrect sentences should
such a theory account for?
We will, in most of what follows, adopt the goals and
guidelines for a semantic theory laid out by Davidson (1975)
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and Lewis ( 1972 ). On the most basic level, a semantics for
a language will be a theory which describes and elucidates
the meanings of the words, phrases, and sentences of that
language. This is a rather vague description, which David-
son and Lewis attempt to make precise. The problem, as
stated by Davidson, is that "a theory of the semantics of
a natural language aims to give the meaning of every mean-
ingful expression, but it is a question what form a theory
should take if it is to accomplish this" ((1975), p. 18).
hot suprisingly, Davidson answers his own question, sug-
gesting that "a theory of truth for a language does, in
a minimal but important respect,
. . .give the meanings of all
independently meaningful expressions on the basis of their
structure" (p . 18 )
.
"By a theory of truth," continues Davidson, "I mean
a set of axioms that entail, for every sentence of the
language
,
a statement of the conditions under which it is
true" (p. 18 ). This connection between a semantics for a
language and a theory which specifies the truth conditions
for the sentences of that language is stated even more
explicitly by Lewis, who asserts that "semantics with no
treatment of truth conditions is not semantics" ((1972),
p . 169). 1
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Such systems of rules for determining the truth con-
ditions of the sentences of a language are familiar to
philosophers who work with model- theore tic semantics for
artificial languages using the techniques poineered by
Frege (1970), Tarski ( 1969 ), and Carnap ( 1937 ). Attempts
10 extend this technique to natural languages have been
made by a number of philosophers and linguists such as
Davidson (1975)* Lewis (1972), Parsons (1972), Partee ( 1972 )
and Montague (1974a, 1974b). The ideas behind such
attempts to connect meaning and model-theore tic semantics
are laid out by Lewis, who states
. . .the meaning for a sentence is something
that determines the conditions under which the
sentence is true or false
. It determines the
truth-value of the sentence in various possible
states of affairs, at various times, at various
places, for various speakers, and so on. . .Sim-
ilarly, a meaning for a name is something that
determines what thing, if any, the name names
in various possible states of affairs, at various
times, and so on. .. Similarly
,
a meaning for a
common noun is something that determines which
(possible or actual) things, if any, that common
noun applies to in various possible states of
affairs, at various times, and so on... (Lewis
(1972)
,
p. 173-174)
In following this account of what constitutes a sem-
antics, we will adopt as our goal a model-theore tic
account which specifies the truth-conditions of the sen-
tences of (at least a fragment of) a language such as
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English which includes serially incorrect sentences. Cen-
tral oo this account will he the specification of a finite
number of rules which will specify the meaning of complex
sentences m terms of the meanings of the parts of such
sentences. All but one of the proposals for a semantics
for sortally incorrect sentences we will look at in this
chapter will share this goal; the one exception, presented
by Katz, has a different set of goals which will be dis-
cussed when we look at that proposal.
Before discussing what results we want to get from
°ur semantics, we should note one aspect of technique. In
ohe accounts of sortally incorrect sentences based on
model-theoretic semantic techniques, the definition of
truth is always given for a formal logical language rather
than for a natural language such as English. The rationale
oehind this is partially an attempt to keep things simple
,
since these artificial languages do not have such natural
language features as ambiguity and vagueness. Further, the
formal languages are connected to natural languages in
that it is generally assumed that the natural language
sentences which interest us can be translated into the
artificial language for which the semantics is given with-
out loss of those features which give rise to the problems
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of sortal incorrectness. In the proposals we will look at
in this chapter such a translation is assumed; in our final
account of sortally incorrect sentences offered in the next
chapter a method of translation will be made explicit. If
the semantics for the formal language succeeds in capturing
the data we wish to explain concerning sortally incorrect
sentences
,
we can then use the formal language semantics
as a model for a direct semantics for English.
Having decided that what we are looking for in a
semantic account of sortally incorrect sentences is a
theory of truth for such sentences, we now need to decide
what data that theory must account for. The obvious place
oO start is to ask what we should expect from our theory
concerning simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect
sentences like
2.1) The theory of relativity is shiny
We want to end up with some sort of explanation for the
judgements of native speakers of English that such senten-
ces are deviant. But how to accomplish this in a theory
of truth is unclear, and different authors have put
forward different suggestions. Another piece of data which
seems fairly safe is that such sentences ought not to be
evaluated by the theory to be true under most, if not all,
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2onditions. A final piece of data which seems generally
agreed upon by those who have offered semantic accounts
°~ mortally incorrect sentences is that we should be
a
D
1 e t0 trace the deviance and lack of truth of such sen-
tences to the fact that the referent of the subject of the
sentence is not the right sort of thing to have predicated
of it the property which is the referent of the predicate
°f Ulh-e sentence. Again, this requirement is not very
clear. But it does have the advantage that nearly every
author who discusses sortal incorrectness agrees to it.
Beyond this, there is little agreement as to just
wha u da oa a semantic theory of sortal incorrectness must
explain. Indeed, one feature of semantic accounts of
sortally incorrect sentences which is immediately striking
is the diversity of what these theories take to be the
facts for which they should account. While there might
be differences in the details of syntactic accounts of
sortal incorrectness, all syntactic accounts agree that
such strings are really ungrammatical sequences which are
not to be generated by an optimal grammar of the language.
Thus all syntactic accounts agree on the datum that
sortally incorrect sentences are not sentences at all, and
the differences in the accounts concern what technical
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devices are used to block the generation of these strings.
Beyond the agreement cited above, no such commonality
ls "° be
- ound in the differing semantic accounts of sort-
ally incorrect sentences. On some semantic accounts,
simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences are
evaluated as false; on other accounts these sentences are
evaluated as having some third or fourth truth-value; and
on others these sentences are evaluated' as having no truth-
value at all. The cause of this diversity often seems to
be technical choices made by the person offering the
treatment
,
as a problem which is solved one way in a
bivalent framework is often solved another way in a multi-
valued theory or in one with truth-value gaps. But while
these various approaches may seem to arise in response to
purely technical problems, they have a major impact on
the philosophical underpinnings of an account. Hence it
is difficult to separate the questions of which semantic
theory is correct and what data such a theory should
account for.
We will, therefore, not attempt to decide what data
a theory must account for at this point beyond that cited
above as the data which is generally agreed upon. In-
stead, we will look at a number of accounts of the seman-
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tics of sortally incorrect sentences. Except in the case
0f our dlscussion of the theory offered by Katz (1964b),
Which is explicitly designed to deal with natural languages
ln a non-m°del- theoretic framework, we will illustrate
the semantics in question by applying it to the simplest
possible language. When we look at model-theore tic seman-
tic accounts, we will first look at how that account would
a P^opos i tional or non-quantified predicate logic,
-nen, if necessary, we will see how we can extend that
account to a first order predicate logic with quantifica-
tion. To further simplify our initial investigation of
uhe current options for a semantics for sortal incorrect-
ness, all of the example languages we will look at will be
given an extensional semantics. We will return to the
question of what data the theory ought to explain in the
last section of the chapter, when we will discuss which of
the approaches (if any) looks the most promising as an
account of sortally incorrect sentences. Once this is done
we can turn to Chapter III and the construction of a
semantics which will more adequately model a significant
fragment of English which includes some sentences which are
sortally incorrect.
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1 /a-4e n „ ineories of S o r ta 1 Inc orrec tness
.
The obvious place to begin our investigation is to
009 if we can fit sortally incorrect sentences into a
standard model-theore tic semantics for a simple artificial
language. If is generally agreed that simple subject-
predicate sortally incorrect sentences such as 2.1) are
not true. In the standard semantics for simple logics all
sentences are either true or false, so simple subject-
predicate sentences which are sortally incorrect will in
^his sort of semantics be evaluated as having the truth-
value false .
We can use a standard formulation of the rule which
evaluates simple sentences to obtain this result. As-
suming that the language we are using to model English
contains names and predicates and that the simple sentences
of this language have the form "s is P" where "s" is a
name and "P" is a predicate, the rule which will evaluate
the truth-value of such sentences will look something like:
2.2) "s is P" is true if and only if the object named
by s has the property denoted by P; otherwise
"s is P" is false.
Given such a rule
,
the sentence which would be the trans-
lation of 2.1) into our simple language would be evaluated
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as false for the following reasons. Sortally incorrect
sentences predicate of an object (in the case of 2.1), the
°b
^
ect we refer in English by the phrase "the theory
oi relativity") a property of the wrong sort (in 2.1), the
property denoted in English by the phrase "is shiny").
Since the object is not the right sort of thing to have
the property, it does not have the property. Hence rule
2.2) tells us that the translation of 2.1), and for anal-
ogous reasons the translations of all simple subject-
predicate sortally incorrect sentences, will be evaluated
as false
.
This approach agrees with our preliminary data in
ohat no simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sen-
tence will be evaluated as true on the theory. Further,
this theory opens the door to an explanation of the truth-
value of sortally incorrect sentences in terms of the
object which is the referent of the subject term of the
sentence being of the wrong sort to have the property
which is the referent of the predicate of the sentence.
In the above explanation we moved from an object being of
the wrong sort to have a property to that object not having
the property, a move which is certainly plausible. This
gives us a connection between sortal status and truth-
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value which allows us to connect our theory of truth to a
theory of sorts.
Having dealt with simple subject-predicate sentences,
we can move on to sentences built up from simple sentences
us ing the standard sentential logic connectives. The
simplest connective is negation, which is a unary operator
Again following the practice of standard model-theore tic
semantics for simple logics, we can define the truth-
value of the negation of a sentence using a rule something
like
2.3) if "A" is a sentence, then "neg A" is true if
and only if "A" is false; otherwise "neg A"
is false .
This approach gives us the result that the negation of a
sentence is true if that sentence is false
,
the double
negation of a sentence has the same truth-value as the
sentence, etc. Applied to simple subject-predicate sort-
ally incorrect sentences the rule give us the result that
the negations of all such sentences are true, their double
negations false, etc.
Rule 2.3) tells us how to evaluate negations of
sentences in our formal language
. The question now is
whether the assignments of truth-values to these sentences
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agree with our intuitions about the truth-values of nega-
tions of sortally incorrect sentences in English.
One way in which we negate a sentence in English is by
prefixing that sentence with the phrase "it is not the
case that." According to our simple theory, then, the
result of prefixing a simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentence with that phrase should yeild a true
sentence. This prediction is confirmed by sentences like
2.4) It is not the case that the theory of relativity
is shiny
which does, in fact, seem to be true. So at least in this
case the simple theory seems to work for sortally incor-
rect sentences.
Unfortunately, there are other constructions in
English which seem to be negations which do not fit in with
the simple theory so nicely. One of these constructions
forms what seems to be the negation of a simple subject-
predicate sentence by inserting what has been called a
negating word, such as "not," before the predicate of the
sentence. Using this construction, we would negate sen-
tence 2.1) using the negating word and get the sentence
2.5) The theory of relativity is not shiny
According to our simple theory, if 2.5) is in fact a
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negation of sentence 2.1) on a par with 2.4), it will also
ce evaluated as true. Indeed, many find this outcome of
the simple theory unobjectionable. But this opinion is not
universally held, as some claim that 2.5) is just as
deviant as 2.1) and hence should not be evaluated as true.
This problem is compounded if we consider a third
construction in English which also appears to be some form
oi negation, namely, the use of negating prefixes such as
non- or un- on predicates. If this construction is
considered to be a negation in the same way the negating
phrase it is not the case that," the simple theory tells
us that if we take a simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentence such as
2.6) The taste of lemon is breakable
and form a negation of that sentence by using a negating
prefix, getting
2.7) The taste of lemon is unbreakable
the result is a true sentence. Further, the double
negation of a false sentence is itself false, so if we can
use negating prefixes to form negations the sentence
2.8) It is not the case that the taste of lemon is
unbreakable
will be evaluated by our simple theory as having the truth-
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value false. But these results are counterintuitive, as
) strikes most as just as clear a case of a sortally
-.--correct sentence as 2.6) and hence should be evaluated
as false on this theory, while 2.8) strikes most speakers
as a sentence which is true. So we seem to have an ob-
jection to a simple theory which evaluates simple subject-
predicate sortally incorrect sentences along the lines of
^.2), negations of sentences along the lines of 2.3), and
considers all three constructions we have been calling
negating constructions to be variants of the same operation
on sentences.
There are at least two ways we can go to avoid these
problems. ihe first is to simply bite the bullet, accepting
the theory's evaluation of 2.5) and 2.7) as true and 2.8)
as false. Taking this line requires that we reject our
(perhaps questionable) intuition that 2.5) is just as bad
as simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences
and our (much stronger) intuitions that 2.7) is sortally
incorrect and hence ought not to be evaluated as true
and that 2.8) is a true sentence, not a sentence which is
false
.
Another way out is to reject the claim that all three
of the constructions we labelled as "negating" constructions
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are to be treated formally in the same way. By taking this
llne
’
° ne could clalt" that the insertion of the negating
particle and the use of negating prefixes do not form
sentences which are to be evaluated using a rule like 2-3).
Since sentences using these constructions are not to be
evaluated using this rule, nothing about the semantics we
have sketched so far commits us to the claim that 2.5)
and 2.t) are true or that 2.8) is false. One could, of
course, combine these approaches, claiming that 2.5) is
a negation on a par with 2.4) and thus is true while 2.?)
is not such a negation.
I m really not sure what to say to someone who wants
to allow that we can negate simple subject-predicate sen-
tences with all three of the constructions discussed above
to get a sentence which is evaluated using a rule like
2-u) hot only would someone who took this way out be
forced to assen u to the unbreakabili ty of tastes, he would
have to assent to the unwed status of numbers and the
incorrigability of fruits. Holding that negations of
sortally incorrect sentences formed with negating prefixes
are true just doesn’t correspond to our intuitions con-
cerning such sentences. Since these intuitions serve as
the data which needs to be explained by the semantic theory,
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une proponent of this line seems to be placed in the
position of denying the data.
The more attractive line of defense for someone who
wants to account for sortally incorrect sentences in a
semantics as close as possible to the one given for standard
two-valued logics is to take the second alternative,
denying that some of the constructions discussed above are
actually negations governed by semantic rules like 2.3).
The approach would be some variant of the following. We
iorm genuine negations (that is, negations which are eval-
uated by rules like 2.3)) in English by prefixing a sen-
tence with the phrase "is is not the case that." This
accounts for our intuition that a sortally incorrect sen-
tence prefixed by this phrase, like 2.4), is true. However,
sentences which use negating prefixes, like 2.8), are not
sentences of the right form to be evaluated in the seman-
tics by clause 2.3); in such sentences, some other form of
negation is being used. Such an approach would rely on a
distinction between what we could call "sentence negation,"
which is exemplified by sentences which begin with the
phrase "it is not the case that;" and what we could call
"predicate negation," exemplified by sentences which use
a negating prefix on a predicate. On such a theory we
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could also account for the conflicting intuitions concern-
ing sentences in which the negating particle "not” is
inserted before the predicate, saying that such sentences
are ambiguous, capable of being read as either sentence
negations or as predicate negations. When read in the
former way, these sentences are judged to be true; when
read m the latter way these sentences are not necessarily
trUe * S uch a theory could say that sentence and predicate
negation are two different sorts of negation, or could
claim that the distinction is based on the scope of a
single negation operation.
Such an approach has much to recommend it. The first
advantage is that the distinction upon which it rests,
which we are indicating by distinguishing between "sentence
negation and 'predicate negation" corresponds nicely to
a syntactic distinction between forms of negation argued
for by Klima (1964). Klima argues that there are syntactic
differences in the behavior of what he calls "sentence
negation" and "predicate negation" in English. On the
tests that Klima gives, sentences prefixed with the phrase
"it is not the case that.. ." are cases of sentence negation
sentences in which the predicate of the sentence is pre-
fixed with what we are calling a negating prefix are cases
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of predicate negation; and sentences in which the negation
particle "not" occurs before the predicate are ambiguous,
allowing for both readings. Hence a semantic theory
Which distinguishes between the two sorts of negation draws
a distinction which is nicely parallelled in the syntax of
a natural language. However, our account can’t end by
merely noting that there are differences in these kinds of
negation. Since we now have at least two forms of negation
we need at least two semantic rules to tell us how to
evaluate sentences in which these different forms occur.
By distinguishing two forms of negation we avoid the
problems of the simple theory, but we must now extend that
simple theory to determine the semantics of our new form
of negation.
ih-is is the problem addressed by Mennie Be ngmann
(1977) who develops an account of sortally incorrect sen-
tences designed to save classical bivalent logic from the
problems posed by sortally incorrect sentences by develop-
ing a semantics which makes a distinction between two forms
of negation. Bergmann begins by characterizing sortally
incorrect sentences in the following way. "Any predicate
in natural language," she claims,
. . .may be assigned both an extension and a
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so r tal range. The extension of a predicate isthe collection of all those entities to which thepredicate is true
,
while the sortal range con-
sists of all those entities to which the pred-icate is significantly applicable. When the
entity designated by the subject expression of
an atomic statement (a predication) falls out-
side of the predicate's sortal range, the
statement is sortally incorrect.
..(
(
1977 )
,
p. 6l)
xhis characterization fits in nicely with our earlier
intuitive account of simple sortally incorrect sentences
as sentences which predicate of an object a property of
the wrong sort. What the Bergmann characterization adds
io the notion of a sortal range
,
which allows us to give a
formal treatment of the notion of being "a predicate of
the wrong sort,” namely, a predicate P is of the wrong
sort to predicate of an object o if and only if object
o is not included in the sortal range of P.
The semantics Bergmann constructs is specifically
designed to deal with the problems of negations of sort-
ally incorrect sentences. The minimal results she wants
from her semantics are
2.9)
All sortally incorrect sentences are false
2.10) if "P" is a sortally incorrect sentence, the
sentence "it is not the case that P" is true.
2.11) If "S is P" is a sortally incorrect sentence,
so are "S is not P" and "S is non-P"
;
since
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such sentences are sortally incorrect they are
false .
To get these results, Bergmann makes a distinction between
what she calls "internal" and "external" negation. Inter-
nal negations are exemplified by sentences of the form
S is not P" and "S is non-P"
; these are to be distin-
guished from external negations of the form "it is not the
case that P. The latter construction forms a genuine
negation of the sentence "P," when the phrase "it is not
ohe case that.
.
." is prefixed to a false sentence the
result is a true sentence, even if the sentence so pre-
fixed is sortally Incorrect. Such a negation is to be
interpreted as denying that the matrix sentence is true.
This is not the case with sentences which are internal
negations, for in cases of internal negation "something
more is at stake," specifically, internal negations "can
be taken as indicating that the denotation of the subject
expression falls outside the predicates extension but
within the sortal range" ((1977). p. 66-67).
We can see how the theory works by developing a sem-
antics for a simple, non-quantified predicate logic. We
define a language L as having the primitive vocabulary:
Predicates: for any n^l, the n-place predicates
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Individual constants: a,, a
,
a.
,
. . .
"L J
Logical signs:
-
, Y . (, )
ie can now define the set of sentences of L as the smallest
set S such that:
2 . 12 ) ^ ' • • > are individual constants of L and
nn .
m
ls an n_Place predicate of L, then
2.13) if A.B6S, then "(~A)", " ( A-B) " , " ( yA) "6S
Having set the syntax, we can now construct a seman-
tics for L. Let D be some non-empty set of objects. We
de fine a sortal specification, R, on D as a function from
n-adic predicates of L to ordered pairs of subsets of Dn
,
specifically, where P^ is an n-adic predicate of L,
R(P^)=<R 1 (P|J) , R
2 (P^)>, where
. Intuit-
ively, R 1 (P^) will be the extension of Pn while P. 2 (Pn ) willm m m
be the sortal range of Pj\ To complete the specification
of an interpretation, we must specify a function ref
from individual constants of L to members of D; intuitively
this function is such that for any individual constant
a^ of L, re
f
(a
n )
is the object denoted by a^. We now
define a model M relative to a sortal specification R on
domain D to be M=<R,ref>.
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We now define a valuation, T, of L for domain D on a
model M=<R,ref> as a function from statements of L to
{T,F} such that
2.14) V
^ P
m
t
l*
' ,i:
n^
_T if and onl
.y if <ref ( t
±
) . .
ref ( t )>€R 1 (Pn )n m
2
. 15 ) V(A-*B)=T if and only if V(A)=F or V(B)=T
2.16) V(~A)=T if and only if V(A)=F
2.17) v( pm ti • • • =T and °nly if <ref(t1
ref(t )>CR 2 (Pn )n m
2.18) V(y(A-B))=T if and only if V( yA ) =V( y b) =t
2.19) V(y(~A) )=T
2.20) V(y(yA) )=T
We can now supply interpretations of the operations
logic. The y operator will truely apply to all and only
sortally correct sentences, as such it is a formalization
of the notion "is sortally correct." The only negation
in the system at present is external negation, which
operates like classical negation. Prefixing this negation
operator to a true sentence results in a false sentence
while prefixing it to a false sentence (whether sortally
correct or incorrect) results in a true sentence. Clause
2.20) tells us that the claim that a sentence is sortally
correct is always sortally correct; while clause 2 . 19 )
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tells us that the external negation of a sentence is always
a serially correct sentence. Clause 2.18) tells us that,
m the case of conditional sentences, sortal incorrectness
is catching; a conditional is sortally incorrect if either
part of that conditional is sortally incorrect.
With this base, Bergmann fleshes out her language by
defining three new connectives:
2
. 21 ) —) A A->~A
2.22) A&B =df —, (A- B)
2.23) -A —i A&yA
The first of these, —
,, functions exactly like external
negation as far as its effect on a statements truth-value,
but differs in that if a statement, "A," is sortally in-
correct then the statement "—i A" is also sortally incor-
rect. The conjunction operation is also normal in its
treatment of truth-value
,
but is like the conditional in
that if either conjunct is sortally incorrect, the entire
conjunction is sortally incorrect. Definition 2 . 23 )
introduces internal negation, specifically defining the
internal negation of a sentence as the conjunction of the
claims that the matrix sentence is false and that the
matrix sentence is sortally correct.
Perhaps the best way of seeing how this semantics
89
works is to see how it deals with some of our examples of
sortally incorrect sentences. Our paradigm sortally in-
correct sentence,
2.1) The theory of relativity is shiny
will translate into L as a sentence of the form "P^a
m n
where the intended interpretation will have R^(P^) be the
set of things which are shiny, and R 2 (P^) be the set of
things the predicate "is shiny" can be significantly
predicated of. Further, ref (a ) will be whatever object
in the domain is the theory of relativity. Since, pre-
sumably, the theory of relativity is not even the right
kind of thing to be shiny, sentence 2.1) will be assigned
the truth-value F. Further, since the theory of relativity
is not a thing to which we can significantly predicate
the predicate "is shiny," the sentence "yCP^a^)" wiH
also be assigned the truth-value F, i.e., 2.1) will be
interpreted as being sortally incorrect.
The semantics was designed to reflect the distinction
between internal and external negation. We can see how the
theory accomplishes this by seeing how it deals with the
sentences
2.4) It is not the case that the theory of relativity
is shiny
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2 . 5 ) The theory of relativity is not shiny
-ne first of these is to be understood as the external
negation of sentence 2.1), and will thus be translated
into L as MP^) . " The second is to be understood as
the internal negation of sentence 2.1)
,
and thus will be
translated into L as the sentence "-(P^a )." Since sen-
tence 2.1) is assigned the truth-value F, sentence 2.4)
^iii 4e assigned the truth-value T. In addition, since the
external negation of any sentence is sortally correct, the
sentence "y ( ~(P^a
n
)
)
" will be true, so 2.4) is sortally
correct. This is not the case with 2.5), however. Since
2.5) is an internal negation, our representation of 2.5)
is really an abbreviation of the sentence
2.24) —.(P^ )&y(P 1a )m n' 5 m n'
Since 2.1) is sortally incorrect, this conjunction has a
second conjunct which is false, hence 2.5) is evaluated as
F. Further, 2.24) will be judged as sortally incorrect on
this semantics, as a conjunction is sortally correct if
and only if both conjuncts are sortally correct. The
second conjunct of 2.24) is sortally correct, as all
sentences of the form "yA" are sortally correct, but the
first conjunct is not--that conjunct is an abbreviation of
the sentence "P^a -^P^a " which is a conditional with a
m n m n
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sortally incorrect antecedent, and hence a conditional
which is sortally incorrect. Since a conjunction with one
sortally incorrect conjunct is itself sortally incorrect,
-•5) will be evaluated as false and sortally incorrect.
This system has a number of features which are worth
noting. The first of these is that the notions of truth-
value and sortal status have been separated. This is
reflected in the truth conditions for sentences of the form
/A
; the -ruth or falsity of this sentence is not deter-
mined by the truth-value of sentence "A" but rather by the
sortal status of the sentence. A second noteworthy feature
of uhe account is that the notion of sortal incorrectness
has been extended so that it is a feature of all sentences,
not just a feature of simple subject-predicate sentences.
In light of the truth conditions for the y operator, we can
define the set of sortally correct sentences of the
language L on a model M=<R,ref> with domain D as the
smallest set C such that
2.25) if <ref (a
n )
, . .
.
,
ref (a^
,
m
)>CR 2 (Pm )
,
then
"P
m
a...a "€C
r n n+m
2.26) if A is a sentence of L, "~A" and "yA"€C
2.2 7) if A,B£C then "A-B"€C
Clause 2.25) reflects our intuitions concerning simple
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subject predicate sentences, saying that such a sentence
is sortally correct if and only if the sentence predicates
of an object or set of objects a predicate of the proper
sort. Clause 2 . 26 ) extends the notion of sortal correct-
ness to external negations and claims about a sentence’s
sortal status, telling us that all such sentences are
sortally correct. The final clause extends the notion to
conditionals
,
telling us that a conditional is sortally
correct if and only if both the antecedent and the conse-
quent of the conditional are sortally correct.
Having laid out the system and seen how it works, we
can now ask whether it does what we want it to do, specif-
ically, does it satisfy the requirements 2.9)--2.1l). It
certainly meets the requirement set out in 2.11) if we
interpret the sentences "S is not P" and "S is non-P" as
being the internal negations of the sentence ”S is P"
,
for
if the latter sentence is sortally incorrect the first two
sentences will be sortally incorrect and false. Unfortun-
ately, 2.11) is the only requirement that is met; on
Bergmann's theory both 2.9) and 2.10) are false.
The cause of this problem is the wedge that has been
driven between the notions of sortal incorrectness and
truth-value. The two notions diverge once we get away
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-rom atomic sentences, simple external negations or claims
t0 sortal correctness; if we restrict our attention to
jnl.v these sentences all sortally incorrect sentences are
false and no true sentence is sortally incorrect. But
once we move to sentences in which the conditional plays a
par., this correlation disappears, for then we can have
true sentences which are sortally incorrect. An example
oi such a sentence would be any conditional whose anteced-
ent was an atomic sortally incorrect sentence. Since
atomic sortally incorrect sentences are all false and any
conditional with a false antecedent is true, such a sen-
tence will be evaluated as true
. But such a sentence will
also be a conditional with a sortally incorrect part, and
all such conditionals are sortally incorrect. So such a
sentence will be sortally incorrect and true, violating
condition 2.9). Further, the external negation of such a
sentence will be false, so we have sortally incorrect
sentences the external negations of which are false, vio-
lating condition 2.10).
The problem is that the 'notion of sortal incorrect-
ness has been extended so that it goes beyond cases in
which we have clear intuitions. Our intuitive notion of
sortal incorrectness (which Bergmann also holds) is that
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a sentence is sortally incorrect if it ascribes to an
object a property of the wrong sort. But this intuition
only guides us in the case of simple subject-predicate
sentences; when we extend the notion to all sentences our
intuitive ground is lost for we are unable to pick out
the subject or the property being ascribed to that subject
in the sentence
.
One way out for Bergmann is to weaken the requirements
2.9) and 2.10) on the system, requiring only that all
subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences are false
and that the external negation of all subject-predicate
sortally incorrect sentences are true. If we weaken the
requirements in this way Bergmann' s system will satisfy
those requirements. But even if we do this, the system
has the counterintuitive consequence that there are sort-
ally incorrect sentences (although no sortally incorrect
atomic sentences) which are true. Perhaps this is a con-
sequence we could learn to live with. The only cases of
true sortally incorrect sentences are molecular sentences
where our intuitive notion of sortal incorrectness does
not apply. So it might be claimed that the fact that some
of these sortally incorrect sentences are true only vio-
lates intuitions about the truth-value of sortally incor-
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rect conditioned by our intuitions concerning the relation
° f truth-value and sortal correctness in atomic sentences.
Rather than casting doubt on the theory, the consequence
that there are true sortally incorrect sentences can be
taken to show that our intuitive correlation between
sortal incorrectness and truth-value is simply not extend-
able to all sentences.
However, the separation of the notions of truth and
sortal status leads Bergmann into unacceptable consequences
once she extends her language to include quantification.
We can replicate her program by extending the language L to
the language L' by adding to the vocabulary of L the var-
iables x1( x2 ,x^,... and the logical sign "V."
2 By the
terms of L' we will mean the individual constants and the
variables of L' . We now define the formulas of L' to be
the smallest set S' such that
2.28) if y Vm are terms of L ' and is an
m-place predicate of L', then "Pm t . . . t , "GS
r n n+m
2.29) if A , B£S ’ , so are " ( ~A ) " , " (A-B) " , "(yA)"
,
and "(\/x^)(A)"
The sentences of L' will be all the formulas of L' in which
no variable occurs free.
Let D be a non-empty domain and M be a model such that
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M=<R,ref> where R is a sortal specification and ref is a
re ference function as specified for L . We now define an
assignment function, d, relative to M on D as a function
from terms of L' to members of D such that if a is an
n
individual
term of L'
constant of L*
,
d(a )=ref(a ). Where t. is anyn n 0 J
and y is any variable of L', we can define a
bivalent satisfaction function S
d
on a model M with domain
D relative to an assignment function d as a function from
formulas of L' to {T,F} such that
2.30)
2.31)
Sd (PjV"W = T iff <d(tn ),...,d(tn+m )>€R1 (P“)
S
d
(A-B)=T iff S
d
(A)=F or S
d
(B)=T
2.32) S d (~A)=T iff S d (A)=F
2.33) S d ((Vy)A)=T iff S d ,(A)=T for all assignment
functions d' on M which differ from d in at
most the value of d'(y)
2 . 3 '-*)
2.35)
S d ( V< p“V--W )=T iff <d(tn) i{tn+a ]>
eR
2 (p”)
S d (v(A-B))=T iff S d(vA)=S d ( YB)=T
2.36) S d (v(~A))=T
2 - 37 ) S d(y(yA))=T
2 . 33 ) S d ( y( (Vy)A) ) = T iff S d ,(yA) = T for
all assign-
ment functions d' on M which differ from d
in at most the value d'(y)
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We can now define a bivalent valuation v of L- on a model
M with domain D as
2-39) for any formula of L' A
, v(A)=T iff S (A) = T
for all satisfaction functions S
d on M; other-
wise v(A)-F
The counterintuitive result which comes immediately
from this treatment of quantification is that most ordin-
ary universally quantified sentences will be evaluated as
being sortally incorrect. For consider the universally
quantified sentence
2.40) (Vx
5
)(P^x
5
-P^x
5
)
sentence is sortally correct only if, for every d
assignment of values to variables as specified in 2 . 38 ),
2 1 2 1d(x^) 6 R (P
2 )
and d(x^)£R (P^). This will only be true in
cases in which R 2 (P 2 )=R 2 (P 2 )=D, that is, the universal will
be sortally correct only if the predicates "P 2 " and "P 2 "
^ I
significantly apply to all of the objects in the domain.
So on this account of sortal incorrectness the seemingly
innocuous sentence "all men are mortal" is sortally in-
correct on any domain that includes a single object to
which we can not significantly apply the predicate "is a
man" or the predicate "is mortal." This is not a case
where we don't have an intuition about the sortal status
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of the sentence and thus can be content with letting the
theory decide the question. In this case, the theory is
simply at odds with a clear intuition concerning the sortal
status of the sentence. We can not say that in this case
the theory tells us a suprising fact about universally
quantified sentences which we had not noticed before; in
this case the theory is simply wrong.
Where does the theory go wrong? The problem arises
when we add quantification to the theory along the lines
suggested by Bergmann. The quantification introduced in
the theory is unrestricted, that is to say, the variables
range over every object in the domain, regardless of the
sort of the object. Because of this, we are virtually
assured that any universally quantified sentence of the
language will be sortally incorrect, for there are very
few predicates which can be significantly applied to
everything
. But, as we saw, Bergmann' s treatment of
quantification treats universally quantified sentences as
sortally correct only if the predicates in the sentence
can be significantly applied to every object in the domain.
This technical problem having to do with quantific-
ation should not, however, be taken as an overriding
objection to the bivalent approach to sortal incorrectness
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taken by Bergmann. The problem arises not because Bergmann
takes sortally incorrect subject-predicate sentences to be
±alse but rather because she treats quantification in her
language as quantification over all entities of all sortal
types. jVhat is needed to patch the hole in the system is
n0b a re j ec tion of bivalence but a different way of dealing
with quantification.
Rather than attempt to come up with a new method of
quantification for Bergmann' s system, we will go on to look
at some other accounts of sortally incorrect sentences. We
^iH i1© turn to this system, for while we leave it with a
technical flaw it is still a viable candidate for a seman-
tic theory of sortal incorrectness. Indeed, the system
does have its failings, but these are minor in that they
do not show that the basic approach of treating sortally
incorrect subject-predicate sentences as false is untenable.
Whether or not it is worth while attempting to solve the
problem this system has in its treatment of quantification
will depend on the theoretical merits of the overall system,
which will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.
Many-Valued Theories of Sortal Incorrectness.
Both of the semantic theories of sortally incorrect
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sentences we looked at in the last section began with the
jasic intuition that simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences were not true and concluded from that
that such sentences should be evaluated as false. We will
now look at semantic accounts which reject this as a base.
The theories we will investigate in this section begin with
the intuition that simple subject-predicate sortally in-
correct sentences are not true, but also claim that sen-
tences such as
2.5) The theory of relativity is not shiny
are both straightforward negations of simple subject-
predicate sortally incorrect sentences and are themselves
sortally incorrect and hence are not to be evaluated as
true. Since the negation of a false sentence is a true
sentence, the failure of simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences and their negations to be true is taken
to show that these sentences have some truth-value other
then either true or false. According to the theories we
are about to look at, an adequate semantics for sortally
incorrect sentences must be one modelled on some semantics
for a many-valued logic.
The most conservative many-valued approach is one
which allows for three truth-values. On such a theory
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sentences can be true, false, or have some third truth-
/alue. This third truth-value is identified by some (for
example
, Routley ( 1969) ) as "non-significant" and by others
'aS oor tally incorrect"; a third alternative is to label
the uhird value as simply "neither true nor false." In
what follows we will simply refer to the third truth-value
oy using the letter "N," the interpretation of this value
will vary from theory to theory. It is this third truth-
value which is had by simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences. The theories proposed differ in the
way that they complete their semantics, that is, in the
way they specify the truth conditions for the connectives.
In any semantic theory which has at least a third
truth— 7alue we can distinguish between two sorts of neg-
ation. The first yeilds a false sentence when prefixed to
a true sentence and yeilds a true sentence when prefixed
to a sentence with either of the other truth-values. We
can informally state the truth conditions for this sort
of negation, which we will symbolize as "— ", as
2 . 46 ) " —A" is false if and only if "A" is true,
otherwise "—A" is true.
The second form of negation, which we will symbolize as
is a bit more complicated. When prefixed to a true
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sentence this connective gives us a false sentence and
when prefixed to a false sentence this connective gives
us a true sentence. However, then this connective is pre-
fixed to a sentence with the third truth-value, the result
io a sentence which also has that third truth-value. The
truth conditions for this sort of negation can be informally-
stated as
2.47) "~A" is true if and only if "A” is false;
false if and only if "A" is true; and N if
and only if "A” is N.
We will follow van Fraassen (1971) and call the latter form
of negation "choice negation" and the former form of neg-
ation "exclusion negation."
Adding a third truth-value and being able to distin-
guish between two forms of negation allows a three valued
system to account for what we have been calling negating
constructions in the following way. Again consider the
sentences
2.4) It is not the case that the theory of relativity
is shiny
2.5) The theory of relativity is not shiny
2.7) The taste of lemon is unbreakable
Intuitively, we have judged 2.4) to be true, 2.7) to be
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sortally incorrect and hence to have the same truth-value
as simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences,
and 2.5) to be either true or sortally incorrect. On a
three valued system, we could account for this by saying
that sentence 2.4) is a case of an exclusion negation of
a matrix sentence which is neither true nor false and hence
is true; sentence 2.7) is a case of a sentence which is a
choice negation of a matrix sentence which is neither true
nor false and hence is itself neither true nor false; while
2.5) is ambiguous, having one reading on which it is
equivalent to 2.4) and another on which it is equivalent
to 2.7)
.
While the introduction of a third truth-value allows
us to distinguish between choice and exclusion negation,
we can also ask if this distinction corresponds to two
readings of negation in English. There are two ways I can
see of motivating this distinction by appeal to English.
The first of these would read exclusion negation as a
metalanguage operator, roughly interpreted in English as
the phrase "it is not true that..." Given the truth con-
ditions for exclusion negation, which take true sentences
to the value false and any other sentence to the value
true, this interpretation of exclusion negation is natural.
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Since the interpretation of this form of negation involves
jhe notlon of truth, standard formal semantic techniques
would relegate this connective to the metalanguage used
to give the semantics for the object language in question,
hence the object language would contain only choice nega-
tion, and the difference in truth-value between negations
like 2.4) and 2.?) can be explained in that the latter is
a negation whose truth-value is tied directly to the world,
that is, the sentence is true or false or neither depending
on the relationship which holds between a thing and a
property, while the former is actually a sentence about
the object language (in this case, English), and hence is
true or false in virtue of the way the matrix sentence is
evaluated. The fact that the distinction between the two
sorts of negation has not been noticed before can be
explained by noting that English is often used as its
own metalanguage, and the failure to distinguish between
English constructions which are used to talk about the
world and similar constructions which are used to talk about
English is a common mistake.
A second way of handling the introduction of two
negation operations would be to claim that the two negation
forms both occur at the same level in English. We saw in
105
the last section that Klima has argued that there are syn-
act-LC reasons for distinguishing between what he calls
"sentence negation" and "predicate negation"; using Klima’s
syntactic data we could indentify exclusion negation with
sentence negation and choice negation with predicate
negation. The fact that the distinction has gone unnoticed
can m this case be explained by noting that investigations
into negation in English are usually done with the assump-
tion that every sentence is either true or false. On this
assumption, choice and exclusion negation are semantically
identical. It is only when a third value is introduced
into the semantics that the two forms of negation become
distinc t
.
Regardless of the interpretation we give to the two
forms of negation, a three-valued semantics which assigns
all simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences
a value other than true or false has the following intuit-
ively attractive features. Because simple subject-predicate
sortally incorrect sentences have a third truth-value, we
can account for the intuition that such sentences are
deviant by pointing out that they have a truth-value which
does deviate from those of classical logic. With the
two kinds of negation available to the three-valued theory,
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we can also account for the intuitions that some negations
0f Slmple sub ject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences
are true while others are just as deviant as the matrix
sortally incorrect sentence, as the exclusion negation of
such a sortally incorrect sentence will be true while the
choice negation of such a sentence will have the third
truth-value, which as we noted before is classically
deviant
.
However, there are technical problems with a three-
valued account which arise once we attempt to complete the
semantics by giving the truth conditions for the remaining
logical connectives. We can see how this problem arises
oy considering what truth conditions we would want to give
in such a theory for disjunction.
The semantics for the operation of disjunction must
tell us what the truth-value of a disjunction is given the
truth-values of its disjuncts. In giving a semantic
account in a three-valued system we are attempting to
extend classical two-valued logic rather than revise it, so
our semantic account of the connectives should be normal,
that is, it should agree with the classical two-valued
semantic account for that connective in cases in which the
components of the molecular sentence have only the classical
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.ruth values. The problem then reduces to deciding what
we want the truth-value of the sentence to be when one or
more of its parts has the third truth-value.
There are two common ways of giving a normal defini-
tion of disjunction in a three-valued logic. Kleene (1952)
labels these as "weak" and "strong" disjunction; we will
adopt these labels here. In giving the truth conditions
for strong disjunction, we follow the intuition that a
disjunction with one true disjunct is true no matter what
the value of the other disjunct and false only if both
disjuncts are false. This yeilds a truth- table definition
for a three valued-system disjunction operation of
2 . 48) v T F N
T T T T
F T F N
N T N N
Weak disjunction, on the other hand, is based on the
intuition already encountered in Bergmann's bivalent theory
that deviance is ' catching", that is, that any molecular
which has a component with the third truth-value will
itself have that third truth-value. Following this intu-
ition yeilds as a definition of disjunction in a three-
valued theory the truth-table
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2.49) V T F N
T T T N
F T F N
N N N N
xhe choice of which form of disjunction we incorporate
into the theory depends, at least in part, on our inter-
pretation o± the third truth-value. A theory which inter-
prets the third value as "non-significant" or "nonsense"
would, if it also interpreted the English "or" as strong
disjunction, be committed to the unacceptable claim that
the sentence
2.50) Either today is Friday or the theory of
relativity is shiny
is true on Fridays and nonsense or non-significant on
other days of the week. Thus it seems that if we wish to
interpret the English word "or" as strong disjunction, we
are forced to interpret the third truth-value as something-
like "neither true nor false," while if we wish to inter-
pret the third truth-value as "nonsense" or "non-signif-
icant" we will be required to interpret the English "or"
as weak disjunction.
While it is clear that it makes a difference which
form of disjunction we choose for our semantics, it is
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not clear which form we ought to choose on the basis of the
data. Our intuitions seem to pull in both ways. If
tooay is Friday, there is some pressure to say that any
disjunction which has as one of its disjuncts the sentence
uo day is Friday" is true. If this is the case, then
sentence 2.50) is a disjunction which is true on Fridays,
and hence we ought to incorporate strong disjunction into
our system. However, there is also intuitive plausibility
to the claim that 2.50) is a deviant sentence even on
Fridays, for one of the disjuncts of the sentence is
sortally incorrect. Since three-valued systems identify
the deviance of sortally incorrect sentences with the
evaluation of those sentences giving them the third truth-
value, following this intuition would require that we
evaluate 2 .$0 ) as having the third truth-value even on
Fridays, a result we would only get by incorporating weak
disjunction into our system. I know of no evidence which
would decide this matter one way or the other, so we are
left in the position of having two alternatives which
differ in important respects without having a clear-cut
reason to choose one alternative over the other.
Nor is the only technical problem with the three-
valued approach to sortal incorrectness confined to deter-
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mining whether to use weak or strong connectives. There
is also a problem common to both sorts of connectives,
arising m cases where the two kinds of connectives give
us the same result.
Both weak and strong disjunction tell us that a dis-
junction of two sentences each of which has the third
truth-value will itself have the third truth-value. This
seems to be correct if we consider a sentence like
2.51) Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the taste of lemon is breakable
Since both disjuncts are sortally incorrect, they will have
the third truth-value and the value of the disjunction will
also oe N regardless of whether we interpret the English
"or" as weak or strong disjunction. This seems reasonable,
as sentence 2.51) seems to be just as bad as either of its
parts. But now consider the sentences
2.52) Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the theory of relativity is not shiny
2.53) Either the taste of lemon is breakable or the
theory of relativity is shiny
Both of these sentences are disjunctions, with one dis-
junct a sortally incorrect sentence and the other disjunct
the negation of a sortally incorrect sentence . We cannot
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evaluate these sentences immediately, as we must first
decide which of the two forms of negation is being used
_n the second disjuncts. Unfortunately, either way we
decide creates problems for the three-valued account.
Suppose we decide that the form of negation being
used in the second disjunct of the above sentences is
choice negation. Then both sentences will have a second
disjunct which has the third truth-value, as the choice
negation of a sentence with truth-value N also has truth-
value N. Then, using either weak or strong disjunction
Uo our interpretation of the main connective of the sen-
tences, both 2 . 52 ) and 2.53) will be disjunctions both of
whose disjuncts have truth-value N, and will therefore
both have the third truth-value themselves. This seems
right for 2.53), but problematic for 2.52). For 2.52) is
a sentence of the form "P or not P," a form of a classical
tautology, and hence ought to be true. Indeed many people
(myself among them) intuitively judge 2 . 52 ) to be true.
If this is the result we want, then our three-valued theory
will not account for the data if we interpret the negations
in 2 . 52 ) and 2.53) as choice negation.
This may not be seen as a fatal blow to a defender
of a three-valued account of sortal incorrectness. After
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all, such a person might say, we only expect sentences of
form P or not P" to be true because we are conditioned
by classical bivalent logics. The only reason we expect
such sentences to be true, the defender might continue,
is because we take them to say that either sentence "P" is
true or that that sentence is false, which is presupposed
by bivalent theories. But in moving to a three-valued
system we have rejected this presupposition. The fact that
we fail to get some of the classical results of logic is
only to be expected. Whether or not this reply is adequate
will be discussed later.
We are not, however, forced to give up the truth of
2.52) in a three-valued system. If we decide to interpret
ohe negation in the second disjunct of that sentence as
exclusion negation, the second disjunct will be the exclus-
ion negation of a sentence with the third truth-value and
will, therefore, oe evaluated as true. If we then decide
to interpret the disjunction using the strong version of
bhe disjunction connective, the whole sentence will be
evaluated as true, saving the truth of all sentences of the
form "P or not P." Unfortunately, if we take this tack
and treat 2.53) on a par with 2.52), which seems reasonable
on the basis of their form, we must also evaluate 2.53) as
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orue
. For 2.53) will now be a strong disjunction one of
whose disjuncts is the exclusion negation of a sentence
with the third truth-value. But we began with the intuition
wia o 2.53) is just as bad as other sortally incorrect
sentences, and hence should itself receive the third truth-
value
. So this approach also fails to account for the
data. Worse still, this approach does not even seem to
have a plausible explanation for why it fails to account
for the data.
To obtain the result that 2.52) is true while 2.53)
has the third truth-value requires that we interpret the
sentences in the following way. While the two appear to
have the same logical form, in fact they are very different;
the first has as its second disjunct the exclusion negation
of a sortally incorrect sentence while the second has as
its second disjunct the choice negation of a sortally
incorrect sentence. If we then interpret "or" as strong
disjunction, we get the result that 2 . 52 ) is true while
2.53) has the third truth-value. While this accounts for
the intuitions we have concerning the two sentences, it
does smack of being an ad hoc explanation, as it basically
requires us to interpret sentences of the form "P or not
Q" in one way when sentence P is distinct from sentence Q
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and m another way when sentence P is the same as sentence
So while this solution does account for the data, it is
less than fully satisfying.
A more radical way of avoiding the above problem with
the three-valued approach is to accept the intuition that
2.52) differs in truth-value from 2 . 53 ) even though the
logical operators in the two sentences are the same, and
conclude from this that we must reject the approach of
the three-valued system at the point at which that system
evaluates sentences as having one of three truth-values.
Instead, some have advocated an approach to sortally
incorrect sentences based on a four-valued logic.
A recent attempt at giving a four-valued account of
sortally incorrect sentences is that given by John Martin
(1975) • Martin begins by characterizing sortally incor-
rect sentences (which he calls category mistakes) using
the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game. "A category
mistake," says Martin,
. . .may be informally characterized as a
predication unprovided for by the rules of a. . .
language game... Each condition for the operation
of. a language game may be called a presuppos-
ition. Then, a category mistake is a failure of
what we may call sortal presupposition ...(( 1975 )
>
p.66)
The account Martin offers is built on Herzberger's theory
of truth and presupposition. The most important aspect of
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that theory for Martin's account of sortally incorrect
sentences is, according to Martin,
...that to say of a sentence that it is true
means. that it has two properties. The first isthat it corresponds to the world. The second...
is that all the presuppositions of the sentence
are themselves true .
.
. ( (1975)
,
p. 75)
The four truth-values of Martin's system are built on this
distinction between correspondence to the world and satis-
faction of presuppositions. Each of the four truth-values
will be an ordered pair, where the first member of the
pair indicates correspondence to the world and the second
indicates satisfaction of presuppositions. The resultant
logic is two-dimensional, that is, the truth-value of a
sentence depends on features along the two dimensions of
correspondence and satisfaction of presuppositions. The
four truth-values, which Martin labels T, t, f, and F, can
be interpreted as "corresponds to the world and has all
true presuppositions," "corresponds to the world and has
some false presuppositions," "does not correspond to the
world and has some false presuppositions," and "does not
correspond to the world and has all true presuppositions,"
respectively. Since simple subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences have some false presuppositions,
specifically, those which Martin calls the sortal pre-
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suppositions, they fall into the categories of sentences
with truth-values of t or truth-values of f. We can also
represent Martin's truth-values as ordered pairs. Where 1
indicates satisfaction and 0 indicates failure of satis-
faction we can identify the truth-values and ordered pairs
as T=<1 , 1>
,
t=<l , 0>
,
f=<0 , 0>
,
and F=<0,1>.
By identifying his four truth-values with ordered
pairs in this way, Martin is able to construct a four-
valued valuation function, w, from two two-valued functions
v and v' . Let v and v' be two-valued valuations, says
Martin, "the characteristic functions of the set of sen-
tences that correspond and are presuppositionally secure,
respectively. Then a four-valued valuation w may be con-
structed as follows: w(A)=<v(A), v'(A)>" ((1975), p. 76).
For a simple sentential logic with the usual syntax we can
define v in the usual way as a function from sentences of
the language to the set {0,1} such that, where A and B are
sentences
,
2.5^) v(~A)=l iff v(A)=0
2 .55) v(AvB)=l iff v(A)=l or v(B)=l
2.56) v( A&B)=1 iff v(A)=v(B)=l
etc. We can define v' as a function from sentences to
{0,1} such that, where A and B are sentences,
11 ?
2.57) v'(~A)=l iff v'(A)=l
2.58) v’(AvB), v'(A&B), v'(A-B), v'(A--*B)=l iff
V (A)=v' (B)=l
-his definition of the characteristic function of sentences
whose presuppositions are satisfied reflects Martin's
acceptance of the principle "that an expression with a
sortally deviant part is itself sortally deviant" (( 1975 ),
P- 74).
If we restrict the above theory to a language all of
whose sentences are presupposi tionally secure, the system
reduces to a two-valued logic with the truth-values T=<1 , 1>
and F=<0,1>, representing correspondence and failure of
correspondence, respectively. All four values come into
play only if we are dealing with a language which contains
some sentences which are not presupposi tionally secure.
On Martin's view, sortally incorrect sentences are deviant
just because they are cases of sentences which have false
presuppositions, hence any sortally incorrect sentence
will have either the truth-value t=<l
,
0> or f=<0
,
0>
.
Further, any sentence which has as a part a sentence which
is sortally incorrect will itself have one of these two
truth-value s
.
On the face of it, Martin's account shares a failure
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of one of the three-valued systems we looked at in that the
sentence
2 . 52 ) Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the theory of relativity is not shiny
//ill not have the value T and hence will not be evaluated
as true in the full-blown sense. Since this sentence has
as parts sentences which are sortally incorrect, it will
have to have either the truth-value t or f; in fact it will
be evaluated as a sentence with truth-value t. One problem
we saw with the three-valued theory which evaluated 2 . 52 )
as having the third truth-value was that 2.52) has the form
of a tautology, and thus our intuition was to say that the
sentence was true
.
However, Martin avoids this problem by noting that
his theory must be seen within the larger context of
Herzberger's theory of truth and presupposition. One tenet
of this theory is that logic does not deal with a full
blown notion of truth but rather restricts its attention
to the single dimension of correspondence. So to say that
a sentence is a tautology is only to say something about
the correspondence satisfaction of that sentence. All
tautologies on Martin's system will satisfy the correspond-
ence criterion, but those which are sortally incorrect
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or have parts which are sortally incorrect will not have
all their presuppositions satisfied and will, therefore,
oe evaluated as having the value t rather than T.
Martin’s system gives us the following results concern
ing sortally incorrect sentences. All simple subject-pred-
icate sentences which are sortally incorrect have either
,ne truth-value t or f
,
so none of these sentences are
true or false in the full blown sense of truth and false-
hood* Further, any complex sentence with a sortally in-
correct part will also fail to be either fully true or
fully false. However, tautologies and contradictions with
sortally incorrect parts, while neither fully true nor
fully false, are true or false with respect to the notion
of truth and falsehood dealt with in logic, namely, the
notion of truth and falsehood which Martin calls corres-
pondence .
Martin extends this system to a first-order quantified
language by interpreting the quantifiers substitutionally
and treating universal quantification as a form of infinite
conjunction. Let L be a first order language with names,
n-place predicates, variables, and with negation, conjunc-
tion, and universal quantification taken as the primitive
logical operations. The sentences of L are defined in the
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usual way. Let "Zx/t" be the result of replacing all
occurences of t in Z by x. A four valued model for L will
be an ordered pair <D,V> where D is some non-empty domain
01 individuals and V is a function from names, n-place
predicates, and sentences of L satisfying the conditions:
2.59) if A is a sentence of L, then V( A ) €[ T , t , f , F}
2.60) if t is a name of L, then V(t)<=D and for all
d€D, there is some name t' of L such that
v(r )=d
2.61) if Pn is an n-place predicate of L, then V(Pn )
is a function from Dn to {T,t,f,F}
2.62) if A="Pn t
1 ...tn
H then V(A)=V(Pn )(Y(t
1 )
V(t
R ))
2.63) if A="~B" and V(B)=<x,y>, then V(A)=<l-x,y>
2.64) if A="B&C
" , V( B ) =<x
,
y> and V(C)=<w,z>, then
V(A)=<x*w, y.z>
2.65) if A="(V’v)B"
,
and x,y are the least values such
that there is a t' such that V(Bt'/v)=<x,y>
then V(A)=<x,y>
In reading the requirements on V contained in 2 . 63)
-
2 . 65)
it must be remembered that the four truth-values have been
identified by Martin with ordered pairs.
The semantics for a quantified four-valued system given
above is somewhat odd, requiring for example in clause
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2.o0) that every member of the domain be named by some term
of the language. This, however, is an outcome of Martin's
use of substitutional quantification and does not bear
direc tly on his treatment of sortal incorrectness.
There is a problem, however, with Martin's truth con-
ditions for the universal quantifier given in clause 2.65).
In fact, on the most reasonable interpretation of Martin’s
truth conditions for universally quantified sentences, we
seem to get the same counterintuitive result we got in
Bergmann's bivalent semantics, for it requires that any
universally quantified sentence which contains a predicate
which is not sortally correct for every name in the language
(and hence every object in the domain) will have an un-
satisfied sortal presupposition. For 2.65) tells us that
the value of a universally quantified sentence is the least
value had by any sentence which results from removing the
universal quantifier and substituting some name of the
language for the quantified variable. To begin with, it
is not clear that there will be a single least value, for
if we have a quantified sentence whose substitution instan-
ces all have either the value t=<l
,
0> or F=< 0
,
1> it is
unclear which of these counts as the least value x,y. But
even if this could be specified Martin would be in trouble.
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For consider the example of a clearly innocuous, sortally
correct sentence such as "all men are mortal." Since,
presumably, the theory of relativity is not the right sort
01 thing to be mortal, the substitution instance of the
above sentence with the name of the theory of relativity
substituted in for the variable will fail in its sortal
presuppositions (since a sentence fails of sortal presup-
position if any of its component senteces fail). So this
substitution instance will have either the truth-value
t=<l,0> or f=<0 , 0> . Either way, there will be a substitu-
tion instance of "all men are mortal" which yeilds a
truth-value which is less than T=<1 , 1>
. So counter to our
intuitions, the quantified sentence is not true--it is at
best a sentence which corresponds but fails in sortal
presupposition. Clearly this is an unacceptable consequence.
Again, this flaw does not show that Martin's four-
valued semantics for sortally incorrect sentences cannot
be modified to give an acceptable system. Whether or not
it is worth the effort of attempting to find such a mod-
ification will be discussed in the last section of this
chapter
.
Sortal Incorrectness and Truth-Value Gaps.
An approach to the semantics of sortally incorrect
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sentences which is often confused with three-valued
accounts is based on the intuition that simple subject-
predicate sortally incorrect sentences, while being fully
grammatical strings of a language
,
have no truth-value at
all. This approach is based on the semantic system for
presuppositon developed by van Fraassen (1966b, I968,
1969, 1970a) which was first applied to the problem of
sortal incorrectness by Thomason (1972).
I 0 is important at the outset to see the difference
bw tween this sort of approach and the three-valued systems
we saw earlier. A three-valued approach begins by saying
that simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sen-
tences are neither true nor false and hence have some
third truth-value. The truth-value gap approach agrees
that these sentences are neither true nor false, but does
not introduce a third value as the value of those sen-
tences. Instead, this approach claims that these sentences
literally have no truth -value at all. This may seem to be
a distinction without a difference. However, when dealing
with the logical connectives the distinction makes a major
difference. When defining the truth conditions for the
logical connectives, a three-valued account must, if it
treats these connectives as truth functional, treat all
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simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences in
tne same way, as all such sentences have the same truth-
value. As we saw, this caused some problems for three-
/alued accounts, as there is some intuitive backing in
distinguishing the truth-values of the sentences
2.52) Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the theory of relativity is not shiny
2.53) Either the taste of lemon is breakable or the
theory of relativity is not shiny
To distinguish these two on the bases of their truth-values,
a three-valued theory is forced to say that the second
disjunct is different in the two sentences, despite the
fact that they appear to be identical. No such problem
need arise in a system with truth-value gaps. Such a
theory can treat the logical connectives as truth functional
in that the truth-value of a complex sentence will be
determined by the truth-values of its parts if those parts
have a truth-value. But no such determination is required
in cases in which one of the parts of a complex sentence
lacks a truth-value. How we deal with such sentences is
left open. Lack of a truth-value is no more a separate
truth-value than lack of color is a separate color.
Thomason's account relies heavily on the intuition
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that the deviant nature of sortally incorrect subject-
predicate sentences is the result of the object referred
t0 ky subject of the sentence being the wrong sort of
hung to have or lack the property which is the referent
of the predicate of the sentence. He reflects this in
his system by introducing the notion of a sortal specif-
ication, which is one of the semantic determinants which
must be specified when giving a model for a language. A
sortal specification will have the form of a function from
predicates (or n-place relations) of the language to objects
(or n- tuples of objects) in the domain. Intuitively, the
sortal specification will map a predicate to the set of
objects which are of the right sort to have or lack the
property referred to by that predicate. We will call this
set of objects the sortal range of the property relative
to that sortal specification. A simple subject-predicate
sentence which says of an object within the sortal range
of a predicate that it has the property referred to by
that predicate will be either true or false. However, if
the sentence says of an object outside the sortal range of
a predicate that the object has the property referred to
by the predicate, the sentence will be neither true nor
false
.
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We °an cons1:ruc " a simple language to illustrate how
such a model works. Let L be a language with an infinite
number of names t^t^t^,...; and an infinite number of
n-place predicates (for n>0) P^.P^.P* Keeping the
language as simple as possible, we define the set of sen-
tences of L as the smallest set S such that
2.o6) if P^. is an n-place predicate of L and
^ • • • •
»
t
m+n
are names of L, then "Pn t ...t
J m m+n
6S
Obviously, L is a very simple language containing no
logically complex sentences, however, it will suffice to
illustrate the role of a sortal specification in setting-
up a model.
To specify a model of L requires that we give a domain,
a sortal specification, and an evaluation function. So a
model will be a triple <D,S,V> where
2.67) D is a non-empty set (the domain)
2.68) S is a function from n-place predicates of L to
subsets of D iX (the sortal specification)
2.69) V is a function from names, n-place predicates,
and sentences of L such that
a) if t
n
is a name of L, V(t )€D
in.
b) if P^ is an n-place predicate of L,
127
V( p
^) ES(P^) ED
n
c) if A is a sentence of L of the form
" P
mV’' t j+n" ’ then V ^ A ) = T iff <V(t.)
V (t.
+n
)>€V(P^)
; V(A)=F iff <V(t.)
V(t j+n )>A( p^) but <V(t.) f ... f V(t.+n )>
^^m^ 5 an<^ is undefined otherwise
j-his semantics works in the following way. The
oor^al specification maps n-place predicates into subsets
of the nth cartesian product of the domain; intuitively,
the n-tuples which are in the set which is the sortal
range of a predicate will be the things which are of the
right sort for the property referred to by that predicate.
The interpretation function, V, then maps names in the
language to objects in the domain and n-place predicates
into subsets of the nth cartesian product of the domain;
intuitively, the set of n-tuples of objects which the
interpretation function maps a predicate to will be the
objects of which that predicate can be truly predicated of.
Note that clause 2.69b) specifies that the objects in
this extension set of a predicate must be members of the
sortal range of that predicate. This captures our in-
tuition that only sentences which are sortally correct can
be true (in the case of subject-predicate sentences). A
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further connection between the sortal specification and the
truth-value of a sentence is given in clause 2 . 69 c), for
according to this clause a sentence can only be evaluated
as false if the objects referred to by the names in the
sentence are in the sortal range of the predicate and are
no u in the set of n- tuples which form the extension set of
that predicate. Any sentence which says of objects outside
oi the sortal range of a predicate that they have the
property denoted by that predicate will have no truth-value
at all; the interpretation function V is undefined for such
sentences
.
I t may strike one as odd that the sortal specification
is a mapping to (sets of n-tuples of) objects from predicates
rather than a mapping to objects from properties. This
would seem to allow for two predicates to differ only in
their sortal range and not in their extension sets. Given
the usual convention under which the meaning of a predicate
is identified in first order extensional languages with
the extension set of that predicate, this seems to give us
the result that two predicates can have the same meaning
without having the same sortal range . This would certainly
run counter to our intuitions.
The problem here is not with the sortal system, but
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with the identification of the meaning of a predicate with
its extension set. In standard predicate logic this ident-
ication is made possible by the fact that if two pred-
icates have the same extension set, the sentences formed
by concatenating a name of the language with either of the
two predicates will have the same truth-value. This is
not the case in the above system. For suppose we have
two predicates, P and Q, and a model such that v(P)=V(Q)
but S(P)^S(Q). While it will be the case on this model
that for any name of the language a, "Pa" is true if and
only if "Qa" is true, it will not be the case in the model
that "Pa" is false if and only if "Qa" is false. For let
a be the name of an object in the domain which is in the
sortal range of the predicate P (but not in its extension
set) and not in the sortal range of predicate Q. Then
"Pa" is sortally correct and false, while "Qa" is sortally
incorrect and has no truth-value. So while the two
predicates denote properties which are true of all the
same objects, they do not denote the same property, for one
is a property which is false of some objects for which the
other is undefined. We can, therefore, no longer identify
meaning with the extension set of a predicate
,
as the
sortal range of a predicate now plays an important part
130
m the meaning of predicates. While this may at first seem
disconcerting, it is hardly implausible that sortal features
should be part of meaning.
By evaluating sortally incorrect subject-predicate
sentences as neither true nor false, Thomason marks these
sentences as semantically deviant. However, he must also
supply us with some way of evaluating the truth-value of
sentences which are logically complex but which contain
oortally incorrect subject-predicate sentences as parts.
As with three-valued theories, a theory of sortally
incorrect sentences which evaluates some sentences as
being without truth-value should define the truth conditions
for logically complex sentences in a way which is normal,
that is to say, in such a way that the truth-value of a
complex sentence all of whose parts have one of the two
truth-values has the truth-value given in classical logic
to such a sentence. The problem, as with three-valued
theories, is to decide what truth-value we should assign
to complex sentences which have parts which themselves
lack a truth-value
.
Thomason deals with this by using van Fraassen's
method of evaluation by supervaluation. Very roughly, the
idea behind this method of evaluating logically complex
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sentences is this. Suppose that we have a logically complex
sentence which has as a part at least one sentence which
lacks truth-value. To determine the truth-value of the
sentence we see what the truth-value of that sentence
would oe if all the parts of the sentence which actually
have a truth-value had whatever value they in fact have
and if the part or parts which lack truth-value had one of
"ne '^wo classical truth-values. In cases where we have
only one sentential part with no truth-value, this means
i^hat we see what the truth-value of the complex sentence
would be if this part had the truth-value true and what the
value of the complex sentence would be if this part had
the truth-value false, using standard two-valued evaluation
techniques. If the complex sentence has the same truth-
value in both cases, we evaluate the sentence as having
that truth-value. If, however, the truth-value of the
complex sentence varies depending on the truth-value we
assign to the truth-valueless part, we assign no truth-
value at all to the sentence as a whole-- its truth-
value will not be defined.
The formal mechanism used to obtain this result
proceeds in three stages. We must first specify a partial
valuation, which will assign to the simple sentences of
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our language the values true, false, or no value at all.
we then specify a set of extended valuations relative to
that partial valuation. These extended valuations will
assign a truth-value to every sentence of the language,
bo .h simple and complex. Simple sentences are evaluated
as either true or false, the only restriction being that
if a sentence is evaluated as either true or false by our
beginning partial valuation, that sentence must receive the
value assigned to it by the partial valuation in every
member of the set of extended valuations relative to that
partial valuation. Simple sentences will all receive
either the value true or false on an extended valuation--
sentences which are not given a truth-value by the original
partial valuation are given some value, which can vary
from one extended valuation to another. Complex sentences
are then evaluated by the extended valuation in the trad-
itional fashion. This is possible since
,
on an extended
valuation, all the simple sentences of the language have
some truth-value. The set of extended valuations relative
to a given partial valuation will include two members for
every simple sentence which is given no truth-value by
that partial valuation, one which assigns that sentence
the value true and another which assigns that sentence the
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vaiue false ' No sentence of any complexity lacks a truth-
value on an extended valuation.
The final step in the evaluation process is to eval-
uate the sentences of the language on the supervaluation
induced by the partial valuation. The value of a sentence
on the supervaluation can be simply defined in the following
vvay. If all the extended valuations evaluate the sentence
as having the same truth-value, the supervaluation will
assign that sentence that truth-value. If, however, there
are members of the set of extended valuations which are
such that one of those extended valuations assigns the
sentence the value true while another assigns the sentence
the value false, the sentence is assigned no truth-value
by the supervaluation.
To demonstrate how we get these results formally, let
us extend our simple language L to the language L+C
,
which will include logically complex sentences based on
the unary connective for negation and the binary connective
for disjunction. The primitive vocabulary of L+C is that
of L with the addition of the one-place connective and
the two-place connective "v"
.
We define the set of
sentences of L+C as the smallest set S' such that
2.70) if ACS (the set of sentences of L) , then ACS'
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2.71) if A,B£S+
,
then "~A", "AvB"£S+
0xher conne,= tives can be added to the language by defining
them in terms of negation and disjunction in the standard
way.
The first step in giving a supervaluation semantics
for L-rC is to specify a partial valuation. This is no
problem, as the models for L will be partial valuations
1 °r L+'"
• Hence we can define a partial valuation, PV, for
as a triple <D,S,V> satisfying conditions 2. 67 ) -2. 69 ).
dote that specifying the partial valuations in this way
gives us the result that subject-predicate sortally in-
correct sentences are evaluated by the partial valuation
as having no truth-value.
We must now specify the set of extended valuations
relative to a partial valuation PV on L+C. This set will
be the set of all four— tuples I=<D,S,V,V , > such that
2.72) D , S
,
and V are the domain, sortal specification,
and evaluation function, respectively, specified
in the partial valuation PV;
V is a function from members of S+ (the set
of sentences of L+C) to {T , F} such that:
a) if ACS (the sentences of L) and V(A) is
defined, then V'(A)=V(A)
2 . 73 )
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b) if A="~B", then Y'(A)=T iff V'(B)=F,
otherwise V*(A)=F
c) if A=" BvC
" , then V'(A)=T iff V'(B)=T or
V'(C)=T, otherwise V'(A)=F
j\/e will call the set of all extended valuations I+
.
We will pause for a moment to take note of some of the
features of these extended valuations. Each of these
extended valuations is a bivalent valuation, in that on
each extended valuation every sentence of L+C is given a
truth-value. Further, on each of the extended valuations
negation and disjunction are classical. The negation of
a sentence will be true only if that sentence is false and
will be false only if that sentence is true
,
while a dis-
junction is true if either disjunct is true and false only
when both disjuncts are false. It should be noted that
extended valuations differ from each other only in the
last member of the four-tuple-- the domain, sortal specif-
ication, and partial valuation function are all copied
from the partial valuation PV. This insures that simple
subject-predicate sentences which are given a truth-value
on the partial valuation will all receive that very truth-
value on all of the extended valuations relative to that
partial valuation. At the level of simple sentences,
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members of the set of extended valuations will differ only
-n the values they give to sentences which are not given
a truth-value by the partial valuation. These sentences
will be given some truth-value on the extended valuations,
but what truth-value they receive may vary from one member
of that set to another.
Finally, we need to define the value of a sentence of
Ih-C on the supervaluation induced by a partial valuation
PV. Where I+ is the set of extended valuations relative
to 3- partial valuation FV on L+C
,
we can define the value
of a sentence A of L+C on the supervaluation induced bv
°PV
PV, denoted (A)
,
as
Spy S^,.
2.74) (A) =T iff V
'
( A ) =T for all l€l' ; (A)
P
=F
5
iff V'(A)=F for all l€
I
-
*"
; otherwise (A) " ^
is undefined
Some of the results of such a supervaluation semantics
are similar to those obtained in a three-valued system
using choice negation and strong disjunction. As with
choice negation, the result of negating a true sentence is
a false sentence, the result of negating a false sentence
is a true sentence, and the result of negating a sentence
which is without truth-value is a sentence which is also
without truth-value. As with a three-valued system using
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strong disjunction, the supervaluation system gives us the
result that any disjunction with one true disjunct is true,
no matter what the value or lack of value of the other
disjunct
.
However, the supervaluation system given above differs
~ rom a three-valued system in its treatment of classical
tautologies and contradictions. Remember that in a three-
valued system with choice negation and strong disjunction
not every sentence of the form "Pv~P" was true; specifically
if "P" was a sentence with the third truth-value the sen-
tence "Pv-P" also had the third truth-value. In a
supervaluation semantics, on the other hand, every sen-
tence which has the form of a classical tautology is
evaluated as true while every sentence which has the form
of a classical contradiction is evaluated as false. To see
this requires only that we note that all the members of the
set of extended valuations are classical valuations. From
this it follows that every member of the set of extended
valuations will evaluate all classical tautologies as true
and all classical contradictions as false. Since all of
the members of the set of extended valuations agree on
the value of these sentences, the supervaluation will
evaluate classical tautologies as true and classical
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contradictions as false, irrespective of the truth-value
or lack of truth-value of the component parts of those
sentences. Whether or not this is an advantage will be
discussed later.
There remains now only the project of extending this
of system to a quantified language. Thomason presents
his treatment of quantifiers in a very simple language,
which has a single one
-place predicate, "P", one binary
predicate, ”Q”
,
and a single individual constant, "a".
In reconstructing his system, we will use as primitive
connectives negation, disjunction, and the universal
quantifier. ^ Thomason does diverge from usual quantified
languages in that he allows for many-scrted quantification,
which he indicates by using different styles of individual
variables. In this language, we will use only two styles
of variables, x-^x^x.^ and y^yg.y^... By the terms
of the language we will mean either the individual con-
stant of the language or one of the variables (of either
sort). We may then define the set of sentences of this
language, which we will call QL, as the smallest set QS
such that
2.75) if w,s are terms of QL then "Pw" and "Qws"
are members of QS
2 . 76 )
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if A,B are members of QS
, then so are "~A"
,
"AvB"
2 ‘ 77 ) if A is a member of QS and u a variable (of
either style) then "(u)A" is a member of QS
A partial valuation of QL will be a four-tuple <D lf D ,S,Vi>
such that D
2 and D 2 are non-empty sets (the domains of the
variables); S a function mapping P to a subset of D-^D and
Q oo a subset of (D^UD
^
2 (the sortal ranges of those
predicates); and V a function which maps a to a member of
DfUD^ P to a subset of S(P), and Q to a subset of S(Q).
Intuitively, V(P) will be the set of objects in the domain
of which P is true while V(Q) will be the set of objects
in the domain which stand in relation Q.
A QL assignment of values to variables will be a
function g from variables of QL to objects in the domain
such that if is a variable of the first type, g(x )€D-^
while if y^ is a variable of the second type g(yn )€D^. An
extended valuation of QL relative to a partial valuation
PV=<D
1
,
D
2
, S , V> and g assignment of values to variables is
a five-tuple I=<D
1
,D
2
, S , Y, V’> such that D 0 , S, and
V are the domains, sortal specification, and evaluation
function, respectively, given in PV and V is a function
from terms, predicates, and sentences of QL such that
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2-78) V' (a)=V(a)
2-79) if u is a variable of QL (of either style),
V'(u)=g(u)
2.80) V(P)cV'(P) and V* (P)n (S(P)
-V(P) )=0
2.31) V(Q) EV'(Q) and V’ ( Q) n(S(Q)
-V(Q) )=0
2.82) if u is a term of QL then V'(Pu)-T iff
V' (u)€V' (P)
2.83) if u,v are terms of QL then V'(Quv)=T iff
<V (u)
,
V' ( v )>£ V
' (Q)
2*84) if then V'(A)-T iff v , (B)=F
2.85) if A= "BvC " then V' (A)=T iff V'(B)=T or V»(c)=T
2.86) if A=
" (
x
n
) B" then V’(A)=T iff for all V" just
like V’ except, perhaps, for the value of
V"(x
n ) ,
V" ( B)=T
2 • 87) if A="(y
n
)B" then V'(A)=T iff for all V”
just like V* except, perhaps, for the value of
v M (yn ), V" (B)=T
2.38) if V’(A)/T and A is a sentence of QL, then
V' ( A ) =F
A sentence is true on an extended valuation I relative to •
a partial valuation P7 if and only if V' maps that sentence
mo T for all g assignments of values to variables; other-
wise the sentence is false on that extended valuation.
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The set of extended valuations, I+
, relative to a partial
valuation PV is the set of all extended valuations I sat-
isfying conditions 2. 78)
-2. 88). A sentence of QL is true
on the supervaluation induced by a partial valuation PV
if and only if it is true on all extended valuations l£l+
;
false if and only if false on all extended valuations I^I4";
and undefined otherwise.
• By now we should be fairly suspicious of quantified
o /o .eras which attempt to deal with sortally incorrect
sentences. Both systems we have seen previously which
attempted uo apply an analysis of sortally incorrect sen-
tences to a quantified language had as an outcome that the
sentence "all men are mortal" is sortally incorrect. So
an obvious first move is to see how Thomason's system
handles this sentence
.
As it stands
,
the language for which Thomason has
given a semantics is not rich enough to allow us to trans-
late the sentence into a sentence of the language. However,
by adding another one-place predicate to the language we
could have a translation of the sentence, and we could
extend the semantics to include this in an obvious way.
However, it is not at all obvious how we are to
translate the sentence "all men are mortal" into the sorted
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quantified logic given by Thomason. The problem concerns
which sort of variable we should use in the translation
of the sentence. Thomason says very little about how one
decides which style of variable to use when translating an
English sentence into his formal language. Two possibil-
ities seem open to us, depending on how, if at all, the
sorted variables interact with the sorts of the predicates.
The first possibility would take the variables to be
sorted independently of the sorts of the predicates. This
seems to be indicated by the way Thomason has set up his
system
,
as the different styles of variables range over
different subsets of the domain, D
1
and D 2> while the
sortal ranges of the predicates are specified as subsets
of the union of these separate domains. So it is possible
that both the sortal range and the extension of the pred-
icates which are the translations of "is a man" and "is
mortal" neither fully exhaust nor are fully exhausted by
the range of either style of variable. If the sortal
range and the extension of these predicates are not fully
exhausted by either of the variable's domains, then no
matter what style of variable we pick there will be objects
in the domain of the variables which are outside of the
sortal range of the predicates. Assuming that everything
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WhiCh iS a man is raorta1
’ this will result in the trans-
lation of the sentence "all men are mortal" being evaluated
as having no truth-value. If the sortal range and the
extension of the predicates are not fully contained in the
domain of either style of variable, then translating the
sentence using either style of variable will not result
m a sentence which says about every man that he is mortal
-
it will only say that every man in the domain of the choosen
variable is mortal.
An alternative to this problematic treatment of the
variables is to take the domains of the styles of variables
to coincide with the sortal ranges of predicates. While
nothing in the formal machinery dictates such a relation-
ship between the variables and the predicates, examples
given by Thomason in his article do use the different
stales of /ariables to quantify over the sortal ranges of
different predicates. If this alternative is adopted, we
should translate the sentence "all men are mortal" using
vhe style of variable which ranges over objects of the
correct sort to be both men and mortal.
An immediate question we must ask is whether or not
the sortal ranges of these two predicates coincide. If
they do not, we must still decide which of two possible
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styles of variable we should pick to quantify over in trans
lating our sentence. But it does not seem unreasonable to
assume that the sorts of things which we can truly or
falsely say are men coincides with the sort of things
which we can truly or falsely say are mortal. If this is
the case, then we can have a single style of variable with
domain a single sort, and we can evaluate the sentence with
respect to only those sorts of things. It should turn out
that the sentence is true for all those objects, and hence
the sentence will be evaluated as true. So Thomason's
system, interpreted in this way, appears to be superior to
^he other quantified systems we have seen in at least its
treatment of this sentence.
By assuming that the sorted variables range over
domains which coincide with the sortal ranges of predicates
we also obtain the correct result in cases of quantified
sentences which we would intuitively want to classify as
serially incorrect, such as "all theories are shiny." In
the case of this sentence, the variable we choose will have
to range over the sort of one of the predicates "is a
theory" or "is shiny." In either case the variable will
not range over the objects which are within the sortal
range of the other predicate. Hence the truth-value of
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of the quantified sentence will vary from extended valuation
to extended valuation, being false on some but true on
3 "hers
. So the sentence will receive no truth-value on
me supervaluation, giving us the result we want.
Unfortunately, we get these results only at the cost
of making some fairly strong assumptions. The first of
..hese is that the domains of the sorted variables will
coincide with the sortal ranges of predicates. Nothing-
in the s true ture of Thomason's semantics guarentees us
this result. Even if this result were guarenteed, we must
make the further assumption that the sortal ranges of
different predicates are either identical or disjoint. If
this is not the case and there are predicates which have
sortal ranges which overlap but are not identical, Thom-
ason will be forced into either saying- that any quantified
sentence which is contingent but has occurences of both
predicates followed by the same variable is neither true
nor false, or introduce a third variable which has as its
domain the intersection of the two sortal ranges.
An additional unattractive feature of the Thomason
quantification system is that on his treatment, sortally
incorrect sentences which are quantified are all ambig-
uous. As we saw before, the sentence "all theories are
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shiny" could be translated using either a variable which
has as its domain the sort of things which can be theories
or a variable which has as its domain the sorts of things
which can be shiny. These different translations do not
represent mere notational variants of the same sentence,
for the choice of variable determines in an important
respect what things the sentence is about. The two
translations differ in meaning, for they make claims about
different sets of objects.
Even with these drawbacks the Thomason system is a
viable alternative as a semantic account of sortally in-
correct sentences. Whether or not his approach deserves
further development will be discussed in the last section
of this chapter.
Katz and Sortal Inc orrec tness .
A final theory of sortally incorrect sentences we
will look at is that given by Katz (1964b). This theory
differs fundamentally from those we have looked at
previously in that it is not an attempt to give a model-
theoretic account of the truth conditions for sentences of
a language. Instead, it is built into a different sort
of semantic framework of the type advocated by Fodor and
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and Katz ( 1964b)
.
This type of semantic theory has as its goal not the
assignment of truth-values to sentences of a language but
rather "the construction of a set of rules which represents
what a fluent speaker knows about the semantic structure
his language that permits him to understand its sen-
tences (Katz (1964b), p. 519-520). Specifically, the
oort of knowledge such a theory is designed to represent
is the knowledge a speaker exhibits when
. . .he differentiates semantically acceptable
from semantically anomalous sentences; he recog-
nizes ambiguities stemming from semantic rela-
tions; he detects semantic relations between
expressions and sentences of different syntactic
type and morpheme constitution; and so forth. .
.
((1964b), p. 522 )
Hence must of the thrust of this sort of semantic theory
is to attempt to elucidate semantic relationships which
hold between different sentences of the language, and to
explicate and account for ambiguity and senselessness
(or anomaly) in sentences of a language.
The structure of the theory envisioned by Katz takes
the semantics of a language to have two components. The
first of these Katz calls the dictionary, which "provides
a meaning for each lexical item of the language" (( 1964b)
,
p. 520). According to Katz,
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. . in a majority of cases a dictionary entry
consists of a finite number of sequences of
symbols, each sequence consisting of an initial
subsequence of syntactic markers, followed by
a
^
subsequence of "semantic markers," then, op-
tionally, one "distinguisher , " and finally a
"selection restriction." Dictionary entries can
be represented in the form of tree diagrams.
.
.
where each sequence in the entry for a lexical
item appears as a distinct path rooted at that
lexical item... Each complete path, each sequence,
represents a distinct sense of the lexical item
in whose entry it appears ...(( 1964b ) p. 523)
The second component of such a semantics is a set of
what Katz calls projection rules. The role of these rules
is to provide a semantic reading for syntactically complex
expressions of the language. The projection rules take
the information supplied by the dictionary along with the
syntactic structure of a phrase and give as output a sem-
antic reading or readings for the phrase built from those
lexical items by those rules. The structure of these pro-
jection rules is complicated and will not be discussed in
this section; for our present purposes it will suffice
merely to state their function.
The two components of such a theory are designed to
give a set of semantic readings to every sequence of lex-
ical items of a language produced by a generative syntax
for that language. These semantic readings will be paths
up a structure tree in which the bottom of the tree is
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formed by the dictionary entries of the lexical items
which make up the sentence. The tree itself will show
now the projection rules put together the appropriate
parts of the dictionary entry for combined lexical items
to form meaningful phrases up to the level of the full
sentence. Features such as ambiguity, anomaly, and synon-
omy can be determined by such trees. If the set of paths
up the tree is empty, the sentence is semantically anom-
alous; if there are n distinct paths up the tree (for n
greater than 1) the sentence is n-ways ambiguous; and if
the trees for two sentences are identical, the two sen-
tences are synonomous.
Katz considers sortally incorrect sentences to be
cases of sentences which are anomalous. As such, these
sentences will have no paths up the semantic tree which
gives such sentences a reading. The mechanism which
guarentees that no such path will be available for sortally
incorrect sentences is to be found on the level of the
dictionary entries for the lexical items which make up the
sentence. More specifically, any path for a sortally
incorrect sentence will be blocked because of the inter-
play between the selection restrictions of the lexical
items of the sentence. The selection restrictions on a
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lexical item "determine the combinations into which the
item can enter and the sense(s) it bears in those combin-
ations" (p. 524). The example Katz gives is the selection
restriction on the lexical item "honest" when used in the
sense of the lexical item "chaste." The dictionary entry
* °r ‘-his lexical item with this sense has the selection
restriction "(Human) and (Female)." This selection restric
Lion has the effect of saying that the lexical item can
have this sense "just in case the head it modifies has a
path containing both the semantic marker (Human) and the
path semantic marker ( Female )"(p. 525)
•
If no such sem-
antic markers are present in the path, the sense of "honest
which is synonomous with "chaste" is blocked; if other
senses of the term are also blocked because of analogous
problems with selection restrictions the sentence will be
anomalous
.
This approach to sortal incorrectness is very much
like that taken by Chomsky, who blocks the generation of
sortally incorrect sentences by introducing selectional
restrictions at the level of syntax. However, the Katz
system treats selection restrictions as semantic features
of the lexical items in question, thus avoiding some of
the problems which led us to reject Chomsky’s account.
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Katz says nothing about how we are to treat logically
complex sentences which have serially incorrect sentences
as parts, nor does he say anything about quantified sen-
tences which we would judge intuitively to be sortally
incorrect. However, this is not suprising, as his system
io not an attempt to deal with the logical notions of
truth or validity. The concern of the theories we looked
at earlier with these logical notions can be treced at
least partially to the fact that those theories grow out
of the tradition of formal semantics. Since Katz has
- 3 jected such an approach as a foundation for the seman-
tics of natural languages, he should not be expected nor
required to answer the same sorts of questions as are
answered in model-theoretic accounts.
The above discussion of Katz's approach is merely a
sketch, and some features of the account have been totally
ignored. Katz never gives a complete example of a dic-
tionary entry nor does he ever discuss in detail how the
projection rules are to function, and we have not attempted
to fill in these blanks. Whether or not the theory is worth
further exploration will depend on the results of the
next section, where we will finally attempt to decide which,
if any, of the approaches to sortal incorrectness we have
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seen so far is the most promising candidate for supplying
us with an adequate theory.
Making a Choice
.
In the previous sections we have seen five different
ways of approaching the problem of giving a semantics for
sortally incorrect sentences. Each of these theories say
something different about sortally incorrect sentences, and
most have some features which we found to be at least
c ^- a Problematic. it is now time to decide which
of these theories, if any, is the most promising candidate
as an approach to the problem.
The i irst decision we must make concerns what sort
of framework our semantic theory should have. We have
two alternatives
--we can either attempt to give a semantics
for sortally incorrect sentences using a system modelled
after the semantics given for formal languages, or we can
use the sort of framework advocated by Katz and Fodor.
The Katz/Fodor semantic framework has at least one
advantage over the formal semantic models in that it
treats natural language directly. The four model-theoretic
accounts we have seen are all ways of dealing with sort-
ally incorrect sentences in formal languages. Implicit in
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these accounts is the supposition that either we can trans-
late from natural languages into the formal languages with-
out loss of important features of meaning or that the
mechanisms used to deal with sortally incorrect sentences
in the formal language are the same as the mechanisms
we would have to use in accounting for sortally incorrect
sentences in the natural language. The Katz/Fodor model
needs to make neither assumption, as no formal language is
ever appealled to. Their model for semantics deals with
English directly. Since the sortally incorrect sentences
we are attempting to account for are sentences of English,
this direct confrontation with the data simplifies the
sort of semantics advocated by Katz and Fodor.
However, it is not clear how much of an advantage this
feature gives to a Katz/Fodor style semantics. Trans-
lation from natural language to artificial languages is a
skill taught in most elementary logic classes. Even more
relevant to this issue are grammars for fragments of
English like that of Montague ( 197^a, 197^+h) which have
mechanical translation procedures mapping English sentences
to formulas in an artificial language for which a model-
theoretic semantics is given. Ideally, a fully adequate
semantics for sortally incorrect sentences in a natural
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language would, if it gave a model-theoretic semantics for
an artificial language, include such a translation pro-
cedure. But there seems to be no problem in principle
about making such a shift from natural to artificial
language s
.
Beyond this dubious advantage to the Katz/Fodor
approach are a number of disadvantages. Perhaps the
strongest criticism of that kind of approach is made by
Lewis ( 1972 ), who argues that a semantics of that type
which does not deal with the notion of truth "is not a
semantics' (p. 169). A Katz/Fodor semantics relies on
bhe decomposition of lexical items to semantic markers.
But, says Lewis,
. . .Semantic markers are symbols ; items in the
vocabulary of an artificial language we may call
semantic Marke re se . Semantic interpretation by
means
. of them amounts merely to a translation
algorithm from the object language to the auxil-
iary language Markerese. But we can know the
Markerese translation of an English sentence
without knowing the first thing about the mean-
ing
>
of the English sentence: namely, the con-
ditions under which it would be true . . . Trans-
lation into Markerese is at best a substitute
for real semantics ...(( 1972 )
,
p. 169)
The fact that the Katz/Fodor method stops at the level
of semantic markers, continues Lewis, "prevents Markerese
semantics from dealing with the relations between symbols
and the world of non-symbols-- that is, with genuinely
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semantic relations" (p. 170).
Put in another way, Lewis' point is at least partly
.he following. The role of semantics is not merely to
explain the semantic relationships which hold among differ-
ent sentences of a language, but to explicate the relations
which hold between language and the world. The Markerese
which is the result of a Katz/Fodor semantic system may
reach the first of these goals, but cannot adequately
tie language and the world together, as the semantics
Slops with other symbols and never ties itself to the
world
.
This point is of special relevance in attempting to
account for sortally incorrect sentences. On the Katz/
Fodor approach, the deviance of sortally incorrect sen-
tences is traced to selection restrictions, which are
restrictions on which lexical items can meaningfully be
put together with other lexical items. But the intuition
we wished to capture was that sortally incorrect sentences
are the result of predicating a property of an object
which is of the wrong sort to either have or lack that
property. On the Katz/Fodor approach to semantics we
could never capture this intuition, as that sort of theory
is incapable of talking about either objects or properties,
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which are not symbols but are (at least in some sense)
objects in the world.
Another consideration against the adoption of a Katz/
Podor model is the following. Suppose that we could give
an adequate Markerese account of the semantic relations
among English sentences on which all sortally incorrect
oub jec t-predicate sentences come out as lacking a reading
and are hence anomalous. We would still need to answer
the question of what truth-value these sentences have.
Since such sentences are not given a reading, they will
l presumably) not be true. But whether such sentences are
false
,
or have some third truth-value
,
or have no truth-
value at all is a question which is not addressed by Katz.
Even if we had an answer to that question, we would still
need to decide how those sentences affect the truth-value
of logically complex sentences which have them as compon-
ents. To do this would require something along the lines
of a semantic theory like those given for formal languages.
If we are going to have to give such a theory anyway,
we might as well start with trying to give such a theory.
The answer to our first question, then, is that we
will pursue a semantic theory of sortal incorrectness
within the framework of model-theore tic semantics. This
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still leaves us with four alternatives and the option of
rejecting all the approaches we have seen so far in favor
of something completely different. But we have decided
on the form of the approach. Now we must decide on the
substance
.
At the most basic level, the formal semantic theories
we have looked at differ in the truth-value (or lack of
truth-value) they assign to subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences. An obvious way to decide on the
preferred approach, therefore, would be to decide what the
truth-value of those sentences should be. If we decide
that these sentences are false
,
we would have good evidence
that some theory like Bergmann's is the proper approach;
if we decide that such sentences are neither true nor
false but do behave truth-func tionally with respect to the
logical connectives, we will have good grounds for adopting
a multi-valued approach to sortal incorrectness; while if
we decide that those sentences are neither true nor false
and further do not behave as though they have some other
truth-value
,
we will have good grounds for adopting a
truth-value gap approach like Thomason's.
This project, however, is not as easy as it seems.
While there does seem to be a uniform intuition among
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philosophers who address the problem of sortally incorrect
sentences that such sentences are not true, no such com-
monality can be found as to what truth-value, if any, such
sentences do have. Our intuitions do not seem to guide us
here; they most certainly do not guide us all in the same
direction. What we seem to need is some sort of argument
which we can appeal to to answer the question.
One philosopher who has argued that simple subject-
predicate sortally incorrect sentences are false is Drange
( 1966 ). Drange claims that sortally incorrect sentences
can be shown false because their negations "can be proved
true... by appeal to premises whose truth is itself beyond
question" (( 1966 ), p. 24). An example of a proof which
Drange gives to show that the sortally incorrect sentence
2 . 89 ) The theory of relativity is blue
is false is
2.90) The theory of relativity is a theory
2.91) Theories are abstract entities
2.92) No abstract entities are concrete entities
2.93) Only concrete entities are colored
2.94) Only colored entities are blue
2.95) Therefore, the theory of relativity is not blue
In this argument, says Drange,
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Of course, if Drange
’ s proof works, he has only shown that
the sortally incorrect sentence 2.89) is false. However,
i'J clear how we would go about constructing a similar
argument which would show that any subject-predicate sort-
ally incorrect sentence of the form "S is F" is false; such
a proof would have a form something like;
2 . 96 ) S is an entity of sort T
2 . 97 ) No entity of sort T is an entity of sort Q
2 . 98 ) Only entities of sort Q are P
2.99) Therefore, S is not P
This sort of argument fails to convince those who
hold theories which deny that sortally incorrect subject-
predicate sentences are false. The problem, according
to Routley (1969) is that to obtain the proper conclusion,
2 . 99 ), we must understand premise 2.98) as saying something
like "everything which is not of sort Q is not P." But
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Routley and other non-bivalent theorists would deny the
truth of the premise so understood, saying that when in-
terpreted m that way the premise is sortally incorrect
and therefore cannot be true.
Routley does admit that there is a way of understanding
the premises m this kind of argument in such a way that
they are true. To do this requires that premise 2 . 98 ) be
understood as saying something like "it is not true of
any entity which is not of sort Q that it is a P." But
if this is the way we understand the premise, the conclus-
ion must be read "therefore, it is not true that S is P."
Routley would not deny the truth of this, but such a con-
clusion falls short of establishing that sortally incor-
rect sentences are false because their negations are true.
To move from the conclusion Routley will allow to a con-
clusion like 2.99) requires that we assume that if a sen-
tence is not true then its negation is true. But this
only follows in a bivalent logic or a multi-valued logic
with a certain sort of negation (exclusion negation). In
a system with truth-value gaps or in multi-valued systems
with choice negation, no such move is possible. More
to the point, the move from the conclusion "it is not
true that S is P" to the conclusion "S is not P" and from
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there to the conclusion that "S is P" is false is only
justified m a system in which every sentence is either
true or false. So if Drange
' s argument is valid, it will
not be sound (or at least will not be based on a priori ,
obvious truths as premises), while if it is an argument
all of whose premises are obviously true, it can only be
made valid by begging the question.
Routley replies to these kinds of arguments by offer-
ing an argument designed to show that the only adequate
semantics for sortally incorrect sentences (which he calls
"non-significant sentences") is a multi-valued theory. A
theory which is not multi-valued, argues Routley,
.
* * -would be quickly discredited as inconsistent:
since the .classical
. negation of a non-significant
sentence is, by definition, also non-significant,
xor some sentence p both p and ^p would be falsem the theory.
..( (1969)
, p. 368)
ihe pro olem Routley is noting here is one we saw in con-
nection with the simple bivalent theory we discussed in
the second section of this chapter. There we noted that
the sentences
2 . 1 ) The theory of relativity is shiny
2 . 5 ) The theory of relativity is not shiny
are both judged by some (but not all) to be sortally
incorrect. If we have a theory which says that sortally
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incorrect sentences are false, then we must say that both
2-i) and 2.5) are false if the intuition that both are
sortally incorrect is accepted. But, says Routley, 2.5)
is the negation of 2.1) and so we are in the position of
saying that for this sentence, both it and its negation
are false, thus throwing our system into the class of
inconsistent theories.
The first thing we should notice about Routley'
s
argument is that it does not show the necessity of a multi-
valued approach to sortally incorrect sentences. At best
it shows that bivalent approaches to the problem are doomed
.o inconsistency. We can avoid the inconsistency, however,
by adopting a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. So
a o oest Routley has eliminated one competitor to the multi-
valued approach he advocates; he has yet to clear the
field.
But even if we restrict Routley' s argument so that it
is directed against only bivalent theories, the argument
fails. In this argument, as Bergmann (1977) points out,
"Routley makes an important assumption: that the classical
negation of a sortally incorrect sentence is itself sort-
ally incorrect" (( 1977 ), p. 64 ). This, in turn, rests on
the assumption that 2.5) is the classical negation of 2.1).
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But as we saw in Bergmann's system, there is no requirement
that this be the case. We can develop a system with two
sorts of negation on which 2-5) is not the classical nega-
tion of 2.1) and avoid the inconsistency charged by Routley.
So Routley' s argument does not show even the weaker con-
clusion that sortally incorrect sentences cannot be ac-
counted for in a bivalent system.
An argument designed to show that sortally incorrect
suo j ec t-pre dicate sentences are without truth-value can be
constructed from the intuitions given by Thomason (1972).
Again, consider the sentences
2.52) Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
the theory of relativity is not shiny
2.53) Either the taste of lemon is breakable or
the theory of relativity is not shiny
Both of these sentences are disjunctions, which have as
their first disjunct a sortally incorrect sentence and as
their second disjunct some form of a negation of a sortally
incorrect sentence. The first of these, says Thomason,
is a sentence which has the form of a classical tautology
and is therefore to be evaluated as true, while the second
sentence is said by him to be sortally incorrect and there-
fore ought not to be evaluated as true. If this is the
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case, it shows that sortally incorrect sentences cannot he
assigned the same truth-value on a semantics which treats
"he connectives of disjunction and negation as truth-func-
tional and treats sentences 2.52) and 2.53) as cases of
two sentences which have the same logical form. For if
jhe owo sentences have the same logical form and simple
subject-predicate sentences which are sortally incorrect
have the same truth-value (no matter what that truth-value
may be), sentences 2.52) and 2.53) should have the same
truth-value. To distinguish the two sentences by their
truth-value requires that we either claim that the sen-
tences do not have the same logical form, or that we deny
that disjunction and negation are truth-functional, or that
we accept the view that sortally incorrect subject-predic-
ate sentences are without truth-value. The first of these
alternatives is highly implausible while the second
requires that we propose a radical change in the nature
of the logical connectives. The most reasonable alterna-
tive is to accept the third alternative, in which case we
would be accepting the basic foundation of Thomason's
approach to sortally incorrect sentences.
I can see no flaw in this argument if one agrees with
Thomason's intuitions that 2.52) is true and 2.53) is not.
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But these intuitions are not universally held. A proponent
of a multi-valued approach who takes the negations in the
second disjuncts of these sentences to he choice negation
-vould deny that 2 . 52 ) is true, accepting the consequence
that not all sentences of the form "Pv-P" are true. Berg-
mann explicitly denies that sentences like 2.52) are true,
asking
...why should the s tatement
. . . he true, if
neither. disjunct. is true?...
I
fail to see the
virtue in retaining the set of classical taut-
ologies if this is the result ...(( 1977 )
,
p. 71)
Bergmann, in fact, claims that sentence 2*52) is false, and
that our intuition that it is true is the result of con-
fusing that sentence, which on her system has a second
disjunct which is the internal negation of a sortally
incorrect subject-predicate sentence, with the sentence
2.100) Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
it is not the case that the theory of relat-
ivity is shiny
which, she says, is true. But 2.100) is true because its
second disjunct is, on Bergmann' s theory, the external
negation of a sortally incorrect sentence, and thus is
true. So Bergmann' s attack on this argument is two-
pronged--she not only disagrees with Thomason in her judge-
ment of the truth-value of sentence 2 . 52 ), she disagrees
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with him as to the logical
ohat it is a sentence with
ology
.
form of that sentence, denying
the form of a classical taut-
A striking feature of the objections presented against
arguments for the truth-value (or lack of truth-value) of
simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences is
tne fundamental level at which those criticisms are lodged.
The objections take the form of denying the truth of prem-
ises the arguer takes to be obvious truths (indeed, in one
case, a Priori truths), or the logical form of a sentence
used m the argument, or the validity of some move in the
argument. Nor are these disagreements confined to those
who are proponents of different approaches to the problem.
Both Drange and Bergmann agree that simple subject-
predicate sortally incorrect sentences should be evaluated
as false, but Drange takes sentences like
2.5) The theory of relativity is not shiny
to oe classical negations of subject-predicate sortally
incorrect sentences and hence sentences which are true,
while Bergmann takes such sentences to be the internal
negations of subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences
and hence sentences which are false.
Given this fundemental disagreement among the pro-
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ponents of different semantic approaches to sortally in-
correct sentences, it is difficult to see how any argument
presented in favor of one approach can avoid criticism
by a P r°P°nen ^ of another approach. If the proponents of
the various approaches cannot even agree on the truth-
values o^ obvious truths," the logical structure of sen-
tences, or the rules of inference which preserve validity,
the common agreement concerning the ground rules for argu-
men u which make such argument possible is missing. With-
out some agreement on these basic issues, arguments for or
against the different approaches will lead nowhere.
If our intuitions concerning the status of sortally
incoirect sentences cannot be used to decide on an approach
and if the common agreement which allows for argument is
missing, how are we to decide which approach is the one
we should adopt? One method would be to flip a coin or
cut cards. A more rational decision procedure, however,
is to compare the different theories in an attempt to
decide which of them leads to the best overall explanation
of sortal incorrectness.
We are driven to this because we find ourselve s in
the following position. The only data which are agreed
to by all the participants in the debate are that sortal
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incorrectness is caused by some flaw in the matching of
object and property; that sortally incorrect sentences are
in some way deviant; and that sortally incorrect sentences
are not true. All the theories we have looked at give
us these results, with the possible exception of Martin’s
four-valued theory which allows for the possibility that
oortally incorrect sentences can correspond even though
they have some unsatisfied presuppositions, making these
sentences "sort of true" in the same way all classical
tautologies are at least "sort of true." Since these are
the only data agreed to by all the participants in the
debate, we are in the position of having the data under-
de termining the theory, that is, we have incompatible
theories all of which account for the available data. When
we are in such a position we cannot decide between the
theories on any basis other than that of which theory has
the preferable internal structure
.
Two criteria which are standardly used in deciding
between incompatible theories all of which account for
the same data are simplicity and generality. Both of these
criteria are vague at best, and while I will try to say
something about how they are to be applied in this case I
do not claim to be able to make them precise. To these
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two vague criteria we will add a third, equally vague
criterion, which we will refer to as logical conservatism.
By logical conservatism I mean something like the
following. Whatever approach we adopt in attempting to
account for sortally incorrect sentences, we should strive
to re °ain as much of classical logic as possible. In
practice, this requirement tells us that if we have two
competing approaches, each of which accounts for the data
and neither of which is to be preferred on other grounds,
we should pick whichever system is most like classical
logic. Of course, it may not be easy to tell which of two
systems is mos o like classical logic. But as a minimum
requirement we should strive to come up with an account
of sortally incorrect sentences within the framework of a
system which, when restricted to sentences all of which
are sortally correct, gives us the same results as classic-
al logic
.
The criterion of generality is no more capable of
being given a precise characterization than the criterion
of logical conservatism, but the idea behind it is reason-
ably straightforward. Given two competing theories both
of which account for the data, one of which accounts for
that data in a way which is applicable to other problems in
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natural language while the other uses mechanism or devices
Which are not
> the first account is to be preferred. The
rational behind this is tied to our third criterion, that
°~ simplicity, in that the more data which can be accounted
j-or oy a technique or mechanism the simplier the overall
theory of language will be.
The third criterion, simplicity, is no more precise
than the other two although it is a little more widely
appealed to in attempts to choose between theories. The
idea is allied to the metaphysical principle of Occum's
razor. Where the latter proscribes against the needless
multiplication of entities, the criterion of simplicity
proscribes against the needless multiplication of complex-
ity. Just what constitutes complexity in a theory has
never been spelled out in a satisfactory way, and no
a otemp t at making the notion precise will be undertaken
here. The best that can be hoped for is that the reader
will agree with my claims that one theory is less complex
than another in certain appropriate respects.
Given the vague nature of the criteria which we will
be appealing to to determine which approach to take in
dealing with sortally incorrect sentences, I can hardly
hope to give a proof that one approach is to be preferred
171
above all others. What I do hope for Is that the following
discussion will convince the reader that the approach I
choose to pursue is in fact the preferable approach. At
worst, the following discussion will indicate to the
reader why I have choosen to approach the problem in the
way in which I do.
To get back to the job at hand, we must now decide on
the basis of our vague criteria which, if any, of 'the four
approaches to sortally incorrect sentences which remain
as viable alternatives we wish to pursue. Our choice is
between something like Bergmann's bivalent theory, Thom-
ason's truth-value gap analysis, the four-valued approach
advocated by Martin, or some variant of a three-valued
theory
.
All four of the approaches satisfy our minimal con-
dition of logical conservatism, that is, all the systems
proposed reduce to classical logic when restricted to
sentences which are not sortally incorrect (or problematic
for some other reason)
. This is obvious in the case of
Bergmann's system, for if all the sentences considered in
that system are sortally correct, the distinction between
internal and external negation disappears and the operator
for "is sortally correct," the y operator, will prefix
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to any sentence of the language and result in a sentence
uh_ch is true. Thomason's system also reduces to classical
logic if all the sentence of the language are sortally
correct. In such a case the partial valuation will give
all atomic sentences a truth-value, leading to only one
extended valuation relative to that partial valuation.
This extended valuation will be classical, and the super-
valuation induced by the partial valuation will have only
a singleton set of extended valuations to look at in eval-
uating a sentence. So the value of a sentence on the super-
valuation Will, trivially, be the value of the sentence on
that single classical expended valuation.
The multi-valued theories will also reduce to classic-
al, two-valued logic when applied to languages all the
sentences of which are sortally correct. For three-valued
logics, this is a result of our insistence on defining the
connectives in what we called a "normal" form. Martin's
system will redice to a logic with the two truth-values
T-<1,1> and F-<0 , 1>
,
the evaluation function in this logic
will replicate that of classical logic.
While the minimal condition is met by all of the
different systems, it does not seem to be the case that
all of the systems are equally conservative with respect
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to the outcomes of other issues generally considered of
logical relevance. One place where this is apparent is in
the Way the bill’s rent systems deal with the classical
tautologies and contradictions. Once we allow serially
incorrect sentences into the language, it is no longer the
case in three-valued systems that all sentences which have
.he form of classical tautologies are evaluated as true
and all sentences which have the form of classical contra-
dictions are evaluated as false. Sentences which have these
forms will have the third truth-value if the component
parts of that sentence have the third truth-value (regard-
less of whether we choose the strong or weak versions of
the binary connectives) in a three-valued logic which takes
as a primitive choice negation. To retain the truth of all
sentences which have the form of a classical tautology and
the falsity of all sentences which have the form of a
classical contradiction, we must include the strong ver-
sions of the binary connectives and interpret negation as
exclusion negation. While this strategy will retain the
truth of tautologies and the falsity of contradictions,
we saw in our discussion of three-valued theories that
adoption of this strategy also gives us as true sentences
which we intuitively judge to be just as bad as sortally
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incorrect sentences, such as
2-53) Either the taste of lemon is breakable or the
theory of relativity is not shiny
defender of this sort of three-valued approach could
merely say that this intuition is incorrect, and that the
correct intuition is that all simple subject-predicate
sortally incorrect sentences have the third truth-value,
1 r°m which it does not follow that all sentences judged to
oe as bad as simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect
sentences also have the third truth-value.
iA/hile this approach is logically conservative, it has
a fatal drawback. The negations of sortally incorrect
subject-predicate sentences will now all be evaluated as
true. So why don’t we do away with the third truth-value,
say that sortally incorrect subject-predicate sentences
are false, and simplify the system by getting rid of the
extra truth-value? The reason given for rejecting the
bivalent approach by Routley is that saying that all sort-
ally incorrect sentences are false leads to a contradiction
in the system, as the negations of sortally incorrect
sentences are themselves sortally incorrect sentences.
This argument looses any force it may have had on the above
approach, for we now have a system in which the negation of
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a sortally incorrect sentence, whether sortally incorrect
itself or not, is true. The price of logical conservatism
bought m this way is the undermining of any reason to
na/e a third truth-value. So it appears that this sort of
three
-valued approach is not the system we ought to pursue
Another alternative we noted earlier as open to the
advocate of a three-valued theory was the "bite the bullet
approach, in which we would simply reject the claim that
all classical tautologies are to be evaluated as true and
all classical contradictions are to be evaluated as false.
If this is the reaction of the three-value proponent, then
the three-valued approach is not logically conservative;
indeed, adopting such an approach to sortally incorrect
sentences will require a major revision in logic. While
it may be that there could be some reasons to adopt such
a radical strategy, such an approach is less preferable
than approaches which account for the same data and which
retain the classical tautologies as true and the classical
contradictions as false. Our criterion of logical con-
servatism tells us that we should only revise classical
logic when there is no alternative. In this case, there
are at least three alternatives. So the bite the bullet
approach is one we will also reject.
176
The third alternative for the three-value advocate
appears to be the most promising. On this approach, the
three-valued system will include both choice and exclusion
negation and the strong versions of the binary connectives
Sentences like 2 . 52 ), which appear to have the form of
classical tautologies, will be interpreted as having the
form of strong disjunctions, the second disjunct of which
has the form of the exclusion negation of a sortally in-
correct subject-predicate sentence. Hence that sentence
will be evaluated as having the truth-value true. Sen-
tences like 2.53), however, which do not have the form of
classical tautologies, will be interpreted as disjunctions
with a second disjunct which is a choice negation of a
sortally incorrect subject-predicate sentence. Such a
sentence will be evaluated as having the third truth-value
thus corresponding to the intuition that sortally incor-
rect sentences which do not have the form of a classical
tautology or contradiction have the third truth-value, no
matter what their logical complexity. Such an approach
is logically conservative with regards to its treatment of
the tautologies and contradictions (although it must
insist that such sentences utilize only one of the two
forms of negation)
,
yet retains the intuition behind the
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three-valued approach to sortal incorrectness.
While this may be the best line of defense for the
three-valued theorist, it is objectionable on at least
counts. The first is the ad hoc fashion in which the
logical forms of the sentences 2.52) and 2.53) are decided
On the surface the two sentences appear to have the same
logical form, differing only in that they have different
f irst disjuncts. On this approach, however, they have
different logical forms, and this difference occurs in the
—
CQnd dl sjunct. This difference in form seems motivated
one reason only--to make 2 . 52 ) turn out to be evaluated
as true without requiring that 2.53) also be evaluated as
true. Such an ad hoc feature is troubling enough now when
we are assuming that some sort of translation from English
in oO the formal language for which we give a semantics is
possible. The problem would be magnified if we attempted
to specify a mechanical translation procedure from English
into the formal language, as that translation procedure
would have to specify that the negation of a sortally in-
correct sentence is translated as one kind of negation in
some contexts and as another kind of negation in other
contexts. I can see no way of accomplishing this without
introducing massively complicated rules into the trans-
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lation procedure. While such a complication may be neces-
Sary
’
We should certainly favor a system in which no such
complexity is required.
A second problem with this approach is that the formal
language itself is required to be more complicated if we
follow this approach than is required by either of the
o oner three-valued approaches or the Thomason or Martin
approach. All of these other approaches have a single form
of negation and a single form of each of the binary con-
nectives. Thus the logical conservatism of this approach
is o ought at the price not only of added complexity to the
translation procedure from English to the formal language
bu i, at the price of added complexity in the formal language
itself
.
Thus the three-valued approaches have a number of
drawbacks when considered in the light of our criteria for
which theory is to be preferred. Unless similar problems
arise in all of the other approaches to the problem, we
would not want to adopt some three-valued theory of sort-
ally incorrect sentences.
Martin's four-valued approach to sortally incorrect
sentences also fails to retain the truth of all tautologies
and the falsity of all contradictions in the full blown
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sense of truth and falsity. Since Martin subscribes to the
position that sortal incorrectness is "catching," his
system gives the result that a sentence with the form of
a classical tautology can have one of two truth-values. If
the sentence has presuppositions all of which are satisfied,
the sentence will be fully true, having the truth-value
T=<1,1>. If, however, one or more of the component sen-
tences which make up the sentence has a presupposition
vhich is not satisfied, the sentence will have the truth-
value t=<l , 0> . Martin claims that this result does not
entail that there are any changes required in our concep-
tions of logic, for according to his approach logic is
only concerned with the first dimension of truth-value,
that of correspondence
.
The effect of this claim on Martin's treatment of
tautologies and contradictions is the following. Since
logic is only concerned with the first dimension of truth-
value, that is, with correspondence, we need not distin-
guish (indeed, cannot on logical grounds distinguish)
between sentences which have all their presuppositions
satisfied and those which have some presuppositions which
fail to be satisfied. So as far as logic is concerned,
there is no distinction to be drawn between the truth-
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values T and t or the truth-values F and f. All classical
tautologies have one of the first two values, and all
classical contradictions have one of the latter two values,
so as far as logic is concerned all tautologies have the
same truth-value and all contradictions have the same
truth-value. Hence we preserve all tautologies as being
true (as far as logic is concerned) and all contradictions
as being false (as far as logic is concerned). Indeed for
.he purposes of logic the four-valued system reduces to a
o tandard classical bivalent logic
By retaining a sense in which the classical tautol-
ogies are true and the classical contradictions are false,
Martin seems to be trying to have his cake and eat it,
too. Martin attempts to satisfy our intuitions that
sortally incorrect sentences, at least in the cases of
those which are not logically complex, are not true by
building a system in which such sentences always fail to
be evaluated as T. But now Martin turns around and claims
that he has retained the truths of logic because all such
logical truths are evaluated as having either the truth-
value T or the truth-value t, both of which are treated on
a par in logic. What he appears to be doing is saying that,
insofar as our intuitions concerning the non- truth of
181
serially incorrect sentences is concerned, a
the truTh-value t is not true; while insofar
tuitions concerning the truths of logic are c
sentence with
as our in-
oncerned
,
such sentences are true.
The problem here seems to be tied to Martin's notion
of correspondence. This notion is intimately tied to his
division of the notions of the non- truth of sortally in-
correct sentences and the non- truth which is dealt with in
logic, as Martin claims that only the dimension of corres-
pondence is relevant to the notion of truth in logic.
Unfortunately, Martin never spells out just what he means
when he says that a sentence corresponds. Admittedlv,
our intuitive notion of correspondence is none too clear.
But Martin's notion is positively mysterious; for example,
since Martin treats all forms of negation in the same way,
either the sentence
2.6) The taste of lemon is breakable
or the sentence
2.7) The taste of lemon is unbreakable
corresponds, even though both have some presuppositions
which fail to be satisfied. Martin even allows for the
existence of some simple subject-predicate sortally in-
correct sentences which correspond, although he admits
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that he can think of no examples of such sentences in a
natural language. Such claims would seem to require that
Ha rtin explicate his notion of correspondence, but no such
explication is offered.
ouch outcomes of Martin's theory do not show that his
approach will not work, but they do cast some doubt on
the advisability of his approach. Further, both Martin's
four-valued theory and the three-valued approaches suffer
in comparison with Bergmann’s bivalent theory and Thomason's
truth-value gap approach when compared using the criterion
of simplicity. Both of these latter theories are simpler
than ohe former two in that they require only two truth-
/alues in accounting for sortal incorrectness. A theory
with more uhan two truth-values is less simple than one
which has only two truth-values not only because there
are more truth-values in the former systems but because
such systems must supply us with interpretations for
the additional truth-values. Even without the problems
concerning logic which we have seen in the three-valued
approaches and Martin's theory, the simplicity of two-
valued theories would, all other things being equal, be a
heavy point in their favor. The additional complexity
inherent in multiplying truth-values shifts the burden of
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proof on to multi-valued theories. Unless Martin or the
proponents of a three-valued approach can show us why we
must accept those theories over bivalent or two-valued
theories, we should adopt a theory which has only two
truth-values. Martin and the proponents of three-valued
theories have not shown us why such approaches must be
adopted; lacking such a demonstration we must favor two-
valued theories.
These considerations narrow the field to the two
theories which have only two truth-values--Bergmann'
s
theory, on which sortally incorrect subject-predicate
sentences are evaluated as false, and Thomason's approach,
which evaluates sortally incorrect subject-predicate sen-
tences as lacking a truth-value altogether.
On the face of it, Bergmann's theory appears to have
the advantage over Thomason's system when the two are
compared using the criterion of simplicity. While both
theories have only two truth-values, those two truth-values
exhaust the possible ways of evaluating a sentence on
Bergmann's theory, while some sentences lack a truth-value
on Thomason's approach. Because some sentences are neither
true nor false on his approach, Thomason is also forced to
complicate his theory by using the method of supervaluations,
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Which requires a three-step semantics. With no truth-value
gaps in her system, Bergmann is able to give a semantics
in which the truth-value of a sentence is obtained by
referring only to a single, self-contained set of rules.
In spite of this, it is not clear that Bergmann'
s
system, taken as a whole, is really any simpler than
Thomason's. While Thomason is able to develop his system
using only the standard logical operations, Bergmann is
required to introduce a completely new operator, the "is
sortally correct" operator she symbolizes as y, as well
as distinguish between two different kinds of negation.
Hence Bergmann buys her simplicity in the semantics of her
system only a t the cost of adding complexity to the syntax
of the language of her system.
Nor is Bergmann* s semantics as straightforward as it
may a t first seem. By introducing the y operator and
dividing the notions of truth and sortal status, Bergmann
gets a system in which the logical connectives are not
all truth-functional. This is because the truth-value of
a complex sentence no longer is fully determined, in all
cases, by the truth-values of the component parts of that
sentence. Sometimes the truth-value of a complex sentence
is determined by both the truth-values and the sortal
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status of the component parts of the sentence.
Both Bergmann and Thomason assume a translation
procedure from English into the formal language for which
they supply a semantics rather than stipulating a trans-
lation procedure. Since Bergmann' s system is syntactically
more complex than Thomason's, it is reasonable to expect
that anj, explicit translation procedure supplied for her
theory would be more complex than the translation proced-
ure needed for a theory like Thomason's. For example,
Thomason treats all forms of English negation as variants
oi English phrases which are translated into his formal
language in the same way, while Bergmann must specify which
negations are to be translated from English into her formal
language as internal negations and which are to be trans-
lated into her language as external negations. Since, as
we have earlier noted, there appears to be some syntactic
evidence for distinguishing two forms of negation in
English, this does not seem to be an overwhelming problem
for Bergmann in the way that the similar problem which
arose in three-valued theories with both choice and ex-
clusion negation was an overwhelming problem for that
theory. But it still cuts into the advantage Bergmann'
s
system seems to have over Thomason's in terms of simplicity.
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It is interesting to compare the two approaches as to
-here they add complexity in dealing with sortally incor-
rect sentences. Thomason adds complexity to the semantics
for his artificial language, leaving the syntax of clas-
sical logic untouched. Bergmann, on the other hand, adds
complexity to the syntax of her language, changing the
semantics only as much as is required to insure that these
syntactic additions receive their intended interpretation.
Since both agree that sortally incorrect sentences are
deviant because of semantic considerations, it would appear
that Thomason's approach is more in keeping with this
shared intuition. This is not a telling point against
-erbmann s approach, as there is no requirement that
semantic features in English be reflected in a formal
language used to model English only in the semantics of
that formal language. However, the fact that Thomason's
approach does mirror a semantic feature of English in a
semantic rather than syntactic fashion in his artificial
language does seem to count in favor of his approach.
While it is difficult to decide which of the two
theories has the edge when compared using the criterion of
simplicity, it is even harder to decide which has the edge
when compared on the criterion of logical conservatism.
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As noted before, both reduce to variants of classical logic
when restricted to sentences all 0 f which are serially
correct. Thomason retains all classical tautologies as
orue and all classical contradictions as false, but only
at
-he price of saying that, for example, there are dis-
junctions which are true even though neither disjunct is
true. Bergmann finds this price too high to pay. Instead,
she retains the principle that a disjunction is true only
n at least one of its disjuncts is true, but pays the
price of being forced to say that there are two sorts of
negation in English, and only one of these can be used to
form a classical tautology. This, in effect, requires that
she deny that some sentences we thought were tautologies
are in fact tautologies. When compared along these lines,
I can see no reason for preferring one approach over the
other
.
This brings us to our third criterion for choosing
between theories, the criterion of generality. It is on
the oasis of this criterion that we have a clear choice
between Bergmann's approach and Thomason's approach.
The approach Bergmann takes to account for sortally
incorrect sentences is specifically designed to take care
of that problem, and it is difficult to see how it could
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be extended to deal with other problems which arise in
iwmg a semantics for natural languages. This is because
the approach centers on the introduction of the y operator,
Which is used to define the interaction between internal
and external negation, the cornerstones of the system.
The v operator is interpreted as "is sortally correct," and
hence is only relevant to determining the sortal status
of a sentence. So Bergmann's approach is specifically
designed to deal with the one problem of sortal incorrect-
ness. While it may deal with this problem successfully,
the technique is not one which is applicable to other
areas in the semantics of natural language
.
In contrast to this, the introduction of truth-value
gaps by Thomason to account for sortally incorrect senten-
ces is the application of a semantic technique which has
been applied to a number of other problems in the semantics
of na uural language bO this particular problem. Semantics
vhich include the result that some sentences of a language
are evaluated as having no truth-value at all have been
used to account for the problem of non-denoting definite
descriptions (van Fraassen ( 1969 )), play a part in two
major attempts to avoid the semantic paradoxes (Kripke
(1915) and van Fraassen (1970a)), and have also been used
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in accounts of future contingent sentences (Thomason
(1970 )) and conditional obligation (Thomason ( 19 ?4a)).
Except for the semantic determinant of the sortal specif-
ication, vvhich also features into Bergmann's semantics,
nothing about the Thomason approach is adopted specifically
to account for sortally incorrect sentences.
By taking the truth-value gap approach we can immed-
iately fit our semantic account of sortally incorrect
sentences into a comprehensive theory of presupposition
developed by van Fraassen (1969). Simply put, this theory
of presupposition works on the intuition that, if a sentence
has certain presuppositions and if some of these presup-
positions are false, the sentence is without truth-value.
Viewed in this light, we have the following explanation
of sortally incorrect sentences. When we say of an object
that it has some property, we presuppose that the object is
of the right sort to have that property. In the case of
sortally incorrect sentences, this presupposition is false.
So such sortally incorrect sentences are neither true nor
false. Like other sentences which have presuppositions
which fail to be satisfied, such sentences have no truth-
value at all. Such a treatment of sortally incorrect
sentences makes sortal incorrectness a special case of a
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general feature of language concerning presuppositions.
This way of tying an account of sortal incorrectness
m with a general theory of presuppositions also diffuses
whatever advantage Bergmann’s approach may have had on the
grounds of simplicity. Remember that Bergmann's theory
had a
-
a
-
ia claim to being more simple than the
truth-value gap approach in virtue of the fact that on that
theory all sentences are either true or false, thus simplif-
ying the theory by not requiring any new semantic mechan-
isms for determining the truth-value of logically complex
sentences which had sortally incorrect sentences as parts.
We saw earlier that a proponent of the truth-value gap
approach could argue that this apparent simplicity is
offset by the complexity which is required in the syntax
of the language to adequately deal with sortally incorrect
sentences. However, if it turns out that the presence of
truth-value gaps is required to account for such things
ao non-denoting definite descriptions, the semantic para-
doxes, or general failure of presuppositions, whatever
complexity is required for the treatment of sortally
incorrect sentences as sentences which lack truth-value
will be required for the treatment of these other problems.
So while Thomason's approach to sortal incorrectness may
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seem more complex than Bergmann's, the overall theory of
language which will include ways of dealing with these
other phenomenon will be less complex, as the complexity
added uy Thomason's approach to dealing with sortally
incorrect sentences will do double duty when applied to
these other problems.
Because of this ability to tie a truth-value gap
analysis of sortally incorrect sentences in to a general
theory of pressuposition in language, we will adopt this
approach. In the following chapter we will present a
truth-value gap theory of sortally incorrect sentences
which, while based on the same sort of semantic treatment
as Thomason's theory, will differ from that theory both in
minor details and in the way quantification is handled.
In the last section of that chapter a complete grammar for
a fragment of English which includes some sentences which
are sortally incorrect will be presented. This grammar
will include not only a syntax for the generation of
English sentences and a semantics for a formal language
but will also contain an explicit translation procedure
mapping the English sentences generated by the syntax to
formulas of the formal language. Once this system is set
out, we will look at what results it gives us in dealing
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With problems not specifically tied to sortal incorrect-
ness in an attempt to back up the claim that the theory
teals With such sentences in a framework which can be
generalized to account for other problems in the semantics
of natural languages.
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The semantic system given in Kripke (1975) contains
oru oh value gaps but does not use the method of super-
valuations.
. However, Kripke does mention that that methodcan be used m the system he presents if one wishes to
retain the truth of classical tautologies and the falsehood
of classical contradictions.
CHAPTER III
A SEMANTICS FOR SORTAL INCORRECTNESS
Introduc tion .
In this chapter we will develop a semantics for sort-
a^ly incorrect sentences in which those sentences are
evaluated as lacking any truth-value. The final goal of
the chapter is the construction of a grammar of a fragment
of English which includes sortally incorrect sentences.
This grammar will include a syntax for generating English
sentences, a set of rules which specify the translations
of the sentences produced by that syntax into a formal
language, and a semantics for that formal language.
The theory presented in this chapter is heavily
indebted to the work of Montague, Thomason, and Bennett.
The work of Montague (1974a) provides the framework for
the grammar presented in the final section of this chapter.
Indeed, the syntax and translation rules of that grammar
are, for the most part, exactly those of Montague's
grammar; what alterations there are are made to expand the
fragment and to translate the logical phrases generated by
the fragment into the modified intensional logic used to
give the semantics. The extension of the grammar to
include the generation of pre-nominal and predicate
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adjectives is based on the work of Bennett (1974). The
semantic system owes much to Thomason’s theory of sortal
incorrectness. While the account of quantification differs
markedly from that in Thomason (1972), the semantics is
based on Thomason’s intuitions that subject-predicate sort-
ally incorrect sentences are without truth-value and that
sentences of the language are to be evaluated by the method
of supervaluations. The techniques used to produce these
results differ from those used in Thomason’s system; for
the most part these differences are dictated by the fact
that the final logic given in this theory is a higher-order
rather than a first-order language.
Rather than simply presenting the grammar, we will
proceed to it by stages. In the first section of the
chapter, we will develop a supervaluation semantics for a
non-quantified first-order extensional language. This
semantics will be much like that presented in the last
chapter in conjunction with the discussion of Thomason's
approach to sortally incorrect sentences, differing only
in some of the technical devices used in the semantics.
In the second section, we will expand the language of
the first section to include both quantification and
identity. It is in this section that we will diverge from
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Thomason's approach. The major difference will be in the
treatment of quantification. Like Thomason, we will use a
system of sorted quantifiers, but our method of sorting
those quantifiers will be very different.
The third section will be devoted to presenting the
fragment of English. Here again we will expand the formal
language, moving from a first-order extensional language
to a higher-order, typed, tensed, intensional language.
This section will also include the syntax for the fragment
of English and the rules for translating English sentences
generated by the syntax into our formal language.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the results
of s,he system, both for sortally incorrect sentences and
for other sorts of constructions which have been of interest
to philosophers and linguists. The discussion of these
issues will center on how the fragment treats a number of
interesting example sentences.
A Non - q uantified Predicate Logic .
In order to introduce innovations slowly, we will
begin by describing a sortal semantics of a non-quantified
predicate logic. Let L^ be a language with the following
as its primitive vocabulary: an infinite number of names
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a
l’
a 2’ a 3’ ' ‘ ’ an inl'ln i'ts number of n-place predicates (for
any number n) P?,p",p£,
. .
.
,
and the logical signs and
"
v "' We define the set of sentences of q as the smallest
set S such that:
3-i) if P^ is an n-place predicate of L and a.,..
J
a
i+n are names of L, , then "P
n
a....a. 'VS1 m j j+n
3*2) if A,B£S, then "~A," "AvB'VS
To give a model for we will need to specify a
domain of objects, a sortal specification, and an inter-
pretation function. The sortal specification will have
the same form it had in Thomason’s theory; it will be a
junction from n-place predicates of the language to sets
of ordered n-tuples of objects in the domain. We will
again refer to these sets of n-tuples of objects as the
sortal range of the predicate mapped by the sortal specif-
ication to that set.
Unlike Thomason, we will not interpret n-place pred-
icates as sets of n-tuples of objects in the domain. In-
stead, we will interpret the predicates of our language as
partial function from n-tuples of objects to the truth-
values T and F.
This notion of a partial function requires some ex-
planation. A function, f, from set A to set B is ordinar-
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ily defined as a mapping from members of A to members of
5 SUCh that
’ for a11 f(x)€B and such that if y,z<EB
and there is some x€A such that f(x)=y and f(x) = z then
y=Z ‘ standardly, set A is defined as the domain of the
" unc l i°n f while set B is said to be the range of the
function f.
The notion of a partial function differs in import-
ant ways from the notion of a standard function. If f is
a partial function from set A to set B, then for all xfk,
either f(x)€B or f(x) is undefined, and if y,z€B and
.here is an x€A such that f(x)=y and f(x)=z then y=z. The
difference between partial functions and our standard
notion o± a function is that the latter requires that the
function give a value to every member of the domain. No
such requirement is made in the case of partial functions.
This notion of a partial function may strike one as
odd, but a little reflection will show that partial func-
tions are reasonably common. An example from mathematics
is the two-argument function f(x,y)=x/y, which has as its
domain pairs of integers and as its range the rational
numbers. Described in this way, the function f is partial,
for it is undefined for any arguments such that the second
member of the argument is 0. Another partial function we
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have seen previously is the function from sentences of a
language to truth-values characterized by a supervaluation
semantics model in which some sentences receive no truth-
value. This function has as its domain the sentences of
the language and as its range the truth-values T and F, but
is such that for some sentences of the language, the value
of the function applied to that sentence is undefined.
The difference between our ordinary notion of a func-
tion and our notion of a partial function can be demonstrat-
ed by seeing how the set-theoretic representations of the
two notions must differ. Ordinary functions are generally
represented or identified with sets of ordered pairs,
specifically, if f is a function from set A to set B, f can
be represented as the set Xc(AxB) defined as X=f<x,y>:
x€A&y=f(x)]
. This sort of definition cannot be used to
represent a partial function, however, for if f is a partial
^ unc uion it is possible that there is some member of the
domain for which the function yeilds no defined value when
applied to that member of the domain. So identifying a
partial function f from set A to set B as the set X=
[<x,y>: x€A&y=f (x) } will not do, as the set X has not been
fully defined. On this definition, some members of the set
X would be ordered pairs the second member of which is
200
undefined. Nor can we identify a partial function as the
set X=C<x,y>:x£A&y=f(x)&f(x) is defined} if we also follow
the standard practice of identifying the domain of a
I unction as the set which is the union of the first members
of all the ordered pairs of the set which makes up the set-
theoretic representation of that function. If we do this,
we
'the domain of the partial function being only
a subset of the actual domain of that function. Instead
Oi identifying the domain as all the objects to which we
can apply the function, we will be identifying the domain
as all the objects to which the function gives a defined
value
.
However, we can give a set-theoretic representation
of partial functions. If f is a partial function from
set A to set B, we can represent f as the set X=<A,C>
where A is the domain of f and C is the set of ordered
pairs defined as C={<x,y>:x€A&y=f(x)&f (x) is defined}. We
can then say that two partial functions are identical if
and only if they have identical se t-theore tic representa-
tions .
Before moving on, we should note two special sorts
of partial functions. The first of these are functions
from set A to set B such that, for every member of set A,
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the function is
null functions.
undefined. Such functions will be called
Note that it is not the case that there
is a single null function, as null functions with different
domains will be represented set-theore tically as different
sets of ordered pairs. The second sort of partial function
of whi^h we will take special note are what we will call
complete or total functions. A complete function is a
partial function f from set A to set B such that, for every
A, f
(
x )
- B
.
This is just our ordinary notion of a func-
tion, which is now a special case of the more general
notion of a partial function. We should also note that
corresponding to every partial function is another function
with domain the subset of the domain of the partial function
for which the partial function yeilds a defined value,
which is itself a complete function agreeing in value with
the original partial function for all arguments which
are members of the union of the two functions domains. We
vvill refer to this function as the complete subfunction
of the partial function.
With this as a preliminary, we can now turn to
supplying a sortal semantics for our language
. A model
for L
x
will be a triple M=<D,S,V> subject to the conditions:
3-3) D is a non-empty set (the domain)
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3.4) S is a function from n-place predicates of
L
i u0 subsets of D
n (the sortal specification)
3-5) V is a function (the interpretation function)
from names and n-place predicates of such
that:
a) if a
n
is a name of 1^, V(a
n
)eD
3f P
m
3s an n-place predicate of L,
,
V(Pn )
1 m
is a partial function from Dn to (T-, F] such
that if <o^ , . .
.
,
o
n
>6D" and < 0
^
, .
.
.
, o^>
/S^ p
m )
then V(Pj)(<o
1 M. i ,on>) is undefined
The set of extended valuations, I+
, relative to a model M
is the set of all four-tuples I=<D, S , V, V»> satisfying the
conditions
:
d-6; D,S, and V are the domain, sortal specification
and interpretation function, respectively,
specified in M;
3.3) V' is a function from partial functions from
D to { T, F} to complete functions from Dn to
{T,F} such that if f is a partial function from
D to C T, F} and x€D and f(x) is defined, then
(V'(f))(x)=f(x)
The value of a sentence A of on an extended interpret-
ation I relative to a model M, denoted (A) 1
,
can now be
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defined as
3.8) if A-"p£a
1 ...a1+n
" then (A)hv (
v(pJJ) ) (<v(a )
,
, V(a^
+n
)>)
3.9) if A="~B” then (A) r=T iff (B) X=F
; otherwi
(a) j=f
se
3.10) if A- " BvC " then (A) I=T iff ( B) or (c ) I-T ;
otherwise (A)^=F
The value of a sentence A on the supervaluation induced by
a model M, denoted (A) M *, can now be defined as
3-11) (A) M*=t iff (A) Z=T for all Ielf (A) M*= F iff
(A) X=F for all I?I+
,
and (A) M * is undefined
otherwise
<fe will say that a sentence A of y is true on a model M
if and only if (A) Mt T ,. that A is false if and only if
/ M *
l A) -F ; and that A has no truth-value if (A) M * is unde-
fined .
This semantics gives us a system much like the one
we saw in the last chapter when we applied Thomason's
theory to a similar language. On the above semantics, all
sortally incorrect subject-predicate sentences will be
evaluated as lacking a truth-value; this is insured by
clause 3- 5b), which tells us that if an object is outside
vhe sortal range of a predicate the function which is the
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interpretation of that predicate is undefined for that
Object as an argument. We get the result that all atomic
sentences which are not sortally incorrect receive a con-
stant truth-value on all extended interpretations because
of clause 3-7), which in effect states that the partial
function which is the interpretation of a predicate on the
model M and the full function which is the interpretation
of that predicate on any of the extended interpretations
are identical when restricted to the domain of the complete
subfunction of that partial function. We also obtain the
standard results of a supervaluation semantics concerning
.he truth of all classical tautologies and the falsity of
all classical contradictions irrespective of the truth-
value or lack of truth-value of the component parts of such
sentences
.
In fact, the semantics given above differs from that
seen in the last chapter for a similar language not in its
lesults out rather in the formal machinery used to obtain
these results. These differences will make the final
semantic account of sortally incorrect sentences fit into
the semantics for a higher-order logic, but at this point
the departures from Thomason's theory are minor. A more
radical departure will be necessary in the next section of
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this chapter, however, when we add quantification to our
system
.
Quantification and Identity
.
In this section, we will extend our first-order
language to include quantifiers and identity statements.
The treatment of identity will be straightforward and
rather standard; our semantics will say that an identity
statement of the form "a=b" is true if and only if the
thing named by a is the thing named by b. Our treatment
of Q.uan "tifica tion , however, will differ radically from
the standard treatments found in most semantic systems
for formal languages.
As we saw in the last chapter, quantification is
troublesome for semantic accounts of sortally incorrect
sentences. The treatments of quantification presented by
Bergmann and Martin, which took as their domain of quant-
ification all objects, had the unacceptable result that
nearly every universally quantified sentence was evaluated
as being sortally incorrect. One version of Thomason's
treatment of quantification avoided this problem by re-
stricting the domain of quantification to the sortal range
of particular predicates, but relied on a number of strong
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and unargued for assumptions about the way in which the
range of the quantifiers are established.
The treatment of quantification we will use is much
like that argued for by Wallace ( 1965 ) and, more recently,
C ochiarella (1978 ). 1 The intuition underlying this approach
is roughly the following. Consider a quantified sentence
of English like
3-12) All men are mortal
We now ask ourselves the question, what objects is this
sentence about? or, more precisely, what objects are rel-
evant to the truth-value of this sentence? According to
standard first-order quantification theory, the answer is
every object in the universe. The approach to quantific-
ation we will take rejects this answer, and instead answers
the question by saying that the sentence is about the
objects which are men, and only those objects are relevant
to the truth or falsity of 3.12).
Intuitively, the answer given by standard quantific-
ation theory, that 3-12) depends for its truth or falsity
on all the objects in the universe, seems absurd--the
mortality or immortality of numbers, theories, and chickens
just does not seem to enter in to our considerations con-
cerning the truth-value of the sentence . Standard
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pproaches to quantification avoid the apparent absurdity
by translating sentences like 3 .12) into universally quant-
ified material conditionals; the standard translation of
3-12) could be paraphrased in English as something along
the lines of "take every object in the universe and it will
be the case that if that object is a man then it is mortal."
This sentence will be evaluated as true just in case all
the objects in the universe are such that if they are men
then the 3' are mortal. Since a material conditional with a
false antecedent is true no matter what the truth-value of
the consequent, no object which is not a man will ever
provide a falsifying instance of the sentence. So the
treatment standardly given gets the effect of saying that
only objects which are men are relevant to the truth of
j.12) by translating the sentence in such a way that all
objects which are not men automatically make the conditional
being quantified over true. By paying the price of saying
that the objects relevant to judging the truth of sentences
like 3-12) are all the objects in the universe, and then
translating the sentence in such a* way that only a small
subset of those objects could actually provide falsifying
instances of the sentence, standard treatments of quantif-
ication gain the simplicity of having only one universal
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quantifier, with a single domain of quantification, namely
all of the objects in the domain of the model.
ihis approach, though counter-intuitive, works well
until we tane sortal considerations into account. Remember
that on Bergmann's account of the quantifiers, the quant-
ified sentence was evaluated as sortally correct only if
xhe matrix sentence was sortally correct for all objects
in the domain of the quantifier. Since the domain of the
quantifier was unrestricted and included every object in
ohe domain, sentence 3*12) was evaluated as sortally
incorrect oecause of objects which were not men but were
also not the right sort of things to be either men or
mortal. Because we are worried about both the truth and
uhe sortal status of quantified sentences, we can no
longer take as the objects relevant to the truth and
sortal status of such sentences all objects in the domain,
for then we must include objects of the wrong sort in our
considerations. Clearly what we need is a restriction of
the domain of the quantifiers so that the only objects
which are relevant to the truth and sortal status of a
quantified sentence are objects which are all of the
proper sort.
The way we will accomplish this is to treat the
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quantifiers, m effect, as operators which take two sen-
tences to form a sentence. One of these sentences will
be used to determine the domain of the quantifier, while
the other is the sentence which we are claiming is true of
all (or some, in the case of the exestential quantifier)
of the objects in that domain. Orthographically
,
we will
follow Wallace and Cochiarella and represent quantifiers
by expressions of the form "Ax[A](B)," which can be para-
phrased m English as "everything which satisfies sentence
A also satisfies sentence B." The role of sentence A is
to establish the domain of the quantifier-
-anything which
fails to satisfy the sentence will be irrelevant to the
oruth or falsity of the quantified sentence. Roughly, the
English equivalent of sentences which are used to establish
the domain of a quantifier are common noun phrases. The
intention of the system is to come up with a translation of
3-12) which will look like "Ax[Px] (Mx)
,
" which will be
true just in case everything which satisfies the open
sentence Px ^roughly, any object which has the property
denoted by the phrase "is a person") satisfies the open
sentence "Mx" (roughly, has the property denoted by the
phrase "is mortal"). Since we have restricted the domain
of the quantifier to objects which are persons, the objects
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relevant to the truth or falsity of the sentence will all
be the sortal range of the predicate "is a person."
In this way we will avoid the problems Bergmann and Martin
encountered in using unrestricted quantification, and will
make explicit how the sort of a quantifier is determined,
thus avoiding the mystery surrounding the determination
of the domain of quantification in Thomason's system.
Rather than attempting to give further motivation for
the system, we will now turn to laying out a language
which uses this kind of quantification. Let L
£
be a
language with the following primitive vocabulary: an
infinite number of names, a-^ ,a
? ,a^ , . . . ; an infinite number
of variables xq
»
x 2
'
x3 ’ ’ ' ’
’
an infinite number of n-place
predicates (for any number n) , p£ , F? , . . .
;
and the log-
ical signs ~ , v , = , A , ( , ) , L
,
and 1. By a term of L 0 we will
mean either a name or a variable of L 2< The set of form-
ulas of will be defined as the smallest set S
2
such that
3.13) if P^J is an n-place predicate of and
a n , • . • , a are terms of L 0 , then "P
n
cu . . .a
r n 2 m ' 1 n 2
3.14) if A,B2S ? and u is a variable of L ? , then
"~A"
,
" ( AvB )
" , "Au[A](B)"€S q
3.15) if a,3 are terms of L 9 , then "a=3"€S 0
A model for L
2
will be a triple M=<D,S,V> where D
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xo a non-empty set (the domain), S is a complete function
_rom n-place predicates of to subsets of Dn (the sortal
spec ii ication)
,
and V is a function from names and n-place
predicates of L
2
such that
3.16) if a is a name of L of V(a )^Dn 2 n
3.1?) if P is an n-place predicate of L„, V(Pn ) i sU1 2 m
a partial function from D to {]T,F(| such that
if x£Dn and (V(p£))(x) is defined, then
x€S(P^)
Sy a g-assignment of values to variables of L 9 on a model
M we will mean a function from the variables of L
2
such
that for all variables u, g(u)€D.
The set of extended interpretations of L 9 relative to
a model M, I
,
will be the set of all fourtuples I=<D,S,
V,V’> such that:
3-18) D,S, and V are the domain, sortal specification,
and interpretation function, respectively,
specified in M;
3.19) V' is a function from partial functions from
D
11
to {T,F} to complete functions from Dn to
[T,F] such that if f is in the domain of V'
and x£Dn and f(x) is defined, then (V'(f))(x)=
f(x)
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By the expressions of L
2
we will mean the names
, variable3i
predicates, and formulas of V The value of an expression
A of L
2
on an extended valuation I relative to a model M
and an assignment of values to variables, g, denoted (a) 1 -*
can now be recursively defined as:
0
.20) if A is a name of L
p , the: ( A
)
1
’ g
=V ( A)
3 .21) if A is a variable of L
? , then (A)
1
’ ?
=g'(A)
3 . 22) if A is an n-place predicate of L„
, then
(A )
I,g
=V'(V(A))
£
3 .23) if A~
"
P
m
al
'
•
,a
n
"
’ then ( A )
I.g
:=(pn ) x 'm
S (<(a1 )
I,g
. . ,
<«n>
’ g»
3.,24) if A-
"
a- 8
"
, then (A) I,g=T iff (a)
I,g
is ( 3) I,S
otherwise (A) 1 ,g=F
3. 25) if A="~B"
,
then (A) I,g’n=T iff (:B) I,g=F;
otherwise (A) 1 ,g=F
3- 26
)
if A= "BvC
"
,
then (A) I,g=T iff ( B )
1
’
= T or
(C) I,g=T; otherwise (A)^ ,g :=F
3. 27) if A="Au[B 1 (C ) " , then
a ) if G-Cg' : g' is an assignment of values
to variables which differs from g in at
most the value g'(u) and such that ( B) 1
'
=T for all I’^r }/0, then (A) I,g=T iff
(C) =T for all g'cG; otherwise (A) x,a’=F
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if G (as defined above) =0, then (A) I,g=T
iff for all g' assignments which differ
from g in at most the value g'( u ) and
which are such that ( B)
1
’
^ are such that
(C ) ,g = T; otherwise (A)^’ g=F
Having thus defined the value of an expression of L
2
on
each of the extended valuations relative to a model and a
g
-assignment of values to variables, we will now define the
value of an expression A of L
2
on the supervaluation in-
duced by M relative to that g-assignment of values to
variables
,
denoted ( A) M *’S, a S;
3.23) if A is a name of L
2 ,
(A) M *’ g=V(A)
3-29) if A is a variable of L
2 ,
(A) M
*
,g
=g(A)
3.30) if A is an n-place predicate of L 2> (A)
,M*,g
=
V(A)
3-31) if A is a formula of L
2 ,
(A) M *’ g=T iff (A) 1 ’®-
T for all Ifl'
; (A)
M *’ g
=F iff (A) I,g=F for
all I€T M* o'
; and (A) is undefined otherwise
We will say that a formula A of L
2
is true on a model M
if and only if (A) =T for all g-assignments of values
to variables on M; false if and only if (A) M *’ g=F on all
g-assignments of values to variables, and is neither true
nor false (i.e., has no truth-value) otherwise.
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We can demonstrate how the syste
some examples. Let us begin with sen
would translate into as the
m works by considering
nate domain and in which we interpret the predicates of
the sentence in the intended way and which assigns them
the appropriate sortal ranges. The value of the sentenc
on the model will be determined by the value of the sen-
tence on all of the extended interpretations relative to
of these extended interpretations, we must first determine
if the set of assignments of values to variables which
interpretations is empty. In effect, we are asking if there
is an assignment of an object to be the denotation of the
variable x
1
which will be mapped to the value T on all the
extended valuations. If our domain contains any objects
which are men, the answer to this question is that the set
is not empty, for the model will interpret "P^" as a
partial function which maps all the objects which are men
to the value T, and the interpretation of that predicate
that model. To get the value of the sentence on any one
make the open sentence true on all of the extended
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on all of the extended valuations must agree with the in-
itial interpretation in cases of objects for which the
initial interpretation yeilds a defined value. By estab-
lishing which g-assignments of values to variables give us
the value T for the formula on all of the extended
interpretations, we are in effect limiting the domain of
ohe quantifier to only those objects which are actually
men on our beginning interpretation. To find out if the
sentence is true on the extended interpre tation
,
we see if
all of these g-assignments also make the formula "P^x "
true, that is, we see if all of these objects are mortal.
It is reasonable to assume that they are, and in fact
ohat uhey will oe on all of the extended interpretations.
Note that the set G of assignment functions will be ident-
ical from one extended interpre tation to another for any
given quantified sentence. So the sentence which we have
used as the translation of 3-12) is true on all of the
extended valuations, hence it is evaluated as T on the
supervaluation induced by the model, and hence we can say
that the sentence is true on the model. And this is the
result we want.
How will the system treat quantified sentences which
we v/ould intuitively judge to be sortally incorrect?
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Consider the sentence
3-32) Every theory is shiny
which we can translate into L
2
as
3-32- ) Ax^P^KpJx^
Again, assume that we are evaluating the sentence in a
model which gives "P^" an interpretation and sortal range
corresponding to the English predicate "is a theory" and
?4 an interpretation and sortal range corresponding to
the English predicate "is shiny." To evaluate this sen-
tence, we must again go to the supervaluation induced by
the model and hence must look at the value of the sentence
on all of the extended interpretations relative to that
model. Once again, the set of assignment functions rel-
evant to determining the truth of the sentence on any
ex tended valuation will be made up of those assignment
functions which assign to the variable x
±
objects which
are mapped to T by the interpretation of "Fyj" on all of
the extended interpretations, which will in turn be the
objects which are mapped to T by the partial function which
is the interpretation of that predicate on the model. It
is reasonable to assume that these objects will all be
outside of the sortal range of the predicate "pj" in our
model. This means that the extended interpretations are
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not constrained in how they specify the full function which
is the interpretation of "p£" on that extended interpret-
ctfion as to what value those objects are mapped to. Many
of the extended interpretations will map at least one of
those objects to F, and hence on those extended interpret-
ations the whole sentence will be evaluated as having the
value F. But we must consider the value of the sentence
on all of the extended valuations, and there will be at
least one of these which completes the partial function
which is the interpretation of the predicate on the model
xn such a way that it maps all of the objects in question
to the value T. On that extended interpretation, the
value of the sentence as a whole is T. So the value of
the sentence varies on different extended interpretations.
Hence the sentence is given no value by the supervaluation
induced by the model, and hence the sentence is evaluated
by the supervaluation as having, no truth-value at all.
Again, this is the result we desire.
In both of the examples we have looked at, the sen-
tence in question has been a quantified sentence evaluated
at the level of the extended valuations using clause
3.27a). Clause 3*2 7b) is necessary for the evaluation of
cases in which the subject of the quantified sentence
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translates as a sentence which is itself sortally incorrect,
as in the cases of the sentences
3-33) Every shiny theory is mortal
3
•
3^) Every shiny theory is shiny
which will translate into L
2 (assuming that we have defined
the operation of conjunction,
, in terms of negation
and disjunction in the standard way) as
3-33') Ax
1
[P^x
1
&P^x
1](p^x :l )
3 • 3^'
)
Ax1[pjx &P^x1](P^x )
hhen we go to evaluate these sentences at the level of the
extended evaluations, we will need to use clause 3.27b),
±or assuming that the sortal ranges of the predicates which
are the translations of the English predicates "is a theory"
and is shiny" are disjoint, no object will be such that
it will be mapped to the value T by the interpretations of
both predicates on all extended valuations. Since this is
the case, we simply look at the objects which are mapped
by the extended interpretations of the two predicates to
the value T by the full function which is the interpret-
ation of "P^" (in the case of 3-33’)) or "P^" (in the
case of 3 •3^')) on that extended interpretation. In the
case of 3-33'), the sentence will be evaluated as T on some
of the extended interpretations and as F on others; hence
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the sentence will be without value on the supervaluation
and so will be considered without truth-value on the model
However
,
3-34') will be evaluated as T on all of the
extended interpretations, for any object which is mapped
to T by the interpretations of both "P^" and "P;1 " will
ce mapped to T by the interpretation of "pf "
.
So this
sentence, even though it has a sortally incorrect part,
is given the value T on the model. This is because 3.34')
has the form of a sentence which is a logical truth, and
indeed 3-34) is judged by some (including me) to be true.
It is to get this result that clause 3.27b) has been
included in the semantics for the language I* t
These examples show how the sorted quantification
system works in a first-order language. We will now move
on bO the construction of an actual grammar for a fragment
English. In giving the semantics for this fragment, we
^ HI expand and complicate the language for which we give
a semantics substantially. However, the basic idea behind
the semantic treatment of sortal incorrectness and quant-
ification will be the same as the one behind the semantics
just given for
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The Fragment.
In this section, we will develop our theory of sort-
ally incorrect sentences within the framework of a Montague
style grammar for a fragment of English. We will first
lay out the syntax of a higher-order, tensed, typed in-
tens lonal logic which will be the language for which we
will supply a supervaluation semantics, along with a sketch
o.i how the language will be interpreted. We will then
present a syntax for a fragment of English, along with a
0 translation rules which will specify a mapping
- r°m sentences of nnglish generated by the syntax to form-
ulas oi the artificial language. Once this is done, we
will specify a semantics for the formal language.
The type structure for the formal language, L Q , is
based on two simple types, which can be thought of as the
type of individual denoting expressions, denoted by "e",
and the type of truth-value denoting expressions, denoted
by "t". Since our language will be intensional, we will
also have as a type symbol "s", which can be thought of as
the type of points of evaluation. Formally, we can define
the type structure for the language in the following
way. Let e,t, and s be three distinct fixed objects, none
221
Of which is an ordered pair. The set of types of expres-
sions of the language L
3
, T^e, is defined as the smallest
set such that:
3-35) e
, tg Type
3 06 ) if a
,
bg Type then <a
,
b>€ Type
3.32) if ag Type then <s , a>g Type
The primitive vocabulary of L
3
will consist in an infinite
number of constants and variables of each type ag Type ,
rhe set of constants of type a will be denoted by Con
a ;
the nth variable of type a will be denoted by v
r .
The
vocabulary also includes as primitive symbols the logical
signs "v", -w, h = »
(
"A " f MV „ f „D „'
"
X ", "W’\ "H"
,
••(•', and
Given this vocabulary, we recursively define the set
01 meaningful expressions of type ag Type as the smallest
set ME such that:d
3-33) if a is a variable or constant of type a,
oc€ME
a
3-39) if a€ME
a
and u a variable of type b, then
"\ua."gME<b
>a>
3-^0) if a€ME
<a
^
b> and p€MEa , then "a( 8 ) "gME,n
3*41) if a,3gME then M a= 0 "gME.
3.-42) if g.g'gME^, and u is a variable of any type,
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then "
,
" 9v9 '
" ,
.
»
(
"vuCeKe )
,
"Au[ 8]( 9 ')”, .<<>0 „
>
,. He( „
_
"W9"€ME
t
3-^3) if a€ME
, then "*a ,,€MEd <s,a>
3.^4) if a€ME
<s
^
a> , then
" v
a"€ME
a
Having so defined the meaningful expressions of each type
ior our language Ly we can now define the set of meaning-
ful expressions of the language as U ME
a€ Type * a ’
The semantics for L
3
will he specified later, but it
may be helpful to mention the intended interpretations of
the primitive logical signs. The signs » V ",
and will be interpreted in a fairly standard way as
the sentential connectives of negation, disjunction, con-
junction, material implication, and material equivalence,
respectively. The semantic treatment of these connectives
m L
3
will not differ in any important respect from the
treatment given them in the first-order language L
. The
sign = will be interpreted as identity in a fairly
standard way. The signs "" and "0” will be interpreted as
modal operators; since L
3
is a tensed language the first
of These will be roughly interpre table as "necessarily
always" while the second will be roughly interpre table as
"possibly sometimes." The signs "A" and "V" will be
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interpreted as the universal and existential quantifier,
respectively. Both quantifiers are sorted in that their
domains, in a way to be made explicit later but which is
much like that used in L
2 , are restricted to the set of
entities which satisfy the sentence following the quantif-
ied variable and enclosed by brackets. The signs "W" and
"H" will be interpreted as tense operators; the first is
roughly interpretable as "it will be the case that..."
While the second is roughly interpretable as "it has been
the case that..." The sign "X" will be used as an ab-
straction operator; where u is a variable of type a and
d a meaningful expression of type b, the expression "Xu9"
will be interpreted as a function from entities of type a
to entities of type b. Finally, the signs and """
will be interpreted as intensional operators; the first
combines with an expression to give the intension of that
expression while the second combines with an expression
whicn is an intension to give the extension of that
expression at a point of evaluation. We could, of course,
have eliminated a number of these primitive logical
signs by defining them in terms of a smaller set in any
of a number of standard ways. For our purposes, however,
such conservation measures are unnecessary.
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To simplify the translation rules from the English
expressions generated by our grammar to the language L
Wil1 make USe 0f a number of abbreviatory conventions,
specifically, we will abbreviate the variables v Q g and
V
l,e as u and v, respectively; the variables v
1 , <s ,e>
v
3 , <s , e>
’
and v
2n, <s , e> as x, y> and xn > respectively; the
^ariaole /
Q as p; the variables v and0 ,<s ,«s
,
e>, t» a
" 1
, <s«s
,
e>
, t» as P and respectively; the variable
V
0
, <s ,«s ,«s
,
e>
, t». t» as variable
nT
’ 0
,
<s
,
<e
,
t»
as M; the variable v~ o „ ^
0 , <s , <e
,
<e
, t»> as ^ 5 and "^e variable
v
0
,
<s
, «s
, «s
,
e>
, t»
,«s
,
e>
,
t»> as R
.
We will also introduce abbreviations for certain
meaningful expressions of L
3
. If 3 is a meaningful ex-
pression of type <s,<a,t» and a a meaningful expression
"t./P e a, then we will aobreviate the meaningful expres-
sion ( va)( a ) as a {a}; if a 6ME
^ , , aoiE and<s,<a,<b,t»> a a
S€ME
b , the expression 3{ a ,8} will abbreviate the expression
(
v
3)(8,a) which in turn abbreviates the expression
xv a,; (a)) (3). If u is a variable of type a and 9 a form-
ula, we will abbreviate \u9 as u9 and A \u9 as u9
.
Finally,
if a€ME
e
, then a* will abbreviate P(P£"a}).
Ha zing specified the syntax of the formal language
,
we will now turn to specifying a syntax for a fragment of
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English, which
for translating
we will call E, along with a set of rules
expressions generated by that syntax into
the formal language L
? .
The syntax we will give for our fragment of English
will be a categorial one, based on the primitive distinct
categories e and t, which will be understood as the cat-
egories of entity denoting expressions and truth-value
denoting expressions, respectively. The set of categories
for our fragment is inductively defined as the smallest
set Cat such that:
3 .45) e , tCCat
3 ^° ) if A
,
BhCat then A/B and A//BhCat
The role of the categories A/B and A//B are that, when a
phrase of such a category is combined in the appropriate
wa-/ with a phrase of category B, the resultant phrase is of
category A. The distinction between phrases of category
A/B and a//B is purely syntactic; when translated into
the intensional logic phrases of the two categories
will be mapped to expressions of the same type.
xhe firs t step in our translation from the language
E to the language is to specify a mapping from categ-
ories of E to types of
. We define this mapping, f, as
3 • ^7 ) f (e )=e
226
3.48) f(t) = t
J ' 4 ° ) f (A/B)=f (A//B)=«s ,f(B)>,f(A)>
Certain categories correspond to traditional grammatical
classes. We will use the following abbreviations to pick
out these classes:
or the category of intransitive verb phrases, is
the category t/e
CN
’ or the category of common noun phrases, is the
category t//e
T, or the category of terms or denoting phrases, is
the category t/lV=t/( t/e)
TV, or the category of transitive verb phrases, is
the category IV/T=( t/e )/( t/( t/e )
)
adj, or the category of adjectives, is the category
CN/CN=( t//e )/ ( t//e_)
xhe categories so defined serve to index sets of expres-
sions of our fragment E. The members of these sets are
cT two kinds
; the oasic expressions, which are given by
enumeiation, and the phrases, which are defined recursively.
The basic expressions of category a, B
,
are defined as:
“IV
=
i- run ’ walk, talk, rise, change]
3
T
={John, Mary, Bill, ninety, he^, he
2 ,
he,,,...}
B tv- l find, lose, eat, love, date, be, seek, conceive"
1
-
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B
CFT'- man ’ WOfnan ' park, fish, pen, unicorn, price,
temperature, theory of relativity, taste of lemon,
king of France}
B
t//t={necessarily, possibly}
BIV/t^ Believe that - assert that, dream that}
BIV//lV^ try 1:0 ’ wish to}
Bad shiny
,
breakable, difficult, big, bald}
BIV/adj=tbe p"!
^
a
=0 if a is any category other than those mentioned
above
By the basic expressions of the fragment E is understood
the set U ,B .
agCat a
We can now specify the syntactic rules which allow
us to build phrases of the language E. Corresponding to
each syntactic rule will be a translation rule, which will
tell us that if a phrase of E is constructed by applica-
tion of a syntactic rule to expressions of E, the trans-
lation into of the phrase so formed can be determined
by applying the corresponding translation rule to the
translations into L,, of those phrases put together by
that rule
.
In what follows, let g be a mapping (function) with
domain the set of basic expressions of E other than be,
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P’ S
-- e °°aril
,
/
. possibly , and the members of B^, such
-hat if at Cat and <x6B
a
then g(a)ST2£e f(a) , with f belng
~he translation function from categories to types specif-
m 3 . 4 ?)
-3 . 49)
.
rurther, let j.m.b, and n be distinct
members of Con Thp +1 ~
e
in s /ntac tic rules for the fragment E,
along with the translation rules, are:
SI: B
aEpa por all aC Cat
T1: (a) if a is in the domain of g, then a trans-
lates as g( a)
(b) be translates as lx${y( v x= v y)}
(c) necessarily translates as p(D v p); possibly
translates as p(O v p)
John, Mary
,
Bill
, nine ty translate as j*,
m*, b*, and n*
, respectively
( e ) he translates as ?Pfx )n u nJ
(f) be
p
translates as RxVP[P{x}] (
(
R [
A
P} ) (x)
)
S2: if a€PCN , then FQ ( a ), F1 (a), F 2 (a)€P T , where
F^( a)
-
every a
F^ ( q ) the a
F
2
(a)=a a or an a, depending on whether the first
word in a takes a or an
if a€PCN and a translates as a', then
F
q ( a) translates as P(Ax[a'(x)l(P[x}))
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translates as P(V/y£Ax[a' ( x)]x=y]] (P{x} )
F
2 (a) translates as P(Vx[a'(x)](P{ x}))
: lf aePCN and 96Pv then F3, n (a ' 9)€PCN’ where
F
3 ,
a ' ^ ~ a c
n
"na ~" 9 '
» and 9 ' comes from 9
oy replacing each occurence of he or him bv
— ’ or her
» it ; depending on the
gender of a
if a€Pg^ and 9^P^ and a, 9 translate into a'
,
9 '
respectively then F^
n (a>9) translates into
^ X
m ia
'
(
xm)^ ") ’ where 9" is the result of re-
placing all occurences of x in 9 1 by x
, where
m is the least even number greater than n which
has no occurence in either a' or 9'
S4: if a€P
T
and 3€P ly , then F4 ( a ,$), F^a.jf),
p
6 ^ ^ > 3 ) » Fy (a, 3) i Fg ( a » 8 ) , and F^ ( a. , 3 ) € P , where
F4 (a,3)=a9', where 3' is the result of replacing
the first verb (i.e., member of Bly , B iy/4.,
P IV//IV’ or PIV/adi' ® ^y its third person
singular present;
F^(a,3)=a3'» where 3' is the result of replacing
the first verb in 3 with its negative third
person singular present;
Fg(a,3)=a3 , ) where 3' is the result of replacing
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the first verb in 3 with its third person sing-
ular future
;
Fr,(a, P)=ag ' , where g- is the result of replacing
tne first verb in g with its negative third per-
son singular future;
Fg(a, $)=a3*
.
where 3' is the result of replacing
ohe first verb in 3 with its third person sing-
ular present perfect;
F^( d , 3 )=a3 1
,
where 3' is the result of replacing
tne first verb in 3 with its negative third
person singular present perfect.
T4: if and 3£Pjy> and a and 3 translate as a’
,
3' respectively, then
F^ta.S) translates into a’ ("3')
F^(a,3) translates into ~(a , C‘3'))
Fg(a,3) translates into W(a'( A 3’))
F^(a,B) translates into ~W( a’
(
A
3 * )
)
Fg ( a , 3
)
translates into H(a’("3'))
F^(a,3) translates into ~H(a'( A 3'))
S5: if a€P IV/,T and p€Pr then F1Q ( a, 3 )€P iy , where
F1Q (a,3)=a3 if 3 does not have the form he , and
F10
^
a * 3 )=a him otherwise
T5: if a€Pjyy/rp an(^ and a, 8 translate into a',
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S6
:
T6
:
S7:
T7:
S8:
T8:
S9:
T9:
S10
:
0 ’ respectively, then F10 C<x, 3 ) translates into
a’
C
A
3
1
)
lf aeF
adj and e€PCN’ then FH ((I ^)^ Pcn’ where
P11 ^ ^ ’ 0 ) -oc.8
if a7P
ad ^. and 0?PCN and a, 3 translate into a’,
8 respectively, then F^(a, 0 ) translates into
a'
(
A
g'
)
lf a€P lv/adj and 5€Padj’ then F11 (a,3)€P IV
ix a ~ PIV/adj and 0€Padi’ and translate as a',
8 respectively, then F-^(a,0) translates into
a'
A
B' )
if a€P
IV// t
and 0€P
t ,
then F
11 (a,B)€P ][v
if a7 pjy^ and 0^P^. and a, 3 translate into a',
3’ respectively, then F-^(a,3) translates into
a
' (
A
3 ' )
if a€P Iv^IV
and 08P
IV , then F^ ( ct , 3 )€P IV
if c^Pjv/fy a^d 0€Pjy, and a, 3 translate as a',
3' respectively, then F-^(a,3) translates into
a
' (
A
0 ' )
if a€
P
t// t
and 0€P
t ,
then F11 (a,0)€P t
if a€P^^_ and P
,
and a, 3 translate into a’,
8' respectively, then F^^(a,6) translates into
a ' (
A
3 ' )
T10
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Sll: if 9,e*€P
t ,
then F12 (e ,A*) , F13 ( 9 , 9 *) 6P t , where
F 12^ e,e*^ and F 13 ^ 9 » 9*)=9 or
Til: if 9,9*£P_^ and 9,9* translate into 9', 9*'
respectively, then F12 ( 9 ,
9
*) translates into
(
9
1 &9 *
' )
;
F^
3
( 9 , 9 * ) translates into (9'v9*')
S12: if a ,3^P IV , then F12 (a, 3) , F 13 (a,3)3P IV
T12: if a,33P-j-y and a, 3 translate into a', 3' respec-
tively, then F 12 (a,3) translates into
x( a' (x)&|B
'
( x) ) ; F-^
3
(a,3) translates into
x( a' ( x) v3
' ( x)
)
S13
:
if a,33?
T ,
then F
13 (a, 3)3 P t
T13* if a,33P m and a,,3 translate into a',,3' respec
tively, then F^
3
(ot f g) translates into
P( a' (P) v3
'
(P)
Sl4: if a€P
T
and 3^?^.* then F^
n
(a,3)3P^., where
a) if a is not of the form he
, ,
then
Fl4 n ( a >$) is result of replacing the
first occurence of he or him
^
in 3 by a
and all other occurences of he
.^
or him
.,
in 3 by he, she , it or him , her , it ,
respectively, according to the gender of
a;
b) if a is of the form he, , then F^ n ( a , 3
)
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is the result of replacing all occurences
of he
n
and him
n
in 3 by he
fc
or him
k ,
respectively
Tlu. if c.3P
t
and B€P^. and a, 3 translate into a', 3'
respectively, then Fu (a,3) translates into
a' (&
n
3
'
)
S15: if a€P
T
and 3^PCN , then n ( a , 3 )€PCN
ant^ an<^ translate into a ',3'
respectively, then F
p4(n (ct,3) translates into
ya'U
n
(3'(y)))
S16: if a€P
T
and B€P ly , then Fl4 (
R
( a , 3 )€P JV
Tlo: if ePP^, and SPPjy and a, 3 translate into a ',3'
respectively, then F-^
n
(a,3) translates into
ya’ (X
n
(3’ (y) )
)
ihe rules S1-S16 can be taken as a simultaneous in-
ductive deiinition of the notion of a meaningful expression
of category a for the language E; more precisely, we can
say that an expression is a member of the set of expressions
of category a for the fragment E if and only if that ex-
pression is a member of the smallest set closed under Sl-
Sl6 and that expression is of category a. The set of
meaningful expressions of the fragment E will then be the
union of the meaningful expressions of category a for all
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agCat
.
It win be useful at this point to step back from the
formal presentation of the language and give an intuitive
account of what each of the syntactic rules S1-S17 are
doing si acts as the base clause of the inductive
definition of a meaningful expression of E. Simply put,
SI tells us that the members of the basic categories, or
the simple vocabulary of the fragment, are all meaningful
expressions. Rule S2 is used to put determiners on common
n° Un P hrase s, changing them into term phrases. In a more
complex grammar we might find that we wanted to introduce
determiners at the level of the vocabulary by introducing
a new category of basic expressions to the fragment and
adding a syntactic rule which put determiners together
with common noun phrases to produce term phrases. Such
an approach has its advantages, and is taken by Thomason
(1974b). However, these advantages are not relevant to
the questions which concern us here and thus this fragment
utilizes the simplier technique of introducing determiners
via a rule
.
Rule S3 is one of four rules in the grammar (along
with S13, S14, and S15) which is actually a rule schemata.
The purpose of S3 is to allow for the generation of
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restrictive relative clauses. This rule takes a common
noun and puts it together with a sentence, with the result
being another common noun. The rule is productive when
the sentence it combines with the common noun has an
occurence of one of the "dummy" pronouns he
R . This rule is
applied in such a way as to bind that pronoun. So, for
example, this rule will allow us to put together the
common noun "man" with the sentence "he
_2
walks " to obtain
the common noun "man such that he walks" which is the
rendering in this fragment of the English common noun
phrase "man who walks."
The fourth syntactic rule is the rule of the fragment
which allows for terms to be put together with verb
phrases to produce sentences, or phrases of syntactic
category t. The six variants of the rule allow for present
past, and future tense constructions along with the sen-
tential negation of any of those forms. As with deter-
miners in this fragment, it might well turn out that to
more adequately characterize English we would not want to
introduce tense and negation by a rule, but rather have
separate basic expression categories for these parts of
speech. However, we will again take the simple way out,
as the syntax of English tense and negation is not our
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primary concern in this work.
Rule S5 allows us to generate intransitive verb
phrases by putting transitive verbs together with term
phrases. Rules S6 and S7 are the rules which allow for
the generation of adjectives in the sentences of E; S6
produces pre-common noun adjectives while S7 generates
predicate adjectives using the "be" of predication, "be "
—
P*
Rules S8-S10 produce sentences which, while perhaps
of little linguistic interest, are of philosophical in-
terest. S8 introduces sentences in which intentional
contexts like belief and assertion play a major role,
while S9 introduces sentences in which the phrases " try
to" and " wish to" are the main verbs. Rule S10 allows
generation of sentences with the modal operators " possibly "
and " necessarily .
"
Rules S11-S13 allow us to produce conjunctions and
disjunctions of sentences and verb phrases, as well as
disjunctions of noun phrases. No conjunctions of noun
phrases are generated in this grammar, enabling us to
ignore the problems of giving an adequate syntax and
semantics for English plurals.
The final three rules, like rule S3, are actually
rule schemata. These rules allow for the generation of
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sentences with varying scope for noun phrases. Specif ic-
aiiy, they allow the implantation of term phrases into
sentences, common noun phrases, and verb phrases. The
importance of these rules will be discussed more fully
below, when we turn to the translation rules.
For each syntactic rule SI—Sl6, there is a corres-
ponding translation rule
. The idea here is that if a
meaningful expression of E is formed by applying one of
rule S1-S16, the translation of the phrase which results
is obtained by taking the translation of the phrases put
together by the syntactic rule and putting those trans-
lations together in the way specified by the translation
rule. The members of the basic categories are translated
in accordance to rule Tl; most of the basic expressions
will simply be translated as constants of the appropriate
type by the function g. For purposes of simplicity, we
will indicate the constant of the language L 0 which is the
translation of such a member of a basic category by using
the following convention: if a£dom(g) then g(a) will
be written "a'". Special translations are provided for
"be " , "be_ " , the modal operators " possibly " and " necessar -
—
P
ily "
,
and the terms " John "
,
"Mary "
,
" Bill "
,
and " nine ty "
,
and the subscripted dummy pronouns "he "
.
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As they stand, the translation rules T1-T16 specify a
translation relation which holds between meaningful
expressions of E and meaningful expressions of L
3
• this
relation is not a function as some meaningful expressions
of E will be capable of being translated into different
meaningful expressions of L
3
. This is not suprising, as
We Wlsh 1:0 be ab le to generate sentences of E which are
amoiguous, even though is a disambiguated language,
de could, however, make adjustments in the domain of the
translation relation which would make the relation into a
function. To do this we need to first introduce the notion
of an analysis tree for a meaningful expression of E.
An analysis tree of a meaningful expression of E will
be a graphic representation of the sequence of rules used
to generate the meaningful expression. Each node of the
analysis tree for a sentence or meaningful expression
will consist of a meaninful expression which is either a
basic expression or an expression generated from nodes
immediately dominated by the node by one of the rules of
the syntax, S1-S16. In the latter case, we indicate which
syntactic function was used to obtain the expression by
writing the number of that syntactic function after the
expression produced. For example, two analysis trees for
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the sentence of E
3.50) Every man loves a woman
are
3.5D Every man loves a woman
,
4
ylove a woman
,
10Every man, 0
1
man love a woman
,
2
woman
3.52) Every man loves a woman
, 14,2
a woman
,
2
1
Every man loves hinu
,
4
woman Every man
,
0
man
love him
2 ,
10
love
\
him.
Corresponding to each node of such an analysis tree
will be a single meaningful expression of which is the
translation of that node
. To find that translation all
that is needed is to apply the translation rule correspond-
ing to the syntactic rule used to form the node to the
nodes immediately dominated. It is fairly easy to see
that every sentence of E will have infinitely many differ-
ent analysis trees; for example, we could produce an in-
finite number of different analysis trees for sentence 3 * 50 )
by simply using analysis trees which differ from 3 - 52 )
only in the subscript of the pronoun and in which version
of the rule schema F-.
,,
is used. However, most of the14
,
n
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different analysis trees which can be used to represent
the generation of a sentence can be ignored as inessent-
ial^ different, as these trees will not result in diverg-
ent translations of the sentence of E into L The in-
finite number of different analysis trees described above
for sentence 3-50), for example, will have translations
Which differ in no way at all at the level of the whole
formula, and which will differ only in the subscript on
<3. /ariable sib any lower levGl.
The device of analysis trees serves to disambiguate
sentences of the fragment E. While a given meaningful
expression may have more than one translation into l the
combination of a meaningful expression and the analysis
tree of that meaningful expression which tells us the
derivational history of that meaningful expression has a
unique translation into Hence if we took as our
domain of the translation relation meaningful expressions
with their analysis trees, the translation relation would
be a function, and we could directly interpret these
meaningful expressions and their analysis trees by way of
the function which is the composition of the translation
function and the ^as yet unspecified) interpretation
function on
. Having noted that this is possible, we
24l
will now return to talking about the translation relation
from meaningful expressions of E to meaningful expressions
L3 ’ re ^urni nS to analysis trees only when necessary.
It should be noted that the analysis trees given above
.or sentence 3-50) are not inessentially different, that
os, the translations of the meaningful expressions gener-
ated by the sequence of rule applications charted in the
orees are not equivalent formulas in L~
. The differences
can be traced to the way the term phrase "a woman " is
brought into the sentence. In the first analysis tree
the phrase is represented as being generated directly while
in the second it is represented as being inserted by syn-
tactic function F-^^. This difference will be reflected
semantically by a difference in the scope of the trans-
lation of the phrase "a woman
. In the first case, repre-
sented by 3-51). the phrase "a woman " has small scope,
giving us the reading of sentence 3*50) corresponding to
"every man loves some woman (although, perhaps, different
men love different women)." The sentence generated by
the sequence of syntactic rules represented by analysis
tree 3*51)
*
on the other hand, gives the phrase "a woman "
large scope. This results in a reading of sentence 3.50)
roughly equivalent to "some particular woman is loved by
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ever,, man. This ability to generate sentences which are
amoiguous in this way is given to the fragment by the syn-
tactic rules S14-S16.
The syntax and translation rules of this fragment
differ from those for the fragment of English presented
m Montague (1974a) only in the following ways. We have
added two basic categories, those of adjectives and the
—p
0f P redica tion. We have also added two rules, S6 and
S7, which allow for the generation of predicate and pre-
nominal adjectives. To the basic category of common nouns
we have added three items, solely for the sake of gener-
ating some sentences which we have talked about previously
m this work. The translation rules involving quantific-
ation have been changed to reflect the sorted quantific-
ation system we will be adopting. We have also deleted
uhe basic category of intransitive verb making prepositions
and the rule making phrases containing those basic ex-
pressions. This was done simply because such constructions
do not play any particularly important part in the theory
of sortally incorrect sentences to be presented here. We
have also added the sentence modifying adverb " possibly "
and the sentence taking verb phrase " dream that"; the
latter was added to allow sentences like those discussed
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by McCauley ( 1971) to be generated by the fragment, the
cormer was added for no reason other than to give symmetry
to the modal operators in the fragment.
It should be noted that none of these changes are
strictly necessary if we want to develop a theory of the
semantics of sortally incorrect sentences with the excep-
tion ol the variation in the translation rules required
J ° a^ ow for sorted quantification. The grammar given by
Montague already allows for the generation of sentences
like
3-5M Ninety loves Mary and tries to date her
which seems to be a reasonable candidate for being con-
sidered a sortally incorrect sentence. Making the changes
we have made allows us to discuss familiar examples. But
not making the changes would not have kept the problem
from arising.
All of what has gone on in constructing the grammar
up to this point is really preliminary work. What we
have done is to set up a syntax which generates sentences,
some of which are sortally incorrect, and specified a way
to translate those sentences into a formal language. We
will now turn to the real work of the chapter, giving a
semantics for the fragment.
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Let A, I, and J be any non-empty sets, which we will
intuitively consider to be the set of (possible) entities,
possible worlds, and times, respectively. We define the
set of possible denotations of type a for aeTyoe relative
to A
,
I, ana J, denoted by D „ eoJ a
,
A
,
I
,
J s
3 - 55 )
3 - 56 )
3 - 5?)
3 - 58 )
D
e ,A, I,
J
=A
D
t,A,I,
D
<a,b>,A, I
,
the set of partial functions
from d
3 a t t t0 D, A T Ta » A , 1 , j b
,
A
,
I
,
J
D
<s , a> , A , I ,
J
= the set of partial functions
from IxJ to D
„ ,
a, A, I,
J
A sorted model of will be a six-tuple UE=<A
, I , J , < , E , F>
such that
3 . 59 )
3 . 60 )
3 . 61 )
A, I, and J are non-empty sets
- is a simple (linear) ordering on J
E (the sortal specification) is a function from
Con
<a,b>UCon<s,a> for any a > b€ Type such that
a) if a^Con
<a>b>) E(cc) is a function from IxJ
b)
t 0 (P(D
a,A,I,J>
if a€C on
<s a> ,
E( a) is a function from IxJ
to (P( IxJ
)
F (the interpretation function) is a function
from constants of such that
3 . 62 )
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a) if ag Type and agCon
, F(a)gD
a <s , a>
,
A , I ,
J
b) if agCon
<a
^
b> and and
((F(a))(<i, j>))(x) is defined, then
x€ (E(cc)
)
(<i, j>)
c) if a€Con
<S(a> and <i’,;j'>gIxJ and
((F( a ))(<i, j>)
)
(<i •
, y>) is defined, then
<i
'
»
j
’>€ (E( a) ) (<i
,
j>)
Having specified what a model for is to be, the next
step is to define the set of extended valuations relative
to such a model. To do this we must first specify a sub-
set of the set of possible denotations of type a for
aC Type relative to the sets of entities, possible worlds,
and times A, I, and J specified in the model. We will call
these sets the sets of possible complete denotations of
type a relative to A, I, and J, denoted D* A T T , defineda
,
a
,
i
,
j
as
3 ' 6 3 > dI,A,I,J=a
3 - 64 > d?,a,i,j=C °' 1}
3.65) D*
a h x j~ bhe se b °b bo tal functions
from D
a>A(I>J bo Db>A>I(J
3.66) D*
. A T T=bhe set of total functions from<s,a>,A,I,J
IxJ to D
. T Ta, A, 1,
J
Clearly, since total functions are special cases of partial
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functions, for all a€Tvoe. D* r-u
~
a , A , I , J— a , A , I ,
J
The set of extended valuations relative to a model
UE=<A,I,J,s,e,F> Will be the set I+ of all seven- tuples
I *-<A
,
I
,
J
,
<
,
E
,
F , New> such that
3.6?) A, I, j, <, E
, and F are the same sets, rela-
ion, sortal specification and interpretation
function specified in UE
3.68) hew is a function from D tin
<a , b> , A , I ,
J
u
< s , a> , A , I ,
J
±or all a
, bg Type to D* , . nn*
<a,b>,A,I,j <s,a>,A,I,J
such that
a) if x€D
b> A j T , then New(x)€D*d,D <a , b> , A , I ,
J
such that, for all if x(y ) is
defined, ( New( x) ) ( y)=x( y)
b) if x8D then New(x)€D*<s , a> , A , l , j <s , a> , A , I ,
such that, for all <i,j>eixJ, if x(<i,j>)
is defined, then (New(x) ) (<i
,
j> ) =x( <i
,
j>)
A g-assignment of values to variables of L
?
on a model
UE=<A
, I , J ,< ,E , F> will be a function from variables of all
n/pss such 6ha t if u is a variable of type a€ Type
,
g(u)€D
a ^^j. The value of a meaningful expression a of
on an extended valuation I*-<A
, I , J, < ,E , F
,
New> which
is a member of the set of extended valuations relative to
a model UE on a g-assignment of values to variables on that
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model at a point of evaluation <i,j>elxJ, denoted byT v • • w
/ \ -L ^
,
l
,
i
, gr
'
:
-
* can now be defined recursively as
^• 69 ) if oc is a cons tant of
, then (cx)"^" ’ a ’ «5 * S'—
(New( F( a) ) (<i
,
j>)
3-70) if a is a variable of L Q , then ( a) ^ ^ ’ ^=g( a)
3.71) if a€ME
a
and u is a variable of type b, then
Uuot) ’^’^’ s=h, the partial function from
D
b , A , I , J
to D
a , A , I ,
J
such that
a) if x?Db)A
^
I(J then h( x)=( a)
X *
’
1
’ ^
’
§ ' where
S’ is an assignment of values to variables
which differs from g only in that g'(u)=x
if and only if ( a) ^ ^
’
g
'
-{ a )
I *
'
*
a
* j >
S
'
for all I*'el+
;
b) if x6Db
^
A>I ^j, then h(x) is undefined
otherwise
3-72) if a€ME
<a b> and 3€MEa , then ( a( 3 )
)
^
^
( New ( (a)
1 *’ 11
^ ,g
) ) ( (9)
1 *’ 1
’ *5 ,g
)
3-73) if a,$<EME
a
, then (o=6)^ ip an(^ only if
(a)^ is (3)^ otherwise
(o^g) 1
*’ 1
’ j 'S= 0
3*74) if 9€ME + , then ( ~9 ) ^ ^ » j > S =1 if and only if
(q)^ otherwise (~9)^ ’ a ’
3
’
0
3.75) if 9,9’£ME_j_, then (9v9’)^ ’ ^’^’S_i ip and only
if (9)^ or (9 ,)I *i>j*g_p. otherwise
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( 9 v9 ' ) ’
1
’ j ’ S_.q
Similarly for ( 9 &e * )
,
(e-9 • ) , and (9<-->9*)
3.?fc) if e,a' ? ME
t
and u a variable of type a, then
(AuEeKe’)) 1 *’ 1 ’ j-s is
a if G Cg'ig' is an assignment of values to
variables which differs from g in at most
the value of g(u) and which are such that
( e )
1
' 1,J,S ’
=lfor all then
(Au[e](e')) I *’ i, 'i ’ e
=l if and only if
^ ^ ^ for all g
' €G
;
otherwise
( Au[ 9]
(
9 , ))
I
^’^’S> g_ o
.
b) if G (as defined above)=j^, then
(/\u[ 9] ( 9 ' ) ) ^ if and oniy if for
all g assignments of values to variables
which differ from g in at most the value
of g’(u), if (e) 1 *' 1 ’ then
(9')^ * otherwise
(Au[ 9] (9 ' ) ) 1 *’ j ’^o
3-7 7 ) if 9,9'9ME_
t
and u a variable of type a, then
( Vu[ 9]
(
9 ' )
J
1 ** 1
’
0
»g i s
a) if G (as defined in 3 . 76a) -0 , then
( Vu£ 9"] ( 9 ' ) ) ^ if an(i only if
( 9-) 1 =1 for some g'€G; otherwise
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(Vu[9] (
0
' ) )
i
» J * g_Q
b) if G=0, then (Vu[e] (
0
* )
)
»
1
» 3 > g
=1 if and
only if there is some g' assignment of
values to variables which differs from g
in at most the value of g'(u) such that
(,)IMU.S ’
=1 and ( 9 .)l*,i.j.g* ; 1
;
otherwise {V u[ 9 ]
(
9 ' )
)
1
> j
* S_ 0
3.78) if eeME
t
, then (m
)
:
I#
-
1
' 3
' s=r if and only if
(e) 1 - 1 'j ’ s=l for all <i',j'>elxJ; otherwise
Similarly for (09)
3-79) if 9€ME
t ,
then (We
)
X *
’
1
’i ’ g
=i if and only if
(q) 1 ’ 1 ’
J
,g
=l for some j'GJ such that j<j’
and j/j'i otherwise (W9 ) ^ ^
’
g
=o
Similarly for ( He
)
3
•
u0 ) H a^ME^, then ( A a)^ where h is the
partial function from IxJ to D
A such that,
for all <i*
,
j
’>eixJ,
a) h(<i'
,
^ ,g if and only if
(a) 1
*’ 1
’ i' ,s
=(a) I#
'
,1 '
’ t3
*’
,g for all
I* » £
I
+
b) h(<i',j'>) is undefined otherwise
3. 81) if a€ME
,
then ( v a)^
*
1
’
^
,g
=
< s
,
a>
250
( New( ( ct) I * ’ 1 ’ ^’ g )(<i, j>)
We are now able to define the value of a meaningful expres
sion a of L
3
on the supervaluation induced by a model UE
relative to a g-assignment of values to variables at a
world and time of evaluation, denoted by (a) UE,i ’^’ g
. Let
I be some extended valuation relative to the model UE
.
Then we can define as
3-82) if a€ME^ for any a€ Type
, ( a)
Uij
’ ^ ^ ’ s-
(a)^ if and only if ( a) ^ ^ ’ g:=
( 1 )
*
» j » & por a pp I*’£l+
; otherwise
(a)^E, ^ , ^ ,g is undefined.
tie will say that a sentence 9 of is true on a model UE
at a world and time of evaluation <i,j> if and only if
'
^~1
- °r all g-ass ignments of values to variables
relative to the model UE
; false if and only if
0 for all g-assignments of values to variables relative
to UE
; and undefined otherwise.
We now have a syntax which generates a subset of the
set of English sentences, a set of translation rules which
enable us to say, given a sentence and the syntactic
generation of that sentence, what the translation of that
sentence into our formal language is, and a semantics
for the language . We will now look at a number of
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example sentences to see just what the results are of
applying this grammar to the problem of sortally incorrect
sentences
.
The fragment is designed to reflect the intuition
that simple subject-predicate sortally incorrect sentences
are without truth-value. An obvious place to begin is to
look at how the fragment deals with what have been taken
as our paradigm sortally incorrect sentences,
3-83) The theory of relativity is shiny
3-84) The taste of lemon is breakable
The most straightforward way of obtaining these sentences
in our syntactic system is represented by the analysis
trees
With
into
3
•
83 ' ) The theory of relativity is shiny
,
4
The theory of relativity
, 1 be ^ shiny, 11
1
“7 \theory of relativity be
,.
shiny
3.84') The taste of lemon is breakable, 4
The taste of lemon, 1
taste of lemon
\
be breakable
,
11
—p^—r
be' breakable
these syntactic generations, the sentences translate
Ijj as
3 . 83 ") VyfAxf theory of relativity ' (x)~!x-y^
V P[P{y}1(
(
shiny ' (*P) )(y)
)
252
^.84 ) Vy[Ax[ taste of lemon ' ( x) ~lx=v~|VP[P£y} ]
(
(
breakable '
(
A
P) ) (y)
)
R oughly, 3.83") can be paraphrased in English as saying
that there is some object which is the unique theory of
relativity, and that this object has some property such
that the property obtained by applying the function from
intensions of properties to properties which is the denot-
ation the term shiny' " to that property is itself a
property which is had by the object which is the theory
of relativity. 3.84") can be paraphrased in an analogous
fashion
.
How are these sentences evaluated by the semantics?
Since both sentences have the same logical form, they will
be evaluated in analogous ways, hence we will only look
a
., how the semantics evaluates 3.83"). Suppose we have a
sorted model which reflects English. The value of 3.83")
on that model will be determined by the value of that
sentence on the supervaluation induced by the model, which
in turn is determined by the value of that sentence on
each of the members of the set of extended valuations
relative to that model. To evaluate this sentence, which
is an existentially quantified formula, at the level of
the extended valuations we must first determine the members
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of the set of assignments of values to variables which
satisfy the sort of the quantifier on all of the extended
valuations. This sentence will be satisfied only by an
assignment to the variable y of an object which is identical
to everything which is mapped to "l" by the function
"theory of rela tivity 1 " on all extended valuations. Such
an object will exist only if the model interprets " theory
~ —j-ativtfry as a function which is defined for and
maps to 1 a unique object, that is, if on the model there
is a unique object which is the theory of relativity.
Assuming that this is the case on the model, there will
be only one g assignment of values to variables which
will be relevant to the evaluation of 3.83") on any member
of the set of extended valuations. The sentence will be
mapped to 1 on an extended valuation if and only if there
is some property had by the object picked out by the g-
assignment on all extended valuations (and which, therefore
is defined for and true of the object on the model) which
is such that shiny ’ applied to the intension of that
property is a property had by the object. However, it is
reasonable to assume that one of two results obtains when
one applies the function which is the interpre tation of
2]}jrn
,Y
.
t° a property had by the object which is the
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theory of relativity. One result 0 . n++ ,* , gotten when one applies
the function to properties like the interpretation of
- o r
y
of relativity '
"
,
right sort for the functi
is that the property is not of the
on, which means that the result
o applying the function to the argument will vary from
extended valuation to extended valuation. The other possib-
ility would be that the property of the theory of relativity
would be something like' the property of being thought about
by John, which would be within the sortal range of the
function which is the interpretation of " shiny ' "
. But it
is reasonable to assume that the property which results
irom applying the interpretation of " shiny '
" to such a
property will itself be a property for which the object
wnich is the theory of relativity is of the wrong sort.
-^i ther way, this means that the result of applying the
i unction which is the interpretation of " shiny 1 " to some
property had by the theory of relativity and then applying
the property which comes from that to the object picked
out by the g-assignment will vary from extended valuation
to extended valuation. On some extended valuations, we
will find that some property had by the object in question
is mapped by the interpretation of " shiny ' " to a property
which, on that extended valuation, the object does have.
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Buu tnere Wl11 be at least one extended valuation on which
all of the properties had by the object are mapped to
properties the object doesn't have by the interpretation
°-
--V rl
.V • Hence on some extended valuations 3.83") i s
evaluated as having the value 1 while on others the sentence
is evaluated as having the value 0. So on the supervalu-
ation induced by the model 3.83") (and, for analogous
reasons, 3-34")) is evaluated as having no truth-value at
all, which is the result we want.
Ao Wlth the 1 i rs t-order theory presented in the second
section of this chapter, the semantics for our fragment
will evaluate sortally incorrect sentences which have the
form 01 tautologies as true. For example, consider the
sentence
3.85) Every shiny theory of relativity is shiny
generated in the way represented by the analysis tree
3 • 8
5
'
)
Every shiny theory of relativity is shiny
,
4
Every shiny theory of relativity, ^"o^be shiny. 11
I
“
shiny theory of relativ ity. 11 be shiny
^ \ ~P
shiny the ory of relativity
which translates into as
3-3 5") AxC( shiny 1 ( A theory of relativity 1 ) ) (x)
3
(VP[P{x}l(
(
shiny *
(
A P))(x)))
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Since the formula which is the sort of the quantifier in
this sentence is sortally incorrect, when we evaluate this
sentence at the level of the extended valuations the set
of g-assignments of values to variables which satisfy that
formula on all of the extended valuations relative to the
model will be empty. In such a case, we evaluate the sen-
tence completely within each of the extended valuations.
On such evaluations, any object which satisfies the formula
which is the sort of the quantifier will satisfy the
quantified formula. So on every member of the set of ex-
tended valuations, the sentence is evaluated as having
the value 1. Hence on the supervaluation induced by the
model the sentence is evaluated as being true. Again, this
is the result we wanted.
Our fragment also allows for the generation of sen-
tences in which a sortally incorrect sentence appears as
the grammatical object of certain verbs. One such sentence
is
3-86) John believes that the theory of relativity
is shiny
We can also generate sentences like those cited by McCawley
(1971) such as
2.8 7) John dreamed that the theory of relativity
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is shiny
Tne first of these, when generated in a way represented
by the analysis tree
8,8c '^ £ohn believes that the theory
-f0 ia t^vi tv is shiny
, 4
—
hn believe^ that the theor 1
£1 relativity is shiny,
, ,
. / x
°e llev0 that the theory of
relativity is shiny
,
(as in^ 3 . 83
'
)
11
4
will translate into as
J ® 8 relieve tha
r
1
( \/y
£
A xL the ory of relativity ' ( x
)
^]
x=ylVP[P{ y} 1 (
(
shiny ’ ( *P ) ) ( y ) ) )
(
" j
)
which states that the relation " believe that'" holds be-
tween the intension of the object which is John and the
intension of the interpretation of the translation into
Lj of the sentence " the theory of relativity is shiny .
"
If we so wished, we could follow Montague and adopt a
meaning postulate reflecting the extensionality in subject
of sentences like this, which would let us further reduce
our translation into a sentence of L ? which states that a
relation holds between the intension of the interpretation
of the translation into of the sentence " the theory
Our concern
of relativity is shiny ” and John himself,
however, is not with the extensionality of the subject
term in such sentences, but rather with how we should
treat the grammatical object.
The object of the sentence is the intension of a
sortally incorrect sentence, that is, a function from
possible worlds and times to the truth-value had by the
sentence at that world and time. While this point is left
open m the semantics we have given, it is not unreasonabl
to assume that a sentence like "the theory of relativity
is shiny” will be sortally incorrect at all worlds and
at a±l times. If this is the case, the intension of the
translation of that sentence will be a function which is
undefined for all points of evaluation; hence the inten-
sion will be the null function from worlds and times to
truth-values
.
The question now is what effect this has on the truth
value of the sentence as a whole. The theory allows for
two possible treatments. One of these would be based on
the intuition that the entire sentence 3.86) is sortally
incorrect, that sortally incorrect sentences are not the
kinds of things which can be believed, asserted, or
dreamed. To get this result requires only that we select
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our sortal specification function in such a way that sort-
ally incorrect sentences are not within the sortal range
of the functions which are the interpretations of these
-ros Oi propositional attitude. Doing this insures that
the truth-values of 3.86") and the sentence which is the
translation of 3 - 3?) into L
3
will vary from extended val-
uation to extended valuation, and hence that the super-
valuation induced by the model will evaluate these sen-
tences as having no truth-value.
While this is a possible way of dealing with sen-
fences like 3 . 86 ) and 3.87) in the fragment, it does not
seem to be the best way. On an intuitive level, it does
not appear that we would want to discount the possible
truth of a sentence like 3 - 86 ) or 3.87). On being told
that John believes that the theory of relativity is shiny
we might wonder about John, and would certainly have
reason to say that John was confused or unclear about the
kind of entities theories are. But I don't think that
we would immediately conclude that the speaker of the
report of John's belief was uttering a sentence without
truth-value. The report is about what John believes, and
John's beliefs may be radically different from our own in
bizarre ways. We would certainly want to say that, if
260
3,86) WaS true
’ John ’ s beli ®f 3hows a mistake about fund-
emental ontological status. But being able to conclude
all of this about John presupposes that we understand
3 ' 86) and acce P t i1: as a true account concerning John’s
reliefs
, which would not be possible under the option
Which results in evaluating 3.86) as a sentence without
truth-value
.
The claim that verbs of propositional attitude have
sortal ranges which exclude the intensions of sortally
incorrect sentences is even less reasonable when we
consider sentences like 3-87). If John, a graduate student
m physics, were to tell us that the night before his
orals he dreamed that the theory of relativity was shiny,
we might be amused or, perhaps, concerned that he was
working too hard. But we would not be inclined, I think,
to point out to him that the theory of relativity was not
the kind of thing which can be shiny and hence that he
could not have dreamed that it was. This intuition that
sortally incorrect sentences can appear as the objects of
verbs of propositional attitudes without causing the entire
sentence to be sortally incorrect is not entirely idio-
syncratic, as McCawley (1971) uses such contexts to
produce sentences in which sortally incorrect sentences
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are parts but which are such that the entire sentence is
-iO t judged as one which is deviant.
The alternative which appears preferable, then, is
to take verbs of propositional attitude to include in
their sortal ranges the intensions of (at least some)
sortally incorrect sentences. Using this approach, the
truth-value of sentence 3 .36") will be determined by what
John in fact believes. If he believes the proposition
expressed by the sentence "the theory of relativity is
shiny, then 3*86 ) will be true; if he does not believe
that proposition the sentence will be false.
It should be pointed out that this approach is not
without problems of its own. Propositions, in this sem-
antics, are identified with functions from worlds and times
of evaluation to truth-values. Assuming that the sortal
range of a term does not vary from world-time to world-
time, the object of belief in 3.86") is a function from
all world-time pairs to no truth-value. This is a function
it is the null function from this domain. The problem
with this treatment is that if sortal ranges remain con-
stant throughout the set of world-time pairs, the propos-
ition expressed by all sortally incorrect sentences will
be the same--they will all express the null function from
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world-time pairs to truth-values
. So if John does believe
that the theory of relativity is shiny, on this treatment,
09 also believes the proposition expressed by every other
serially incorrect sentence. Yet if we allow belief in
sortally incorrect sentences it would appear that we ought
to allow for the possibility that John believes that the
theory of relativity is shiny without his also believing
that the taste of lemon is breakable. On our treatment
this is not possible, for the propositions expressed by
the two sentences, which are the object of belief, are
identical
.
However, this is not a problem brought about by our
treatment of sortally incorrect sentences, but rather a
proolem inherent in the treatment of propositions which
takes propositions to be functions from points of reference
t0 truth—values • Once we have identified propositions with
such functions, we are unable to distinguish not only the
propositions expressed by different sortally incorrect
sentences, but the propositions expressed by different
necessary truths (which will all be the function from
points of reference to the truth-value true) or the prop-
ositions expressed by necessary falsehoods (which will all
be the function from points of reference to the truth-value
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false). To avoid this problem we need something more than
a different treatment of sortally incorrect sentences.
-'/hat is needed is some way of representing propositions
which makes finer distinctions between them than is now
made by our semantics. A solution to the problem of dis-
tinguishing between various necessarily true propositions
should also allow us to distinguish between the various
proposi oions expressed by sortally incorrect sentences.
A linal pair of examples we will consider are sen-
tences which are not sortally incorrect, but show an
interesting facet of the system concerning the way in
which it deals with definite descriptions. Consider the
sentences
3-88) The king of France is bald
3-89) The man is bald
whose generations can be represented by the analysis trees
3 .88') The king of France is bald
,
4
The king of France
,
1 be_ bald, 11
king of France be
—
P
bald
3.89’ The man is bald, 4
The man, 1
man
be bald, 11
} \be bald
Jr
and which translate into as
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3.33") Vy[Ax[ king; of France.' (x) 3x=y]VP[P{y} 3
( (bald' ( A P) )
(
y )
)
3.89") Vy[Ax[rnan’(x)lx^ylVP[p{ y}l(( bald t (-P) )( v ) )
Both of these sentences have definite descriptions which
fail t0 refer uniquely. In 3-88), the definite description
^ails to refer because there is no object which is (pres-
ently) the king of France. In 3-89), the definite des-
cription does not fail because there is no object which is
a man, but oecause there are too many objects which are
men. In standard treatments of definite descriptions, both
of these sentences would be dealt with in the same way,
and the truth-value of the sentences would be the same.
In the semantics we have constructed for this fragment,
however, the two sentences are evaluated differently.
The evaluation of these sentences is somewhat com-
plicated, due to the fact that in both sentences the sort
of the first existential quantifier is itself a quantified
formula. In evaluating 3.88”), we must first see if there
are any objects which satisfy the formula "Ax[king of
France 1 ( x) ! x=y" in all of the extended valuations relative
to our model. This in turn requires that we see if there
are any objects which satisfy the formula " king of France '
(x)" in all of the extended valuations. This will be the
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case only if there are some objects which are the king of
r ranee; since there is no (present) king of France, the
set of g-assignments which satisfies this formula in all
of the set of extended valuations will be the null set.
This means that the formula is to be evaluated using the
second clause of the quantification evaluation rule, that
is, the domain of the quantifier will be all those objects
which satisfy the formula " king of France’ (x)" on the
particular extended valuation. Whether or not there will
be any objects which satisfy this formula on a particular
extended valuation will depend on how the function which is
the interpretation of " king of France ' " is completed on
oha t extended valuation. There are three possibilities we
must consider: either there will be no objects satisfying
the formula, there will be a single object satisfying the
formula, or there will be more than one object satisfying
the formula.
In extended valuations in which no objects satisfy the
formula, every object (vacuously) satisfies the formula
"^xj king of France
'
(x) n x=y" on all extended valuations.
Given that there is some object in the model which is bald,
on these extended valuations the sentence as a whole will
be evaluated as having the value 1.
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There will also be extended valuations in which more
Vhan one object will satisfy the formula "king of France '
( :0". The objects which will do this are all outside the
sortal range of "king of France’" but satisfy the formula
oecause of the way the function which is the interpretation
of cing Of France'" is completed on the extended valua-
tion. In such a case, no object is identical to every-
thing which satisfies the formula " king of France * (x) .
"
So we must evaluate the existential quantifier within the
particular extended valuation. But we have already seen
that there is no single object on this type of extended
valuation which is identical to everything which, on this
extended valuation, is identical to all of the objects
which satisfy the formula. So on such extended valuations
bhe sentence as a whole is evaluated as having the value
0 .
ihe variation of the value of 3 • 88"
)
in the cases
above is sufficient to show that the sentence is evaluated
as having no truth-value by the supervaluation induced by
the model. We will look at the third case merely to
illustrate how the semantics works in such cases.
The final possibility concerns extended valuations
in which a single object satisfies the formula "king of
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I^nce'fx)". On such an extended valuation, there will be
a single object which is identical on all of the extended
valuations to the object which satisfies the formula on
Shis extended valuation. The evaluation of sentence 3.88")
on this extended valuation will depend on whether that
object has a property which is mapped by the function which
is the interpretation of •'bald'" 0n that extended valuation
to a property which the object also has on that extended
valuation. On some of these extended valuations the
object Will have such a property and hence the sentence
will be evaluated as having the value 1 ; on others it
will not have such a property and the sentence as a whole
evaluated as having the value 0 .
Thus we can see that the value of sentence 3 . 88 ")
-aries from extended valuation to extended valuation. Thus
uhe supervaluation induced by a model on which there is no
v present) king of France will evaluate sentence 3.88")
as having no truth-value
.
The case of 3 • 89"
)
is somewhat different. Again, we
must first determine the domain of the existential quant-
ifier, so we first see if there are any objects which sat-
isfy uhe formula ’ Axl man *
(
x ) x=y" on all of the extended
valuations. To determine this requires that we determine
the range of the universal quantifier in that formula.
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This in turn requires that we determine if there are any
oo jeers which satisfy the formula "man'(x)" in all of the
extended valuations relative to the model. Assuming that
our model has a domain of objects which includes a number
of men, there will be a number of objects satisfying that
formula on all of the extended valuations. But this means
that there will be no object identical to all of the objects
vvnicn are in the domain of the universal quantifier on all
of the extended valuations. Nor will there be any obiect
in any particular extended valuation which is identical
to all of the objects in the domain of the universal quan-
tifier. So on every member of the set of extended valua-
tions, 3 . 89 ") is evaluated as having the value 0. Hence
the supervaluation induced by a model with more than one
man in the domain will evaluate 3.89") as a false sentence.
The effect of this is to split the truth-value of
sentences with non-denoting definite descriptions depending
on the cause of the failure of denotation. If the definite
description fails to denote because of there being no
object in the model which satisfies the description, the
sentence is without truth-value. If the description does
pick out objects in the model but picks out more than one,
the sentence containing the description as subject is
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evaluated as false. If we identify lack of truth-value
with failure of presuppositions (more on this in Chapter
O, this gives us the result that existence is presupposed
m definite descriptions, while uniqueness is actually
claimed or entailed by such descriptions.
It should be noted that in the above discussion
of 3.88") we moved from there being no existing king of
France at this time to there being no object which is the
.•ving of France at this time. This, however, presupposes
that the only objects that there are are those objects
which exist. We could have obtained the same result by
saying that the definite description in 3*88) picks out
a unique non-existing object for which all the functions
obtained by applying " bald * " to the intension of one of
that non-existing objects properties were undefined for
that object as an argument. By taking this approach to
such a sentence, we can begin to apply the semantics we
have developed to the problems of fictional and non-exist-
ent objects, a problem not generally considered to be
connected to the problem of sortal incorrectness. It is
to this that we will turn in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
NONEXISTENT OBJECTS
Introduc tion .
In the last chapter, we developed a semantics which
utilized truth-value gaps and a supervaluation approach to
evaluating complex sentences of the language in order to
account for sentences which are sortally incorrect. At
-he end of that chapter, we looked at the results of
applying that kind of semantics to definite descriptions
unpacked in a way similar to that advocated by Russell, and
saw that the results were very different from those obtained
m standard theories. Further, we saw that there are at
least two ways to handle definite descriptions such as
the one which was the translation of the phrase "the king
of France in this iramework. One way of handling this
phrase is to say that there is no object which has the
property of being the present king of France, and so the
interpretation of the pnrase is taken to be a function
j.rom possible worlds and times to objects (or, more accur-
ately, intensions of objects) which is a partial function
yeilding no defined value for this world and time. On
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this approach, the definite description fails to denote
because nothing has the property in question, and in such
a case the sentence "the king of France is bald" is eval-
uated as neither true nor false.
However, we noted that our semantics was open to
another way of treating the sentence "the king of France
is bald" on which there is taken to be an object (or,
perhaps, many objects) which have the property of being
bi.e king of France, but which are objects which do not
exist. If there are many of these nonexistint objects
which have the property, then the definite description
-ails to denote, but not because there is no object which
satisfies the description. In such a case the definite
description in the sentence fails to denote for the same
reason that the definite description in the sentence "the
man is bald" fails to denote
--there are some objects which
have the property in the description, but there is not a
unique object which has that property. In such a case, as
in the case with the sentence "the man is bald," the sen-
tence will be evaluated by the semantic system in the last
chapter as having the truth-value false. If, on the other
hand, there is a unique nonexistent object which has the
property of being the king of France (as we assumed in the
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brief discussion of this option in the last chapter), then
"he sentence "the king of Prance is bald" will be true,
" a 1 s
e
’
or !ack a truth-value depending on whether or not
une ooject (which doesn't exist) has the property of being
bald, lacks that property, or is undefined for the inter-
pretation of the predicate "is bald," respectively.
Whether we wish to take definite descriptions such as
"the king of France" to denote nonexistent objects or to be
descriptions which fail to denote at all is not a question
I will attempt to answer immediately. However, the fact
that we can take such descriptions to denote nonexistent
objects in the semantic system we have developed points
to another area, distinct from the problem of sortally
incorrect sentences, to which the framework can be applied.
One of the reasons given in Chapter II for preferring the
truth-value gap approach to sortally incorrect sentences
was that such an approach was more general than the other
approaches we were considering in that chapter, and in
that chapter it was noted that truth-value gap semantic
systems were used in attempts to account for such problems
as the semantic paradoxes and the problem of future con-
tingencies. If we can show that such a semantics is
useful in the solution of problems concerning fictional or
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nonexistent objects, we have further strengthened our
claim to the general applicability of such a semantics.
The purpose of this chapter, then is to show how the
pe of semantic system developed in the last chapter to
account for sortally incorrect sentences can be used to
account ior certain aspects of a certain type of theory of
nonexistent objects. The account presented here is neither
complete nor original. Much of the foundation of this
system is based on the Meinongian theory of nonexistent
objects recently developed by Terence Parsons (1974, 1975
,
1T73). One way of viewing this chapter is to see it as a
proposal to modify a part of Parsons' theory. The account
in this chapter is incomplete in that it does not attempt
to deal with all of the problems which an adequate theory
0 .. fictional objects would reasonably be expected to deal
with. The language we will use to develop the account
vvill be a first-order language without an abstraction
operator and without relational predicates. It is not felt
that such a language will be adequate to model a full
blown theory of fictional objects, but that is not the task
of this chapter. Such a language will suffice to show
how the intuitions behind the account are to be put into
practice in a semantic system, and how such a theory
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interacts with a semantics which can deal with sortally
incorrect sentences. That is the modest goal of this
chapter
.
-he choice of Parsons' theory as a base for the
account of nonexistent objects which will be presented
here is far from arbitrary. If nothing else, Parsons'
theory is the most fully worked out semantic system deal-
ing with nonexistent objects in the recent philosophical
literature. His theory also has the following two char-
acteristics, which are necessary components for the type
of system I wish to propose. First, Parsons' theory
allows for some sentences which are about fictional objects,
such as
4.1) Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street
to be true, and true because there is an object named by
the name "Sherlock Holmes" which has the property of
having lived at 221B Baker Street. Secondly, Parsons'
theory allows for there to be objects (among which are
fictional objects) which are what we will call Meinongian
incomplete objects, that is, objects which are in some
sense indeterminate with respect to the having of certain
properties
.
It will be a consequence of the theory to be developed
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that sentence 4.1) is true and that some objects neither
nave nor lack certain properties. Since Parsons' theory
of fictional objects already has similar characteristics,
his is the theory we will take as a base for our discussion
If there are other theories of fictional objects which
have these characteristics, I believe that the sort of
truth-value gap semantics developed along the lines of
Parsons’ theory could also be developed for them.
In this chapter, we will adopt the following strategy.
»e will first look at the theory of fictional and non-
exis Lent objects developed by Parsons. We will not develop
ohe complete theory, but will rather sketch it in suffic-
ient detail to allow us to see how it works. We will
then look at an alternative approach based on similar
metaphysical intuitions but which utilizes a truth-value
gap semantic framework. When this approach has been
sketched out, we will see how this approach differs from
that 01 Parsons, and how we can fit such an approach into
a theory which also accounts for sortally incorrect sen-
tences .
Parsons ' Theory .
The theory of nonexistent objects developed by Parsons
277
is an attempt to give a consistent account of objects along
tne lines sketched out by Meinong (i960). One of the basic
intuitions behind the theory can be illustrated in the
.Lollowing wa}
. know that there are objects which exist,
and further tha t there is a one to one correspondence be-
tween these objects and certain sets of properties, namely,
corresponding to every object which exists is the set of
properties which that object has. This correspondence
nolds
, for example, between the object which is Jimmy
Carter and the set of properties made up of all the prop-
erties Jimmy Carter has. Given an infinite amount of time,
we could list all of the objects which exist and the sets
of properties which correspond in this way to those objects.
This listing would exhaust the set of existing objects,
but it would not exhaust the set of sets of properties.
For example, the set of properties consisting of the
properties of being golden and being a mountain (and,
perhaps, some other properties) would not appear on our
listing, for there is nothing which exists which is a
golden mountain. But, says Parsons, there is an object
which corresponds to this set of properties in just the
way Jimmy Carter corresponds to the set of properties had
by Jimmy Carter. This object is a golden mountain, and it
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is an example of an object which does not exist.
Put in an overly simple way, Parsons' theory tells us
that we have the following set of objects. Take any set
of properties you like. There is some object which has
all and only the properties which are members of that set.
Some of these objects exist while others do not, but all
of these objects are objects.
When phrased in this simple way, the theory immed-
iately runs into the criticism lodged against Meinong's
theory by Russell (1907). If any set of properties cor-
responds to some object which has all of those properties,
then consider the set of properties which has as its
members the properties of being golden, being a mountain,
and existing. If this set corresponds to an object, it
corresponds to an object which is golden, a mountain, and
exists. But no golden mountain exists. So the theory
must be wrong.
Parsons avoids this problem by distinguishing between
two types of properties. One type of property, which he
calls the nuclear properties, are such that any set of them
corresponds to an object which has all and only those
nuclear properties. The other type of property, called
by Parsons the extranuclear properties, cannot be used to
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-uild up sets of properties which correspond to objects.
The properties of being golden and being a mountain are
nuclear properties, and so we can be sure that there is
an object which is a golden mountain. But the property
being an existing object is not a nuclear property. It
is an extranuclear property, and the theory is not committed
t0 Saylng that any set of nuclear and extranuclear prop-
erties corresponds to some object which has all and only
those properties. Thus the set of objects is not in one
to one correspondence with the powerset of the set of
all properties, but rather in one to one correspondence
uh bhe powerset of the set of nuclear properties.
A natural question to ask at this point is how do we
determine whether a property is nuclear or extranuclear?
It is easy enough to give examples of the two types of
property. Among the nuclear properties will be such
properties as being red, being hit by Descartes, and being
round. Among the extranuclear properties will be the
properties of existing, being possible, and being bigger
than a breadbox. Roughly, the breakdown is along the
following lines. If the property in question is one which
everyone agrees is an ordinary property of individuals,
then the property is nuclear. If, on the other hand, the
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property in question is either a comparative or an example
of a property which some deny is a property of individuals
or even a property at all, then that property is extra-
nuclear
.
^
This decision procedure works for at least the clear
cases. No one argues that predicates like "is red" should
not be interpreted as properties of individuals. However,
many have argued that the predicate "exists" is either not
mterpre table as a property at all, or if it is it is only
interpre table as a property of concepts or something other
ohan individuals. >00 on the above decision procedure this
tells us that the predicate "is red" should be interpreted
as a nuclear property, while the predicate "exists" should
be interpreted as an extranuclear property.
However, no matter how successful our decision pro-
cedure, it would be nice to have something more. Specif-
ically, it would be nice to have either a definition of
the notions of nuclear and extranuclear property, or at
least a specification of the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a predicate being interpre table as one or
the other. Parsons does not give a definition of the
notions, and in fact admits that he does not know of any
definition of the notions which is satisfactory. Nor does
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he ever specify a set of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for a predicate being either nuclear or extranuc-
lear. He does, however, give the following test which is
somewhat more satisfactory than searching the history of
philosophy for controversy concerning the proper inter-
pretation of a predicate. It is a thesis of Parsons'
theory that "no nuclear property, F, satisfies:
(3X)(X is a set of nuclear properties and F/X and
i x ) i, x nas every member of X then x has F))"(1978,
p. 19).
Similarly, it is a thesis of Parsons' system that no nuc-
lear property is such that there is a set of nuclear prop-
erties which does not include that property and which is
sucn that every object which has all of the properties in
that set lacks the property.
0 bviously
,
this test for nuclear or extranuclear
propertyhood will only work if we have a beginning stock
of nuclear properties. Assuming that we have such a
beginning stock, the test does tell us that the properties
Parsons wants to say are extranuclear are in fact extra-
nuclear. For example, consider the property of existing
and the set of nuclear properties which is the singleton
set of the property (nuclear property) of being a unicorn.
282
All of the objects which have every member of that set of
nuclear properties fail to have the property of existing
'-.or no unicorns exist), and hence the property of exist-
ence does satisfy the second of the tests Parsons proposes
for determining whether a property is nuclear or extra-
nuclear. Hence that property cannot be a nuclear property.
At base, however, the crucial notions of nuclear and
extranuclear property remain unanalysed and uncharacter-
i^ed in Parsons' theory, and no foolproof method is given
±or determining whether a given property is one or the
other. This is not a fatal flaw in the theory, for some
terms must be primitive and there is some intuitive backing
for uhe distinction. It would be nice to have some defin-
ite characterization, however, and this will be discussed
in the revision of Parsons' theory proposed in the next
section
.
Once we have (however vaguely) the distinction be-
tween nuclear and extranuclear properties, we can say
what objects there are, what nuclear properties they have,
and what the identity conditions are for those objects.
Given any set of nuclear properties, there will be an
object which has all and only those nuclear properties.
Further, both the laws of the indescernability of identicals
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and the identity of indescernables holds when restricted
,o nuclear properties. So x has a nuclear property if
and onl
^ y has that nuclear property if and only if
y ‘ 0b ^ ects may hav ® other ( extranuclear
) properties,
but these properties cannot be used to determine which
objects there are, nor do these properties play a role in
individuating objects.
3y adding to our stock of objects an object which has
all and only the properties of any arbitrary set of nuc-
lear properties, we include in our ontology objects which
are incomplete. According to Parsons, to say of an object
tha o it is complete is to say that for any nuclear property
"the object either has that property or it has its nega-
tion" (1978, p. 13 ). Parsons characterizes the negation
of a nac laar property, p, as the nuclear property q "which
is had by all and only those existing objects which don't
have p" (p. 14). Given this definition, all existing
oojects are complete. But there will be nonexisting
objects which are incomplete. For example, consider the
object which corresponds to the set of nuclear properties
whose only members are the properties of being golden and
being a mountain. This golden mountain neither has the
property of being blue, nor does it have the negation of
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.hat property. Hence the object is incomplete.
The theory also allows for there to be impossible
objects. For consider the set of nuclear properties
1 roundness
, squareness}. According to the theory, there
is an object which has only these properties; this is
Meinong's round square. Of course, these properties are
incompatible and therefore no existing object could have
both of these properties. But, says Parsons, "that doesn’t
prevent there from being an impossible object which has
them" (1978, p. 15 )
.
Another distinction drawn by Parsons is between ob-
jects which are logically closed with respect to their
nuclear properties and those which are not. This distinc-
tion is just what one would expect--an object is logically
closed if and only if the set of properties had by that
object is logically closed, otherwise the object is not
logically closed. Existing objects, says Parsons, are all
logically closed, but nonexisting objects need not be.
For example, says Parsons,
...consider the set of properties got by taking-
all of my properties and replacing "hazel-eyed"
by "non-hazel-eyed ."... there is an object which
has the resulting properties and no others.
This object will be complete but it will not be
logically closed. For example, it has brown-
hairdness and it has non-hazel-eyedness but it
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does not. have the nuclear property of bein^ bothbrown-haired-and-non-hazel-eyed.
.
.
(1978, p? II-15)
Parsons' theory, as it has been sketched so far,
allows into its ontology lots of objects which don't exist,
before going on to sketch his theory of fictional objects,
it should be noted that there are some things which
Parsons' theory does not allow into its ontological realm.
Specifically, Parsons excludes from the realm of things
which are contradictory objects, that is, there are no
objects which satisfy any sentence of the form "(x has P)
and not (x has P)" for any nuclear property P.
Some might think that by denying that there are any
contradictory objects Parsons is in conflict with his claim
oha 0 there are impossible objects. After all, Parsons
admits into his ontology objects like the round square
(even though it is an impossible object), and this appears
to be a likely candidate for the status of contradictory
object, for a round square would seem to be an object
which is both round and not round. Parsons answers this
objection by noting that the move from saying that the
round square is an object which is both round and square
to saying that it is an object which is both round and not
round relies on the assumption that any object which is
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square is not round. This move is reasonable enough if
we restrict our domain of objects to objects which exist-
any object which exists and is square is not round.
BUt that d^sn't mean that we can say of any object which
is square that it is not round, for we have a counter-
example to that claim--namely the round square. One could
argue that it is a theorem of geometry that anything which
i° Square 13 not round. But Parsons argues that geometry
is a theory concerning the geometrical properties of
existing objects, and as such cannot be expected to hold
tor objects like the round square which not only don't
exist but are impossible
.
Given the addition of nonexistent objects to the
ontology, Parsons is able to develop a theory of fictional
oojects. By a fictional object here is meant an object
//hich appears in a work of fiction. Parsons explicitly
restricts his theory to objects in realistic narrative
fiction, although he does at times give hints as to how to
extend the theory to other sorts of fiction.
A preliminary distinction drawn by Parsons is between
what he calls native and immigrant fictional objects. An
object is native to a piece or work of fiction if that
object has in some way been created by that piece of
287
fiction. The sense of "creation" used here is the sense in
which Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes and Watson. It
does not mean that the author brings it about that there
is such an object, as the theory of objects underlying
uhis theory of fictional objects holds that the objects
have always been. But an object will be native to a work
(or series of works) of fiction if that work is the source
of information about the object.
Immigrant objects, as the name suggests, are objects
in a work of fiction which in some sense come from somewhere
else. In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes and Watson
live in London. This city is understood to be the real
London, not some city which simply shares the name "London"
with the capitol of England. So in these stories, the
city of London is an immigrant object.
Fictional objects can be native to one story and
immigrant in another. As stated above, Holmes is a native
object in the Conan Doyle stories, but is an immigrant
object in the recent rash of Holmes novels such as The
Seven Percent Solution .
Parsons' theory is concerned, for the most part, with
objects of fiction which are native to the stories in
question. The need for objects to correspond to such
288
characters of fiction is shown, Parsons states, not so
much by the nuclear properties we ascribe to those char-
ac ters but because of the extranuclear properties we
abcnoe to those characters. We might, for example, think
that we need to have some object referred to by the name
"Sherlock Holmes" because of the truth of sentences like
4.2) Sherlock Holmes was a detective
which are naturally interpreted as saying that an object,
namely oherlock Holmes, has a certain property, namely
xhat of being a detective. But these sorts of truths can
be accounted for by saying that sentences like 4.2) are
really shorthand for sentences like
4.3) According to the story, Sherlock Holmes was
a detective
which can be taken to be true even if there is no object
which is referred to by the name "Sherlock Holmes."
The need for some object named "Sherlock Holmes" is
shown, argues Parsons, by true statements about Holmes
which involve extranuclear predicates. For example, the
sentences
4.4) Sherlock Holmes does not exist
4.5) Sherlock Holmes is a better musician than
Travis Magee
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are not true if paraphrased along the lines of 4 . 3), for
according to the story Holmes does exist and no mention of
Travis Magee is ever made in the Holmes stories. To
account for the truth of sentences which attribute extra-
nuclear properties to fictional objects, says Parsons, we
must have some object which either has or lacks the proper-
ty.
^arsons sets out, therefore, to construct a theory
ot. fictional oojects which will accomplish three goals.
"First," he says,
...we need. a stock of objects from which toselect the fictional ones ... Second
,
we need toh
"Y\ a to tel1 ’ given a body of literature,
il^icn objects are written about in that body ofiiterature.
:
.Third, we need to select the objects
o iiction m such a way that the theory turns
out to oe consistent with the extranuclear pred-ications that we make about such obiects
l Parsons (1975)
,
p. 78)
xhe first of these goals has already been accomplished
hot suprisingly, Parsons' Meinongian theory of objects
supplies us with more than enough objects to account for
xhe ones which are native objects in works of fiction.
The second of these objectives can also be accomp-
lished in a fairly straightforward way. Basically, the
idea is this. The object named in a work of fiction will
be that object which corresponds to the set of nuclear
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properties which the story says the character has. Put
only a little more precisely, we can say that name a picks
out the object o which corresponds to the set of nuclear
properties [p: according to the story, a has p}
.
The intuition behind this characterization of which
object is picked out to be, say, Sherlock Holmes is reason-
ably clear; but it is difficult to say just what properties
an object has "according to the story." "Whether or not
something is true in a story," says Parsons,
.
• • -ought to accord with what a normally atten-
tive reader understands to be true in the story.
We can model the origins of such understanding^
as follows: as the reader reads, an account is
cons tructed by extrapolation from the sentences
being read. The account is modified and expanded
during the reading, and the final result may
be called the maximal account. Then what is
true in the story is just whatever the maximal
account explicitly says, and nothing else. The
trick is to get an understanding of the extra-
polation process that produces the maximal
account.
..( (1978)
,
p. VII2)
Just what extrapolation process we go through in the
construction of a maximal account is unclear. Parsons
lists a number of alternatives and shows that none of them
is acceptable. However, we do in fact seem to be able to
construct maximal accounts from stories, and the common
agreement as to what went on in a given story and what
properties a character of that story has can be taken as
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evidence that however we come to arrive at a maximal
account, we all do it in pretty much the same way. Det-
ermining how we go about constructing maximal accounts
is an important question in aesthetics and literary theory,
out it is not a question which will be addressed here.
Instead, we will simply assume that the notion is clear
enough to be used, and will assume that it is understood
for the remainder of the chapter.
Once we have a maximal account, we can determine which
object is referred to by a name in a work of fiction, and
what nuclear properties that object has. Further, we can
aj_so find out what extranuclear properties are had by the
ob jec t--since we have an object as reference for the name,
we see if the object has or does not have the extranuclear
property in question. So if we want to determine whether
or not Sherlock Holmes exists, we check and see if the
object named by "Sherlock Holmes" has the extranuclear
property of existence. Since the object is incomplete
and, according to Parsons, no incomplete object exists,
Holmes doesn't have that extranuclear property. To see
if Holmes is more famous than any living detective, we
need to find out how famous Holmes is and how famous the
most famous living detective is. If Holmes is more famous,
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"hen he has the extranuclear proper+v in +•uy m question; if he
"t > then he doesn't haizo +uve the property. To build up a
semantics for discouse concerning the creatures of fiction
is also straightforward (in the simple cases)-a sentenoe
ascribing a property to a creature of fiction is true if
and only if the object which is that fictional character
has the property ascribed to it, and is false otherwise.
One feature of this theory which is worth noting is
the way in which it handles the truth-value of sentences
about incomplete objects when the sentence predicates of
such an object a property with respect to which the object
is indeterminate. Remember that Parsons distinguishes
between it being false that an object has a property and
that object having the negation of that property. This
distinction does not come into play with existing objects,
for according to this theory every existing object is
complete, which in turn means that every existing object
either has a property or has the negation of that property
for every nuclear property. The distinction is important,
however, when we consider incomplete objects. To say of
an incomplete object that it is false that it has a proper-
ty is not the same as saying of that object that it has
the negation of that property. So, on the assumption that
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the maximal account which establishes which object is
She rlocx Holmes has nothing to say about whether or not
Holmes has a mole on his back, Parsons' theory gives us
as true the sentences
4 ' 8) Xt 1S not the oase tha
-t Sherlock Holmes has a
mole on his back
H-?) It is not the oase that Sherlock Holmes has the
property of not-having-a-mole-on-his-back
.
But this does not give us a contradiction, for one can only
move from a sentence of the form "it is not the case that
a has property P" to the sentence "a has the property of
nob-P if a names a complete object.
A final aspect of Parsons' theory we will look at is
his treatment of definite descriptions. Parsons forms
definite descriptions in the usual way: if 0 i s a formula,
you can prefix 9 with "(*x)" to get an expression whioh is
read as "the thing which is 9." "The semantical account
of these definite descriptions," says Parsons,
. . .is to be about as commonsensical as poss-
ible, namely, (7x)e refers to the unique objectthau satisfies 0
,
if there is one, and otherwise
l?xj9 just doesn't refer at all
. .
.
(
(
1978 )
,
p. V23
)
In real life situations, according to Parsons, we must
often represent definite descriptions used in English in
a non-obvious fashion in our formal language. For example,
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if someone were to use the definite desoription "the man
in the doorway we would not want to represent this des-
cription in our formal language as "
(
?x) (Mx&Dx) ,
" for this
definite description would not pick out a unique individ-
ual. To 0 ee this all that is necessary is to remember
fhat there are a great number of objects which have the
property of being men and being in the doorway but which
are also such that they do not exist. In everyday speech,
says Parsons, "the man in the doorway" is really used as
ohorthand for the definite description "the existing man
m the doorway," a description which would be represented
in our formal language as something like " ( ? x ) ( E ! x&Mx&Dx ) . "
In our everyday speech, says Parsons, the context makes
it clear that we are concerned only with objects which
exist
.
The truth-conditions for sentences with definite
descriptions supplied by Parsons is just what one would
expec t--a sentence saying of the 9 that it has property P
is true if there is a unique object satisfying 9 which
has P, and the sentence is false otherwise. Note that on
this specification of truth conditions all non-denoting
definite description containing simple sentences are
false
.
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This way of forming definite descriptions works fine
existing objects, but makes it very difficult to refer
to many nonexisting objects by the use of such definite
descriptions. For example, suppose we want to refer to
the nonexistent object whose only nuclear properties are
roundness and squareness. The natural way of doing this
would be to use the description "the round square." But
this definite description will fail to refer uniquely on
the semantic analysis given above, for there are all sorts
of nonexisting objects which have the nuclear properties
of roundness and squareness. We can’t even get unique
reference to the object we want to refer to by expanding
the description with other properties that the object has,
for the object we want to refer to only has those two
nuclear properties. We might be able to get the right
object oy adding extranuclear properties, but it would
be nice if we could take some other route.
To take care of this sort of case, Parsons introduces
a special sort of definite description operator, which he
calls the Meinongian use of "the." This sort of definite
description is formed by prefixing a formula, 9, with
( mx ) * Parsons proposes that such a description refer
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to
"'minimum'
he unpacks as
of the objects which satisfy 9 a notion
refers^ tn
0
tha°^^
C
^-u
Sa 't ^ S:^^es 9
’ ^en (mx )9
a rp ,, 4.u
°^^ eCu whose nuclear properties
b
? ^ir^ectr^hh(mx)e refers +n +h hJecf satlsfles e thento t e null object.
..( (I978)
, p. V31)
By using this Meinongian description operator, we can
Pick out the object which has only the properties of round-
ness and squareness by the use of the phrase "the round
square" as long as we understand the "the" in the descrip-
tion as the Meinongian "the."
This sketch of Parsons' theory is far from complete,
but it does show some of the intuitions which serve as the
base for that system and how Parsons accounts for those
intuitions. We will now turn to a sketch of a theory of
nonexistent objects which attempts to account for those
same intuitions in a semantic framework like that developed
in the last chapter to account for sortally incorrect
sentences
.
A Modest Proposal
.
Parsons' theory of fictional and nonexistent objects
is at base a metaphysical theory. The modest proposal to
be sketched in this section is an attempt to develop a
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semantic theory of sentences concerning fictional and non-
existent objects in the framework of the semantic theory
for sortally incorrect sentences which will be based, as
as possible, on Parsons’ metaphysical theory. Of
course, one can’t completely separate semantic and meta-
physical theories, as the job of a semantic theory is to
tie together language and the world, while the job of a
metaphysical theory is to say what things there are in
that world. The goal in this section is to change the
semantic system for sentences about fictional objects while
retaining as much of the metaphysical theory as possible.
-he major change in the semantic framework will be in
the treatment of sentences which predicate of an incomplete
object a property for which that object is indeterminate.
In the theory given by Parsons, such sentences are evaluated
as false. In the semantic framework we will develop, such
sentences will be evaluated as being neither true nor
false. So, for example, while Parsons' theory gives us
the result that the sentence
4.10) Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back
io false, as the object which is Sherlock Holmes is indeter-
minate with respect to the property of having a mole on his
back, the semantics we will give in this section will say
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tnat the sentence is neither true nor false.
Why say that 4 ’ 10
> is neither true nor false? On an
intuitive level, the reasoning is something like this.
Sherlock Holmes is an incomplete object, incomplete because
there are some properties with respect to which Holmes is
indeterminate. Nowhere in the maximal account which tells
US the nuclear properties had by Holmes is it ever spec-
ified that Holmes has the property of having a mole on
his back or does not have that property. According to
Parsons' theory, this is not an oversight on the part of
the author. It isn’t that the object which is Sherlock
Holmes either has the property or lacks the property, and
the author simply forgot to tell us. The object which is
Holmes is really indeterminate in respect to this property.
But to say that sentence 4.10) is false seems to be telling
us something determinate about the relation between the
object which is Holmes and the property of having a mole
on ones back. To say that 4.10) is false seems to say
chat Holmes does not have the property.
The basic intuition behind saying that sentences like
4.10) are neither true nor false is this. We are going
40 take the intuition that incomplete objects are indeter-
minate with respect to certain properties seriously, so
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seriously in fact that we will hold that we can say
determinate about the relationship between such an object
and a property with respect to which the object is indeter-
minate
.
Of course, this line of reasoning does not prove
that we must add truth-value gaps to a semantics for sen-
tences about incomplete objects. To see this, we need only
realize that the above reasoning assumes that saying that
false that an object has a property is saying some-
thing determinate about the relationship between that
object and that property. Parsons' theory denies this
,/ introducing the distinction between sentence negation
and property negation. Recall that Parsons' theory tells
us that while 4.10) is false, the sentence
4.11) Sherlock Holmes has the property of not-having-
a-mole-on-his-back
is also false. The incompleteness of the object which is
Holmes consists of Holmes neither having the property of
having-a
-mole
-on-his
-back nor having the negation of that
property, which we have phrased as the property of not-
having-a
-mole- on-his
-back
. To say something determinate
about Holmes with respect to these properties would be,
on Parsons' theory, to say that Holmes had one of these two
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properties. Saying that it is false that ho hj-ai.se e has one only
entails that he has the other if Holmes were an existing
:
.°r at least a complete) object, which he is not. Accord
ing to Parsons' theory, Holmes lacks both the property in
question and the negation of that property.
This sort of move should ring some bells; it is anal-
ogous to that made by Bergmann when she distinguishes
oetween internal and external negation in her account of
serially incorrect sentences. The advantage of a seman-
tics which utilizes truth-value gaps is the same here as
it was there. By introducing truth-value gaps and saying
that sentences like 4.10) are neither true nor false, we
can ao away with the distinction between sentence negation
and predicate negation, thus simplifying our semantic
system
.
Another motivation for using a truth-value gap sem-
antics for a Parsons style account of fictional and non-
existent objects can be demonstrated by looking at Parsons'
discussion of theoretical entities. "One of the most dis-
tinctive aspects of theoretical entities," says Parsons,
. . .is that they seem to be incomplete, in the
sense that for most mundane predicates it doesn't
make sense to either apply the predicate to them or
apply its negation. We don't debate whether or
not a neutrino loves Mary, or whether the element
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with atomic number 79 is irmcro^
mobile. This suggests that
^
auto "
may be analysed within +hp\h
h ret
i
Cal entities
incomplete ob jects
. .
. ( ( io 78 ?‘ ^4imof0tS &S
Parsons goes on to argue that the senselessness of sen-
tences like
4.12) A neutrino loves Mary
should not be accounted for in a theory of fictional
oojects
, which I think is correct. Sentence 4.12) is a
serially incorrect sentence, and should be accounted for
in a theory of sortal incorrectness. What I think is
important, however, is the intuition had by those who think
that sentences like 4.12) could be accounted for in a
theory of fictional objects. The intuition, I take it, is
that the same sort of thing is going on when we predicate
of an incomplete object a property with respect to which
that object is indeterminate as is going on when we pred-
icate of an object a property for which the object is of
the wrong sort. This intuition, when coupled with the
theory of sortally incorrect sentences we have presented
earlier, leads to the conclusion that sentences which
predicate of an incomplete object a property with respect
ro which that object is indeterminate results in
tence which is neither true nor false.
a sen-
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Again, these considerations do not prove that we must
handle ° f none* is^t objects within a semantic frame-
which allows for sentences which are neither true nor
false. However, they do provide us with some motivation
for seeing what such a treatment would be like. We will
now turn to sketching such a treatment. The goal is to
lit a theory based on the metaphysical intuitions of
Parsons into a truth-value gap semantics.
We Wl11 be &ln by saying what objects there are and
what nuclear properties those objects have. Like Parsons,
we will do this by establishing a correspondence between
the set of objects and something else. The correspondence
we //ill use is not between the set of objects and the set
of sets of nuclear properties however, since we want to
capture a distinction between an object lacking a property
and an object being inde terminate with respect to that
property. We do this by correlating the objects with
partial x unctions from nuclear properties to truth-values.
Given any partial function from nuclear properties to
truth-values, we will say that there is an object which
has all of the nuclear properties mapped by that partial
function to the truth-value true, and which lacks all of
the nuclear properties mapped by that partial function to
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the truth-value false, and which is indeterminate with
respect to all the nuclear properties for which that par-
rial function yeilds no defined value. This tells us what
objects there are, and also tells us which nuclear prop-
erties those objects have, which they lack, and which they
neither have nor lack.
Of course
,
if we wish to maintain a correlation be-
tween objects and sets, we could do so. The set which
would be correlated to the set of objects would be the set
of all ordered pairs of the form <A,B> where A and B are
disjoint sets of nuclear properties. Intuitively, A would
be the set of nuclear properties had by the object, while
B would be the set of nuclear properties lacked by the
object. Nuclear properties which are not members of the
union of A and 3 would be nuclear properties for which the
object is indeterminate.
Our semantic treatment of sentences which say of an
object that it has a property will be just what one would
expect. Such a sentence is true if the object has the
property, false if the object lacks the property, and
neither true nor false if the object neither has nor lacks
(is indeterminate with respect to) that property. Notice
that we are now allowing sentences which are not sortally
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incorrect to lack a truth-value. But this possibility is
already built in to the semantics we gave in the last
chapter for sortally incorrect sentences. All that seman-
tics required was that all simple sortally incorrect sen-
tences be evaluated as being neither true nor false. It
did not require that all sentences which are not sortally
incorrect be evaluated as either true or false.
By making a three-way distinction between an object
having a property, lacking a property, and being indeter-
minate with respect to a property, we can do away with
Parsons’ notion of the negation of a property. We no
longer, for example, need to distinguish between the prop-
erty oe ing ascribed to Holmes in the sentences
^.10) Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back
4.13) Sherlock Holmes does not have a mole on his
back
saying that 4.10) ascribes one property to Holmes and that
4.13) ascribes to Holmes the negation of that property,
which is a separate nuclear property related to the first
only in that all existing objects having one of them fail
to have the other. We can now say what seems intuitively
to be the case, namely that 4.10) says that Holmes has some
property, and 4.13) says that Holmes lacks that very
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property, since Holmes is indeterminate with respect to
the property of having a mole on his bach, neither of these
sentences is either true or false. Further, since we will
be evaluating complex sentences using a supervaluation
semantics, it will turn out that the sentence
b.lb) Either Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back
or Sherlock Holmes does not have a mole on his
back
Will be evaluated as true, in spite of the fact that neither
4.10) nor 4
. 13 ) has a truth-value. But this, it appears
to me, is the correct thing to say.
netting rid of the distinction between an object not
having a property and that object having the negation of
tnat property does require that we come up with some new
characterization of the notion of an incomplete object.
Parsons defines an incomplete object as one for which there
is a property, p, such that the object does not have prop-
erty p nor does the object have the negation of the property
p. Since we have done away with the notion of the nega-
tion of a property, this characterization will no longer
do
.
How, then, are we to characterize an incomplete object?
The intuition seems pretty clear--an object is incomplete
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if that object neither has nor lacks some property. We
mlght try t0 Capture this intuition by saying that an
ooject, 0, is incomplete if and only if there is some
formula of the form
-Pn»Px- which is such that object o
does not satisfy that formula. Unfortunately, this will
because we will be using a supervaluation semantics,
which every object satisfies every formula of the form
"Pxv~Px," even when the object does not satisfy either
"Px” or "~Px."
The solution to this problem appears to be fairly
straightforward. We want to say that an object is incom-
plete if and only if there is some nuclear property such
that saying of that object that it has that property
results in a sentence which is neither true nor false.
Since saying of an ooject that it has a property with
respect to wnich that object is indeterminate yeilds a
sentence which is without truth-value, this charac teriza-
uion appears to capture our intuition concerning incom-
plete objects.
Unfortunately, this characterization leads to the un-
acceptable conclusion that most, if not all, existing
objects are incomplete. For example, consider the existing
object Terence Parsons, and the nuclear property of being
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Prime
. Since Parsons is not the right sort of object to be
prime, the sentence
"Terence Parsons is prime" is serially
incorrect and so, on the semantics given in the last
chapter, neither true nor fai <- ,,l se. So on the above charac-
terization of what it is for an nhipn+ kobject to be incomplete,
Terence Parsons is an incomplete object.
The problem we have come up against is this. When
we say that an object is incomplete, we are not merely
saying that the object neither has nor lacks some property
or other. An incomplete object is one which neither has
nor lacks some property, but that property must be one
for which the object is of the right sort to either have
or lack. That Parsons neither has nor lacks the property
of being prime should not count against his being a com-
plete object, for that property is one we never expected
Parsons to either have or lack. If Parsons neither had
nor lacked the property of having a mole on his back, we
'would want to say that he was an incomplete object, for he
is .he right sort of thing to either have or lack that
property.
It is because of considerations of the sorts of objects
which can have or lack certain properties that we would be
led to the conclusion that all existing objects are incom-
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plete in the sense given above. To be complete in this
sense requires that an object either have or lack both the
property of being prime and the property of being six feet
tall. But existing objects of the right sort to be prime
are not of the right sort to be six feet tall, and existing
objects which are of the right sort to be six feet tall are
not of the right sort to be prime. So all existing objects
would be incomplete.
It should be noted that since we have said that there
is an object corresponding to any partial function from
nuclear properties to truth-values, there will be an object
which has both the property of being prime and the prop-
erty of being six feet tall. But such an object can
reasonably be considered to be an impossible object in
Parsons' sense, that is, it is an object which is such that
it is not possible for it to exist. A theory which
accepts into its ontology round squares should not feel
uncomfortable with also accepting into its ontology tall
primes
.
Returning to the problem of characterizing the notion
of an incomplete object, it appears that we must limit
our original intuition concerning what makes an object
incomplete. We do not want to say that an object is
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incomplete if it merely fails to have or lack some prep-ay, for then sortal considerations give us the result
Chat most if not all existing objects are incomplete. What
makes the object Sherlock Holmes incomplete is not that
it neither has nor lacks properties for which it is of
the wrong sort, but rather that it neither has nor lacks
properties for which it is nf ~l 01 correct sort. This
points to the way in which we will characterize incomplete
Objects in this theory. We will say that an object, o, is
incomplete if and only if there is a nnn1oaJ l ucle r property, p,
such that o is of the risrht snr+ ^i &nx o w to have or lack p but
Which is such that o neither has nor lacks p.
Given the stock of objects provided by the set of
partial functions from nuclear properties to truth-values
,
we will pick out the fictional objects (or, at least, the
native fictional objects 2 ) using a method similar to that
used by Parsons. Again, in determining which object is
named by, say, "Sherlock Holmes," we must first construct
a maximal account for the stories in which Sherlock Holmes
IS a native object. The object which is Sherlock Holmes
will be the object which corresponds to the partial func-
tion which maps a nuclear property to true just in case,
according to the maximal account, Sherlock Holmes has that
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property; maps a nuclear property to false just in case
according to the maximal account Sherlock Holmes does not
that property; and is undefined for all other nuclear
properties
.
.Vith this as background, we will now turn to the con-
struction of a semantics for a language which includes
both sortal factors and names of nonexistent and fictional
objects. As stated before, the point is not to' give a
complete theory of fictional objects, but rather to show
how one would go about constructing such a theory within
the framework of the type of semantics supplied in the
previous chapter. We will, therefore, give a semantics
for a simple, firso order language which includes only
monadic predication.
The vocabulay of our language, L*, consists of the
following. We have as terms of the language an infinite
number of names, ,a
2
,a^
, . .
.
; and an infinite number of
variables, x-^x^x^,... The language will contain two
kinds of predicates: the nuclear predicates P.,P p
;
-L ^ J
and the extranuclear predicates E!, Qr
,
Q
0 ,
Q
q , . .
,
4
l n
1. £ J
addition, the vocabulary of the language includes the
standard logical connectives of ~,&,v,- r—
•
the identity
sign =; the (sorted) quantifiers V and A; and (,),[, and 1.
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The set of formulas
that
of L* will be the smallest set S* such
4
' 15> lf 1 is a Plicate (nuclear or extranuclear)
0"
^2 anc^ 7 a ierm of L *, then "2a"€S^
.lo) If a, 8 are terms of L*, then "a=(3"£S*
lKl,j if 4,f)'€S* and u a variable of L|, then
"(e&9 • )
"
,
"(f)v9 )
"
,
"(e-o • )"
t
"(£,„£,
.
)
..
(Au[ ^ 1 ( ^ ' ) ) " , and "(Vu[]q~|(8 , ))"€S^'
As usual, the sentences of L* will be all those formulas
in which no variable occurs free.
A model of L* will be an ordered fourtuple M=
<D ,
D
g
, S , V> where
a) D (the domain of objects) is a nonempty set
b) D
e
(the domain of existing objects) is a subset
of D
c) S (the sortal specification) is a function from
predicates of L* to subsets of D
d) V (the interpretation) is a function from names
and predicates of L* such that
i) if a is a name of L*, V(a)€D
ii) if 1 is a (nuclear or extranuclear) predicate
°f L
2 ’
vW 7S a partial function from D to
{T,F'- such that for all o€D, if (V(2))(o)
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is defined, then o€S(3E)
The set of extended valuations of L* relative to a
Todel M=<D,D
e
,S,V>, if wln be the set „f all fivetup]
_es
I-<D,D
e
,S
,
V,V’> such that
a) D
’
D
e’
S
’
and v are the same domain of objects,
domain of existing objects, sortal specification,
and interpretation specified in M
b) ^ is a function from partial functions from D to
lT.F 1- to full functions from D to {T,F} such that,
if f is in the domain of V’ and o€D and f(o) is
defined, then ( V* <f ) ) ( o)=f ( o)
Let g be an assignment of values to variables rel-
ative to a model M defined in the usual way. We can
define the value of a formula 9 of L* on an extended val-
uation I relative to a model M and an assignment g, written
as
4.13) if 9 has the form "la", where I is a predicate
and a a name, then ( 9
)
1
' g
=(
V
(v(l) ) )
(
y( a ) )
if 9 has the form IEx"
,
where IE is a predicate
and x a variable, then (9
)
1
’ g
=(V (V(I) ) ) (g(x)
)
4.20) if 9 has the form "(~9')", then (9) d ’^-T
iff ( 9
'
)
^
”^=F
; otherwise (9)^’^=F
Similarly for &,v,-,--
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4.21) n 9 IS of the form "Vu[e • ] ( 9 » ) ..
, thgn
if G-i S ; g' is an assignment of values
to variables which differs from g in at
most the value assigned to u and which is
such that (9 1 ) X
'
,g
'=T for all I'ti+M,
then ( 9 ) t i -p-p 4-u^iif there is some g*GG such
that (e'') I,g ' = T; otherwise (,)I.g
=P
h)
’ if G (as deflned above) =0, then ( 9 ) I '§=T
iff there is some g' assignment of values
to variables which differs from g in at
most the value assigned to u such that
(9 ' )
I
'S'
=T d J
-1; otherwise
( 0
)
1
’
Similarly for A
1-22) if 9 is of the form "a=B”, then (9 ) X 'S=t
iff V*(„) is V*(6), where V- ls a function
from terms of L* to D such that, if a is a
name of L* V*( n ) =V( n
)
i -p2’ and if a is a variable
of L*, V*(a)=g(a)
; otherwise ( 9 )^»S-p
^e now define the value of a formula of 9 of L* on
the supervaluation induced by a model M and an assignment
of values to variables g, denoted (9) M*’S, as
4.23) (9) M ,g= T iff (9 ) T 'S=t for an I€I+.
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(e) M iff ( 0
)
1
’ s_ F for all I€I+
(e) M* , g ,is undefined otherwise.
Je will say that a formula 9 of L* is true1 ^2 l ^ on a model M
i! and only if ( 9 ) M*>g=T f nlor a11 S assignments of values
to variables relative to M, false if and only if (,)M*.g=p
for all g assignments of values to variables relative to M,
and undefined otherwise.
This semantics gives us a framework for our account
of nonexistent and fictional objects, but is stated in an
overly general fashion. To more closely capture the in-
tuitions and features we sketched earlier, we need to add
some conditions a model M must satisfy if it is to be con-
sidered as a candidate for being an intended interpretation
of the language L*.
The first condition we will impose is designed to
insure that we get a sufficient number of objects in the
domain, and that those objects have the right nuclear
properties. The intuition we want to capture is that
there is an object corresponding to any partial function
from nuclear properties to truth-values which has the
nuclear properties mapped by that partial function to true
and lacks those nuclear properties mapped by that partial
junction to false. To insure this, we require that for
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a model M to be a possible intended interpretation, M
-st be such that for every partial function f from the
range of V restricted to the set of nuclear predicates to
set l T,F 1 there is an o€D such that (V(P ))(o)=
f(V(P ))
.
n
The second requirement has to do with the interpret-
ation of the first of our extranuclear predicates, "Eh'.
This predicate is intended to be interpreted as the extra-
nuclear property of existence. We therefore require just
What one would expect, namely, that if M is a possible in-
tended interpretation, V(E!) be a function such that for
all o€D, (V(E! ) ) ( 0 ) = t if and only if 0
€D
6
The third requirement we will lay down on intended
interpretations also has to do with the way the model
treats the extranuclear predicate "E ! "
.
One of the things
that a model must tell us about that predicate is what
its sortal range is, and it seems reasonable to require
that the sortal range of the existence predicate be the
entire domain of objects. This amounts to saying that
any ooject is the sort of thing which can sensibly be said
uO either exist or not exist. To capture this, we require
of an intended interpretation that the sortal specification
S of that model be such that S(E!)=D.
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In fact, at is reasonable to combine the requirements
stated above concerning the interpretation and sortal range
on the existence predicate into an even stronger require-
ment on intended interpretations. The idea behind this
requirement is simply that every object is such that it
either has or lacks the extranuclear property of existence.
r, o object is of the wrong sort tn6 b x u0 have the property, and
no object is indeterminate with respect to that property.
This is not quite captured by the two requirements we have
laid out above, but it can be captured by requiring that
any intended interpretation be such that V(E!) be a total
-unction from D to [T,F"f such that, for any o€D, ( V(E
! )
)
( o
)
= T if and only if 0€D
.
e
That the intended interpretation of the existence
predicate is a total function rather than a partial
± unction differentiates this predicate from nuclear pred-
icates like "is blue" or "is prime" in an interesting
'Vay. This differentiation becomes even more interesting
when we look at other extranuclear predicates and the
sortal ranges of those predicates.
'jtfhen Parsons first introduces the distinction between
nuclear and extranuclear predicates and properties, he
gives as examples of extranuclear predicates "exists,"
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"is mythical," "i s fictionalnotio , is possible," " is impossi _
ble ’" " 1S th °USht ab0ut ^ Melnong," " is worshipped by
someone and "is oomplete" ((1978), p. i 7 . I8 ) . When we
look at this list and ask about the sortal ranges of the
various predioates, one fact is striking-all of these
predicates are such that we can predicate them of any
object without producing a sentence which is serially in-
correct. To say this in another way, all of the paradigm
extranuclear predicates listed by Parsons are such that
their sortal range is all objects. If we look at some
paradigm nuclear predicates, such as "is blue," "is tall,"
or "is kicked by Socrates," we can see that all of them
are such that their sortal range is not all objects but
only a proper subset of the set of all objects. This
makes it appear that in bringing together our theory of
sortally incorrect sentences and Parsons' theory of fic-
tional and nonexistent objects, we have provided a way of
distinguishing between nuclear and extranuclear predicates.
The nuclear predicates appear to be those with limited
sortal range, while the extranuclear predicates are those
whose sortal range includes all objects.
Unfortunately, one type of extranuclear predicate acts
as a counterexample to this claim. Parsons categorizes
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comparative predicates such as "being taller than" as
extranuclear. The sortal range of such predicates is not
the entire domain of objects (or, in this case, the entire
domain of ordered pairs of objects), for example, the
number seven is not the right sort of thing to either have
or lack the property of being taller than Richard Nixon,
bo if comparatives are really extranuclear predicates, the
method of distinguishing between nuclear and extranuclear
predicates based on the sortal range of such predicates
will not work.
But are comparatives really extranuclear predicates?
Parsons admits that such a classification bothers him, but
gives the following evidence for the classification:
* '
*
^
taller than" were a nuclear predicate,then I could not be taller than Hercule Poirot.For Hercule Poirot does not exist, and so I would
not have the property, being-taller-than-Poirot
.
And. since I do not occure in any of the AgathaChristie
. novels
, Poirot would not have the prop-
erty, being-such-that-Parsons-was-taller-than-him
.
bo on both counts, Poirot and I would not be re-lated by the taller than relation. If "taller
than" were nuclear, anyway. But Poirot is very
short, and I am at least of average tallness,
so doesn t this establish that I am taller than
him?.
.
. ((1978)
,
p. VI21)
The argument here is basically the following. Existing
objects are never related to nonexisting objects by
nuclear relations. But existing objects and nonexisting
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°^
9CtS are related V comparative relations. So compar-
a.i/e relations are extranuclear
.
I±
“hl ° 1S thS Case
' then our way of distinguishing
bStWeen nUCl8ar and extranuclear predicates on the basis
of sortal range will not work. But this argument for the
extranuclear status of comparatives rests on the assump-
tion that comparatives are rplafi „ , .e tions among objects. This
assumption is open to question.
Parsons notes that "there is a lot of evidence that
comparatives are much more complex than they might seem
at first," and that "both philosophers and linguists have
proposed that comparatives are the surface forms of fairly
complex 'deep structures '"( ( 1978 )
, p. VI22). He goes on
to mention one account of comparatives which, he says,
V" 'meanI
S
"x°has
h
a
nS this: " x is taller than
ness and l ha
certain quantity, u, of tail-l
, y has a certain quantity, v, of tall-ness, ana u exceeds v"
. .
. ( (1978 )
,
p
.
VI22)
If this analysis of comparatives is on the right track,
it supplies us with a way of avoiding the counterexample
comparatives appear to provide to our way of different-
ia uing nuclear from extranuclear predicates on the basis of
the sortal range of such predicates. For the distinction
cetween nuclear and extranuclear predicates is intended
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t0 SPPly °nly t0 Predicates which denote properties or
relations among objects. On the above sort of analysis
ci comparatives, comparatives do not denote properties
or relations among objects, but rather denote properties
or relations among properties of objects. Thus to say
that Parsons is taller than Hercule Poirot is not to say
That there is some nuclear relation between an existing
object and a nonexisting object, but rather to say that
there is a relation between a property had by an existing
object and a property had by a nonexisting object. These
properties both exist, so there is no violation of the
principle that no nuclear relation can hold between the
existing and the nonexisting. Further, there is no reason
to hold on this sort of analysis that comparatives are
either nuclear or extranuclear
. The sorts of things which
are nuclear or extranuclear are properties and relations
among objects, not properties and relations among proper-
ties. We might want to extend the distinction to proper-
ties and relations among properties, and if we did, I
see nothing problematic about saying that comparatives are
relations among properties which are nuclear relations.
But if comparatives are not predicates which denote
relations among objects, how can it be that some sentences
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using comparative predicates are sortally incorrect? After
all, this discussion originated because of the problem
caused by the number seven not being the right sort of
thing to either have or lar'ic .ack the comparative property of
being taller than Richard Nixon. Doesn’t thi,• u s require that
comparatives be interpreted sc; i a +i i m c as relations among objects?
I do,, t think so. If we unpack comparatives in the
way sketched out above, part of what is being said when
we say that the number seven is taller than Nixon is that
the number seven has a certain quantity of height. But
the number seven is not the right sort of thing to have
any quantity of height. The sortal incorrectness of such
a sentence would be explained along this line without
saying that comparatives are relations among objects.
If this explanation for why comparatives are not
properties or relations among objects is at all persuasive,
then we have reason to deny that comparative predicates are
not nuclear predicates. If we have reasons for saying
that comparatives are not extranuclear
,
then we can offer
the following as a characterization for what predicates are
nuclear and what predicates are extranuclear:
^•24) A predicate P is nuclear if and only if the
sortal range of P is a proper subset of the
4 . 25 )
set of all objects
A predicate P is extranuclear if and only if
the sortal range of P is the set of all
objects
itfhe „her or not this method of distinguishing nuclear from
extranuclear predicates will give the correct results in
cases of complex predicates or predicates formed by the
use of an abstraction operator or comprehension axiom is
a question beyond the scope of this chapter. It does work
in the proper way to differentiate the predicates used as
examples by Parsons to introduce and give intuitive backing
to the distinction. It also shows an interesting inter-
relation between the theory of sortal incorrectness and
Parsons' theory of nonexistent and fictional objects.
Finally, let us turn to some examples and see how
the semantic system given for L* works. Translating the
predicate "lived at 221B Baker Street" as "P
1
", the pred-
icate "has a mole on his back" as "P
2
", and the name
"Sherlock Holmes" as "a
1
"
,
the sentences
4.1) Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street
4.10) Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back
ill translate into the language L* asw
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^• 10 ')
Since the maximal account which establishes which nuclear
properties are had by Holmes tells us that he does have the
property of having lived at 221B Baker Street, sentence
4-1 ) Wl11 be evalua "ted as true. Since that maximal
account says nothing about whether or not Holmes has a
mole on his back, sentence 4.10') will be evaluated as
neither true nor false. Further, the translation of the
sentence
^•13) Sherlock Holmes does not have a mole on his
back
will simply be 4.10’) prefixed with the negation sign.
That sentence will also be evaluated as being neither true
nor false
.
Since we started this chapter with a question of how
we should treat definite descriptions, we should see how
the semantics treats a sentence like
4.26) The king of France is bald
Transla ting the predicate "is the king of France" as "P Q
"
and the predicate "is bald" as "P^" and using the analysis
of definite descriptions utilized in Chapter III, this
sentence can be translated into L* as
4*26'
)
Vy[Ax[P
3
x3x=y](P^y)
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I- this is how we trarmln+o +wns ate the sentence into L*
, the
sentence will be evaluated as false. Since there will be
.any nonexistent objects which have the property of being
the king of France, there will knot be a unique object which
property. Since, on our treatment of definite
descriptions, a definite description which fails to have
a unique reference results in a sentence which is false
(ln the Case of sil
"i:)le sentences), this reading of the
sentence makes 4.26) false.
However, we could follow Parsons and say that when-
ever anyone uses a definite description like that in 4.26),
that person is actually using it as shorthand for something
like "the existing king of France." If this is the case,
th en 4.26) should be translated into L* as
4.26") Vy[Ax[E : x&P
3
x]x=y] (
P
4x)
Since there is no object (existing or nonexisting) which
is an existing king of France, this sentence will be
evaluated (for reasons spelled out in the last chapter)
as being neither true nor false.
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CHAPTER v
GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS
Introduc ti nn
,
Thus far in this work, we have seen a fairly detailed
proposal for the semantics of serially incorrect sentences,
and have considered a suggestion for how the mechanisms
used in that account can be used to elucidate and modify
a theory of nonexistent and fictional objects. In this
final chapter, we will step back from the formal present-
ation, and attempt to tie up some loose ends, say some
things about the general picture of language painted by
this account, and say where we might wish to apply these
techniques next.
In the first section of this chapter, we will return
momentarily to the problem of sortally incorrect sentences.
The question which will be discussed in this section is
a basic one
—
given the semantic account of sortally incor-
rect sentences presented in Chapter III, do we have any
way of saying, for any sentence of a language
,
whether or
no b uhat sentence is sortally correct or sortally incor-
rect? It will turn out that the semantics does not give
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us any way of saying in general which sentences have what
serial status, so we will also discuss why this is so and
•Vhe.her or not this is a weakness of the account.
In the second section, we will look at how we can
tie the semantic accounts of sortally incorrect sentences
and sentences about nonexistent objects into a broader
theory of language. We will sion +11 also try to say something in
sec ^on about a picture such a broad theory of lan-
guage gives us about the nature of language.
In the third section, we will discuss the possibility
of giving an interpretation of some of the central notions
used m the semantic systems of Chapters III and IV in
-erms of psychological mechanisms of human beings. We
will also discuss briefly the importance of such claims
to the psychological reality of semantic systems.
In the final section, we will suggest that the sem-
antic methods used in this work are plausible candidates
or use ln supplying a semantic theory of metaphor. We
"ill try to briefly sketch why these methods appear to
be applicable to that problem, and to indicate what ques-
tions would be central in an attempt to give such an
account
.
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—~ Incorrectness
. Revisited
.
In Chapter III, we presented a semantics which gave
as one result that simple serially incorrect sentences
are neither true nor false. However, we never give a
general account in that chapter of which sentences are
so rtally incorrect and which are sortally correct. Since
the job of the semantics is to account for sortally in-
correct sentences, it would seem that the job has not been
done until we specify some method for determining, for
any sentence of a language, what the sortal status of that
sentence is.
One thing which we cannot do in attempting to say
which sentences are sortally correct and which are sortally
incorrect is to identify sortally incorrect sentences with
sentences lacking a truth-value. While it is true that
our paradigm sortally incorrect sentences are evaluated by
the semantics we presented as being neither true nor
false (after all, that was the purpose of the semantics),
it does not follow from this that all sentences which are
neither true nor false are sortally incorrect. If the
suggestions of Chapter IV are accepted, there will be a
host of counterexamples to this claim in sentences which
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predicate of an incomplete object
object neither has nor lacks, but
of the proper sort to either have
the sentence
a property which that
for which that object is
or lack. More concretely,
^•1) Sherlock Holmes has a mole on his back
would, on our analysis of that sentence, be a counterexam-
ple to the claim that lack of truth-value is coextensive
°r lden,
- lcal wlth sortal incorrectness. For on our anal-
ysis of 4.1), that sentence is neither true nor false.
But Holmes is certainly the sort of thing which can have
the property of having a mole on his back or lack that
property, so the sentence does not predicate of an object
a property for which that object is not of the proper
sort. So the sentence, even though it lacks a truth-value,
is not sortally incorrect.
Even if one does not accept the analysis of nonexist-
ent objects given in Chapter IV, there are grave problems
wi yh identifying sortal incorrectness with lack of truth-
/alue. These problems arise when we attempt to say what
she sortal status of complex sentences is to be. For
consider the sentence
4.2) Either the theory of relativity is shiny or
today is Friday
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According to the semantics given in Chapter III, this
sentence is true on Fridays, and without truth-value on
Other days. So if we identify sortal incorrectness with
lack of truth-value, we will be forced to say that sentence
A. 2 ) is serially incorrect on any day hut Friday, and
sortally correct on Fridays. And this conclusion is
clearly not one we would wish to accept.
This type of consideration leads Thomason to the con-
clusion that "the notion of sortal incorrectness does not
extend very well to complex sentences" ((1972), p. 243).
Thomason makes no attempt to say, for any sentence of the
language, whether that sentence is sortally correct or
sortally incorrect. Instead, he says, "the distinction is
to be regarded as informal, part of the data to be explained
rather than of the explanation" ( ( 1972
)
,
p. 209).
That the distinction between sortally correct and
sortally incorrect sentences does not extend to complex
sentences is not suprising if we consider our intuitive
characterization of such sentences. Intuitively, we said
that a sentence was sortally incorrect if that sentence
predicated of an object a property and the object was not
ohe right sort of thing to either have or lack that property.
The problem with extending this to complex sentences is
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obvious, for in complex sentences it is not at all clear
that we can say what, in that sentence, is the property
being predicated of the object of the sentence. In 4.2),
for example, we have two objects, the day which is today
and the theory of relativity; and two properties, being
shiny and being Friday. It makes sense to talk about the
object and the property being ascribed to that object in
the simple sentences which are parts of the complex sen-
tenoe
’
au " lt does not seem to make sense to talk about the
object or j^oe property of that sentence.
This type of consideration leads us to the conclusion
that, if sortal incorrectness and sortal correctness are
properties of sentences at all, they are not properties
of all sentences, but rather properties of simple, subject
predicate sentences. If we restrict our attention to
these, we can say, using the mechanisms of our theory,
which simple subject predicate sentences are sortally
correc t and which are sortally incorrect (relative to a
model). The definition will be relatively straightforward;
we will say that a sentence is sortally correct on a model
if and only if the object which is the referent of the
subject of that sentence is a member of the set which is
the sortal range of the predicate of that sentence, and
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that the sentence is serially incorrect otherwise. This
tells us which simple subject predicate sentences are
serially correct and which are serially incorrect, and that
is all the further we can go.
Ihe Kantian Conception of Language
.
One of the reasons given in Chapter II for attempting
to give a semantic account of sortally incorrect sentences
using a system which employs the devices of truth-value
gaps and supervaluations was that such an approach attempts
to explain the deviance of sortally incorrect sentences by
using general features of language. It was noted in
Chapter II that truth-value gaps and supervaluations are
used in attempts to give a semantics which will avoid the
semantic paradoxes, analyze sentences about future contin-
gencies
,
and explain the logic of obligation. By giving
an analysis of sortally incorrect sentences which utilizes
the same techniques as are used in attempting to solve
these other problems, we are in effect trying to fit our
account of sortally incorrect sentences into a framework
which would make sortal incorrectness an aspect or facet
of a more general feature of language.
The account of sortally incorrect sentences and
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nonexistent objects given here can, in fact, be seen as an
attempt to fit the semantics for such parts of language
mto a general theory of presuppositions developed along
the lines of Strawson (1956) by van Fraassen (1969, l 97 0a)
.
The general theory of presupposition, crudely put, i s
something like the following. Presupposition is a semantic
relation between sentences or statements. To say that
statement A presupposes statement B is to say that, for
A to be either true or false, B must be true. The stand-
ard sort of Strawsonian example of presupposition is that
the statement that the king of France is bald presupposes
that the king of France exists. If the presupposition (or
one of the set of presuppositions) of a sentence is false,
that sentence will be neither true nor false.
The account of sortal incorrectness given in Chapter
III can be viewed as a semantics which incorporates a
particular kind of presupposition, which we could call
sortal presupposition. To say that an object has a
property, on this interpretation of the theory, presupposes
that that object is the right sort of thing to have or
lack that property. When the object is the right sort of
thing, no sortal presupposition is false and, supposing
no other presupposition of the sentence is false, the
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sentence itself will be either true or false. When the
object is not the right sort of thing to have the property
however, the sortal presupposition behind the sentence is
raise, and the sentence itself is neither true nor false.
The account of fictional objects given in Chapter IV
can also be seen as an account of a special variety of
presupposition. When we say of an object that it has a
property, we not only presuppose that that object is the
right sort of object to have or lack that property, but
also that the object is determinate with respect to that
property. In the case of incomplete objects, it is this
oecond variety of presupposition which is violated, with
the result that such sentences are neither true nor false.
Thus the account we have given of sortaily incorrect
sentences and sentences about nonexistent objects can be
fit into an overall theory of a general feature of natural
language
. The question we will turn to now is what
picture that general theory of language paints concerning
the nature of language
.
The picture we get is of a language which, according
to van Fraassen, "is essentially incomplete, in the sense
that objective facts and conventions governing language do
not suffice to determine the truth-value of every sentence
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f (1970a), p. 14). The idea here is something ^^
The syntax of a language allows for the expression of
sentences which, for one reason or another, cannot he given
a truth-value based on the facts about the world and the
conventions governing language which are used to assign
truth-values to sentences. One reason for failure to
assign truth-value (and perhaps the only reason) is failure
of presupposition. So, for example, the syntactic rules
of a language allow for generation of a sentence by putting
together a noun phrase and a verb phrase in an appropriate
way, and following that rule we can get the sentence
^*3) The theory of relativity is shiny
But this sentence will only have a truth-value if the
theory of relativity is the right sort of thing to be shiny,
which it is not. The sortal presupposition of the sentence
is violated, leading to a lack of truth-value. This
reflects the incompleteness of our language in that the
interpretation of the phrase "is shiny" is not complete,
that is to say, there are certain objects to which the
predicate does not truly or falsely apply. This incom-
pleteness is reflected in the semantics of Chapter III by
interpreting "is shiny" as a partial function rather than
as a complete function.
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While language is, on this view, incomplete in the
eense that there are some sentences which fail to have a
truth-value, it is not incomplete with respect to its
Structure. How meanings are put together to get other
meanings is determinate, and is specified by the super-
valuation semantics.
The picture behind a supervaluation semantics is
something like this. The truth-values of sentences which
are complex (i.e., have as parts other sentences) are
determined by the truth-values of the component sentences
Wh^ h make UP th0Se sentences. But since language
is incomplete, some of these component sentences may be
themselves without truth-value. But even though the lang-
uage itself is incomplete, the structure of that language
is determinate, by which we mean that we can tell what the
truth-value of a complex sentence which has as a component
a sentence which fails to have a truth-value would be if
that truth-valueless component did have some truth-value.
The supervaluation model of semantics tells us that we
evaluate such complex sentences with truth-valueless com-
ponents by considering what van Fraassen calls the "ideal
extensions" of our incomplete language. An ideal extension
of a language is a language which is not, itself, incomplete;
33 ?
an ideal extension of an incomplete language win be a
truth Zl
^ Uke that in° 0raPlete langUage except that the
ue gaps of the incomplete language have been filledln
'.
F ° r inC °mplete language
, there will be a number
Of ideal extensions of that language, each of which fiUs
ln the truth -valu e gaps of the incomplete language in a
different way . The structures of these ideal extensions
are just what one would get in a standard, classical two-
valued logic, in fact, van Fraassen claims that "classical
logic is the theory of the ideal extensions" of a language
(U970b)
’ p - 64) - These ideal extensions, of course, are
the extended valuations of a language on a supervaluation
semantics
.
In evaluating a complex sentence with a truth-value-
less component, we look at what the value of that sentence
would be on all of the ideal extensions (extended valua-
tions)
. If the sentence receives the same truth-value on
all of these ideal extensions, then we say that the sen-
tence has that truth-value, if the truth-value of the
complex sentence varies from ideal extension to ideal ex-
tension, we say that the sentence itself has no truth-
value
.
The idea here is that if the truth-value of a complex
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sentence which has as a part a sentence which is neither
true nor false has a consistent truth-value on all ideal
extensions of the language, no matter what the truth-value
or the truth-valueless component is on that extension,
then the truth-value (or lack of truth-value) of that
component is irrelevant to the truth-value of the complex
sentence as a whole. In such sentences, the truth-values
of the component parts of the complex sentence which do
have a sruth-value
,
coupled with the determinate structure
of the semantics of the language, suffice to tell us what
uhe truth-value of the complex sentence is. In some cases,
such as disjunctions made up of one disjunct which is true
and ano oher which lacks a truth-value
,
the complex sentence
is true because the structure of our semantics tells us
that any disjunction with one true disjunct is true, and
the method of evaluating sentences, while incomplete, does
tell us that one of the disjuncts of that sentence is true.
A more startling case is presented by tautologies or
contradictions the component sentences of which all lack
truth-value. In such cases, it is the structure of the
semantics alone which dictates that the sentence is true
or false
.
If, on the other hand, the value of the complex
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sentence does vary from ideal extension to ideal extension,
this tells us that the truth-value of the sentence as a
whole does depend on the truth or falsity of the component
part or parts of the sentence which lack a truth-value. In
such sentences, neither the complete subpart of the language
nor the structure of the language can tell us the truth-
value of the sentence, and such a sentence is itself
neither true nor false, a further example of the incom-
pleteness of our language.
Van Fraassen refers to this view of the world as
ohe Kantian conception of language," for according to him
this view of language is analogous to Kant's view of the
world. According to Kant, says van Fraassen,
...we have experience of objects and events,
and in this experience these objects and events
are given as
.
part of the world... But what is the
status of this part of the world outside my
experience? According to Kant, the world is con-
stituted in my experience, so that this "outer"
part has the status of something yet to be
constituted. But this constitution is according
to definite rules --and, knowing these rules,
we know the general structure of the world not
yet constituted in experience. But what is real
here are those rules; they do not determine the
further construction uniquely, and what they
leave indeterminate is at this point neither
thus nor so ...(( 1970b )
,
p. 62)
Whether or not van Fraassen' s characterization of Kant's
view of the world is historically accurate is not a point
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at issue here. What is of interest is the parallel being
drawn between this sort of view of the world and the view
of language given by a semantics based on a presupposition
logic like the one we have constructed. Like the world of
experience, language is, on this view, essentially incom-
plete in a way which results in there being some sentences
which are neither true nor false. But while language is
essentially incomplete, the structure of language, repre-
sented by the semantic rules which tell us how the meanings
inter-relate and are built up, are determinate, just as
the rules which govern the structure of how we will in
the future experience the world are determinate. This
structure does not tell us how we should go about filling
up the holes which language has, but they do tell us
certain constraints which must be observed if we are to
attempt to fill in any of these holes. Further, the
structure tells us that certain sentences are true and
certain other sentences are false, not because of the way
that the language inter-re la tes with the world, but
because of the structure of language itself dictating that
those sentences have those truth-values.
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~s yc hological C onsiderations
.
The semantic systems presented in the previous
chapters have all been based on the paradigm of semantic
accounts of the formal languages of logic. Because of
this
,
the semantic systems have been basically mathematical
systems, and nothing has been said which would directly tie
this sort of semantic system to a theory of how speakers
of a language understand that language.
Whether or not this is a drawback in the semantic
systems depends, at base, on what one takes to be the job
of a semantic system. Among current practitioners of
semantics there are two very different views on this
question.
The first viewpoint, held by many philosophers, is
that psychological considerations are irrelevant to the
study of semantics. This viewpoint is ascribed by Thomason
to Montague. "According to Montague," states Thomason, "the
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of natural languages are
branches of methematics, not of psychology" (( 1974b), p. 2).
On this view, one who studies language should be concerned
with saying, in the most general fashion possible, what
the structure of language is. Psychological facts about
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the beings who use that language are as irrelevant to that
study as are psychological facts about mathematicians to
the study of mathematics.
A very different viewpoint is ascribed by Barbara
Fartee to most linguists. This view, she states, takes
"the central goal of linguistic theory to be an account
of what the native speaker of a language knows when he or
she knows a language, and of how such knowledge is aquired”
iv lt?3), p. l). On this view, linguistics is a branch of
psychology, and the goal of the linguist is to discover
facts about the structure of language (specifically, human
language) in order that those facts can be used to discover
facts about the human beings who speak that language.
Partee notes that the two approaches are not strictly
incompatible. There is no reason, she points out, for
saying that we cannot study the structure of human psychol-
ogy using mathematical tools, nor is there any reason to
think that a methematical system of human language cannot
be interpreted in a way that makes it into a psychological
theory. The different approaches do have some practical
effects, however. One who approaches the study of language
from the mathematical viewpoint will attempt to account
for the structure of all possible languages, while one who
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approaches the study of language from the psychological
viewpoint will attempt to restrict the structure ascribed
so language to account for all and only the languages
spoken by human beings. Hence the linguist is concerned
with constructing a grammar which is as restricted as
possible, while the philosopher will attempt to construct
a grammar which is as general as possible.
The semantic systems developed in this work grow out
of the tradition which takes the study of language to be
a part of mathematics, and not a part of psychology. How-
ever, I do not wish to say that psychological facts about
human beings are irrelevant to the semantic systems
proposed. What I consider to be relevant psychological
facts concern the possibility of interpreting the mechan-
isms used in the semantics in such a way that human beings
are capable of evaluating sentences in a way similar to
that spelled out in the semantics. For example, if we had
a semantic account of language which required the carrying
out of an infinite number of operations in order to evaluate
the truth-value of a sentence, the fact that human beings
have only finite mental capacity (a claim which I will
assume to be true) would count against that semantic
system. For whatever the mathematical merits of that
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I
system, the fact of human psychology concerning the finite
capacity of the brain would show that that system would
not accurately model the way human beings do in fact
-L-.rerpre o their language. While I don't think that a
oemantic theory is required to supply a psychological
interpretation of the mechanisms it uses, I do think that
it must be shown that the theory is not incompatible with
the psychological facts.
The concern of this section, then, is to see if we
can give a way of connecting the central mechanisms of
our semantic system to mechanisms which are plausible
candidates for being a part of the human psychological
makeup. The three semantic mechanisms I will be concerned
with are partial functions, which play the central role
in our semantic system of introducing the truth-value gaps
the notion of sorts, which is central both to the notion
of a sortal specification and to the account given of
quantification; and the notion of supervaluation, by
which the theory evaluates complex expressions.
In our semantic theory, we interpreted predicates as
partial functions, in the simpliest case as partial
functions from objects to truth-values. Is there any
sort of psychological interpretation of predicates which
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could lead us to say that this mathematical construction
reflects some psychological mechanism?
One such interpretation is given by Pavel Tichy ( 1971 ).
"One cannot understand the word 'dog'," says Tichy,
...unless one knows how to distinguish dogs
-Lrom o uher objects, unless one has a way ofdiscriminating between dogs and non-dogs. We
may well be quite in the dark about how we cometo possess such criteria and how we come to
share them with other people, but we can hardlyhelp assuming that we do possess and share them.For . what can my understanding of 'dog' consistin if not a link in my mind between the word
and a suitable dog-discriminating procedure 9
( (1971)
,
p. 273)
Tichy is here giving a psychological account of meaning--
he is not saying that we can represent meanings mathemat-
ically by discrimination procedures, but rather that the
psychological facts are that meanings of terms like "dog"
are discrimination procedures. Whether or not this account
is accurate in fact is not my concern here; for my purposes
it is sufficient to note that the claim that meanings
are discrimination procedures is not one which can be
ruled out by saying that human beings are psychologically
incapable of constructing such procedures. We do it all
the time, though the mechanisms for doing it may be
unknown
.
While we cannot draw a direct link between discrimin-
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ation procedures and partial functions, Tichy points out
that there is another way of thinking of these discrimin-
ation procedures. A discrimination procedure, says Tichy,
can, of course, he thought of as an identification pro-
cedure as well: as a procedure whose application to an
indi/idual results in identification of one of two objects,
say truth and falsehood" ((1971), p. 273). Such an
identification procedure can be mathematically represented
as a function from objects to truth-values, namely, that
function which maps all those individuals the application
of the identification procedure to which identifies the
object truth to the truth-value true, and all those the
identification procedure applies to to identify falsehood
to the truth-value false
.
This gives us a link between the mathematical notion
of a function and the psychological notion of an identif-
ication procedure. But can we get a link between such
procedures and partial functions? Of course we can, for
nothing about the nature of identification procedures
guarentees that such procedure^ always succeed in iden-
tifying something. We could have an identification pro-
cedure which when applied to some objects identified
either truth or falsehood, and when applied to other objects
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failed to identify anything at all. Using the same
bsfinition of a function that we used above for represent-
ing the identification procedure, such an imperfect iden-
tification procedure would be characterized by a partial
function
.
Let me say again that in the above I do not wish to
be read as saying that Tichy's identification of meaning
and discrimination or identification procedures is correct.
The only claim I am making is that we can use Tichy's
psychological account of meaning as a way of interpreting
the notion of a partial function in our semantics so that
that notion is not ruled out as a semantic mechanism which
is impossible in a semantics for human language because
of the psychology of human beings.
A second central feature of the semantic accounts
given in this work is the notion of a sort, which is
related to the notion of a sortal specification and the
theory of quantification . In this case, it is easy to
see that it is possible to give a psychological inter-
pretation of the mechanism, for attempts at giving such
an interpretation already exist in the literature.
One such attempt is given by Nino Cocchiarella (1978)
in an attempt to construct a logic which will provide a
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structure in which we can understand some of Piaget's
notions of conceptual development. The logic developed by
Cocchiarella is very much like the first order quantified
logic we saw in Chapter III with regard to its treatment
o
* quantification, and the notion of a sortal concept
plays a central role in this logic. "We shall speak of
sortal concepts, ' says Cocchiarella, "in the sense of
socio-gene tically developed cognitive abilities or capac-
ities to distinguish, count and collect or classify things"
((1978), p. 441). We can interpret both the notion of a
sortal specification and the sort of a quantifier in light
of this. The sortal specification function will be a
mapping of predicates to the objects which can be distin-
guished, counted and collected or classified by reference
to the property which is the referent of that predicate,
and the sort of a quantifier can be interpreted as a
restriction of the domain of that quantifier to a set of
objects which are all distinguished, counted and collected
or classified in the same fashion.
In fact, this interpretation of the notion of a sort
points to a possible way in which the mathematical and
psychological approaches to sortal notions can compliment
each other. A mathematical approach to sortal notions can
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produce a general framework like that seen in Chapter III
which tells how the sortal notions play a part in the
o uc ture of L.he semantic system. However, that system
says nothing about what the sortal system is like
,
that
is, what the conditions on the sortal specification func-
tion are to be. This investigation would be the task of
the psychologist. Once we have seen how sortal consider-
ations play a part in the semantics of a language, we can
then try to cut down the number of possible interpretations
or models for the language by restricting the form of the
sortal specification function in ways which mirror the
psychological facts about the conceptual systems of the
speakers of that language.
Finally, we must ask if the central notion of the
semantic systems in this work, the method of supervalua-
tions, falls prey to the problem of psychological im-
possibility. It may appear that it does, as that method
appears to be impossible for human beings who have finite
brains. The method of supervaluations tells us that to
discover the value of a complex sentence, we must see
what the value of that sentence is on all of the members
of the set of extended valuations. This set would seem
to be too large to be comprehended by beings with finite
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brains if the language we are dealing with has an interest-
ingly large number of sentences which are neither true
nor false. For in a simple sentential language with n
simple sentences which are neither true nor false, there
will be 2n different extended valuations relative to that
model of that language. The problem is compounded if we
consider what happens below the sentential level. For
given any predicate which is interpreted as a partial
function, if there are n objects in the domain of that
function for which it is undefined, there will be 2n
distinct extended valuations which represent different
ways of filling in the gaps caused by that one partial
function. So it would seem that there are just too many
extended valuations for beings with finite mental capacity
to be able to check the value of a sentence on all of those
extended valuations. If this is the case, then we can
never know the value of any sentence, which is certainly
false .
This problem can be dispelled, however, once we
distinguish between the general structure which tells us
how to evaluate any sentence, and the way in which we can
go about using that structure to evaluate a given sentence.
The set of extended valuations relative to a model may be
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°° la
-ge i>hat no human being could comprehend all of them,
-ut in evaluating the truth-value of any particular sen-
tence, one need only consider the set of extended valuations
which differ with respect to the components of that sen-
tence. For example, if we had a sentential logic with an
number of atomic sentences, only two of which, P
and Q, are given a value by a model, there will be an in-
finite number of distinct extended valuations relative to
that model. But if we wish to evaluate a sentence like
" ( P&Q ) vR ) " , we need only consider two of those extended
valuations--one of which assigns R the value true, and
the other of which assigns R the value false. Since we
know the rules which govern the form of any extended
valuation, we know that all of the extended valuations
assign to P and Q the same truth-value, and all of them
assign some truth-value to R. So in looking at two of
the infinite set of extended valuations relative to the
model, we know that we have checked all of the possible
truth-values for the complex sentence in question. While
the other extended valuations will differ in some ways
from the two we have looked at, they will not differ from
one or the other of these extended valuations in the value
they assign to the complex sentence in question. So even
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if there are an infinite number of extended valuations
relative to a model, in evaluating a particular sentence
<ve need not look at all of them. Further, since we know
^he structure which all of the set of extended valuations
must have, we can use facts about that structure to discover
what the value of a sentence will be on all of those ex-
tended valuations without having to go through them one at
a time. This, for example, is the way in which we know
that all tautologies are true on all extended valuations.
We know this not because we checked the value of the taut-
ologies in all of the members of the set of extended
valuations, but because we know from facts about the
structure of all of these extended valuations that all
tautologies are true on all of the extended valuations.
Because of this, I do not think that the method of super-
valuations falls prey to the criticism of psychological
impossibility.
The mechanisms of the semantics, therefore, do not
seem to fall prey to the claim that they are psychologically
impossible as a basis for a semantics for natural language.
Of course, nothing that I have said has shown that any
of these mechanisms are part of the psychological basis
of language. To make that claim would require that one
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supply positive arguments. Nor do I think that the question
is not an interesting one, or one which is not important
to the claims of this theory to correctness as a semantic
account of natural language. My claim is not that the
semantic systems presented in this work reflect the psycho-
logical makeup of the speakers of natural language, but
rather that these systems provide a plausible mathematical
model for the structure of natural language.
New Direc tions
.
Throughout this work it has been argued that the
account of sortally incorrect sentences and sentences about
fictional and nonexistent objects presented here have the
advantage over some other theories in that they were part
of a general theory of language. If the mechanisms which
are used in this semantic system are really general
features of the semantics of natural language, one would
expect that there are other problems to which they could
profitably be applied. In this section, I will suggest
another area in which these techniques can, I think, be
expected to produce interesting results: in the construc-
tion of a theory of metaphor.
We can back into the problem by considering one of our
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paradigm sortally incorrect sentences,
4.3) The theory of relativity is shiny
Throughout this work, we have claimed that 4.3) is a
deviant sentence, and the semantics we developed was an
attempt to say what that deviance consisted in. But there
are conceivable occasions of use in which the sentence
would seem natural. If one were, for example, reading a
poem entitled "An Ode to Einstein," and one were to read
as a part of that poem sentence 4.3), it might well seem
that not only was 4.3) not deviant in that context, but
that it was just the right thing to say. If pressed by
someone who pointed out that the theory of relativity was
not the right sort of thing either to be shiny or not to
be shiny, one might well agree, and then point out that the
sentence was not being used to make a factual claim, but
was rather being used as a metaphor.
That a semantic system which accounts for sortally
incorrect sentences might be used to account for metaphor
may seem obvious, if for no other reason than that often
the only difference between a metaphor and a sortally
incorrect sentence is the context of use of the sentence.
The approach to sortally incorrect sentences taken in this
work seems particularly appropriate for extension to a
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theory of metaphor, for metaphors also seem to be sentences
which are neither true nor false, a result which could be
easily obtained in this framework.
However, a theory of metaphor would have to say much
more about metaphorical sentences than just that they are
neither true nor false. At least, such a theory would have
to say what it is about metaphors which gives them what-
ever semblance of meaning they have
.
While I don’t have an answer to that question, I will
sketch a suggestion of a possible answer which can be
given within the framework of a picture of language given
earlier in this chapter.
We begin with a picture of language as incomplete, at
least to the extent that there are sentences of the lan-
guage which are neither true nor false. On our model, this
lack of truth-value is brought about, in the simpliest
cases, by interpreting a predicate as a partial function
which is undefined for the object which is the referent
of its subject. Metaphors like 4.3) will be sentences
which lack a truth-value for this reason.
In this framework we can view metaphors as attempts
to extend language, to fill in some of the gaps which make
language incomplete. On this view, sentence 4.3) uaken
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metaphorically would be understood as making the suggestion
that we extend the partial function which is the inter-
pretation of the predicate "is shiny" in such a way that
°hat function now maps the object which is the theory of
relativity, for which it is now undefined, to the value
^rue . Metaphor
,
on this view, would be a truly creative
use of language, in which the metaphor functions as a
way of creating extensions of our incomplete language by
suggesting ways of filling in the gaps.
This suggestion, of course, only presents a picture,
and could itself be viewed as little more than a metaphor.
We talk of metaphors as being appropriate or inappropriate,
apt or bizarre, and say a host of other things about meta-
phors which would have to be explained or accounted for
by an adequate theory of metaphor but which have not been
touched upon here. I have no idea how to account for such
features of metaphor; if I did, I would be presenting the
theory instead of merely suggesting how one might start in
developing such a theory. But I do think that the theory
of the semantics of sortally incorrect sentences and sen-
tences about nonexistent objects given here provides a
framework within which such a theory of metaphor might be
developed, and that the developement of such a theory
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within such a framework is an enticing possibility.
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